

RELIGION IN LIFE

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The Fatal Apostasy of the Modern Church

EDWIN LEWIS

MODERN theological liberalism undoubtedly rendered the church an important service. It helped to break the strangle-hold of terms and phrases which had become in all too many cases merely empty shibboleths. It re-established, after the fashion of the thirteenth century, the rights of the intellect in the evaluation of the things of the spirit. It garnered for the use of the church the rich harvest of scholarship in many fields—biblical, historical, sociological, psychological. It served notice to a world too often skeptical that a man could believe in Jesus and at the same time be fully aware of all the amazing kaleidoscopic changes occurring in contemporary life. For such a service we cannot but be grateful. Nevertheless, all is not well with us. Liberalism has not brought us to the Promised Land. We may have gained a battle, but the campaign is still on, and there is more than a suspicion that the gain made at one point involved a serious loss elsewhere. We yielded positions whose strategic significance is becoming more and more manifest. We so stressed the Bible as coming to us in "the words of men" that the sense in which it is also "the word of God" has become increasingly vague. We so freely allowed the influence of contemporary forces in the development of doctrine as to have endangered the continuity of that living core of truth and reality for which contemporary forces were but the *milieu*. We exposed all the delicate nuances of spiritual experience to the cold dispassionate gaze of psychology, until it has become a question whether psychology of religion is not in danger of destroying the very thing it lives by. And in particular we were so determined to recover for the church "the human Jesus" that we lost sight of the fact that the church is the creation of "the divine Christ," or at least of faith in Christ as divine. Have we sown the wind, and is the whirlwind now upon us?

THE GOSPELS AND THE CHURCH

The *Hibbert Journal* symposium of a generation ago, "Jesus, or Christ?" was a sign of the times. It showed very clearly the results of the "Jesus-study" of the latter part of the nineteenth century. It prophesied an increasing emphasis on "the religion of Jesus," a prophecy which has been abundantly fulfilled. In many quarters of the modern church it is now taken for granted that "the Jesus of the Gospels" is the primary datum

for Christianity. This would not be disturbing if Jesus were given his complete significance, but before he can become a datum he must be passed through the alembic of critical investigation. By that time, he has become a hardly recognizable Figure, as Schweitzer himself—notwithstanding his own arbitrary construction—so vigorously contends. But such as he is, he is given to us. We are asked to suppose that one who may have been anything from the energetic “go-getter” of Bruce Barton to “the Man of Genius” in the Middleton Murry sense, is the adequate explanation—plus certain “tendencies” in the time—of the genesis of Christianity and of its historical growth. Let us therefore “return to Jesus.” Let us eliminate from Christianity everything not agreeable to the “Portrait” we have had re-constructed for us. Let us be done with the majestic Figure of the Epistles. Let us admit that the Prologue of the Fourth Gospel, and the Kenosis passage in Philippians, and the daring flights of Colossians, and the introduction to Hebrews, represent simply so much mythologizing—understandable enough in the circumstances, but corresponding to nothing in the world of actual reality. Having thus arrived at “the essence of Christianity”—Harnack’s familiar grouping, “the Fatherhood of God, the value of the soul, the righteousness of the heart, and the commandment of love”—let us “re-think” the whole Christian enterprise in the appropriate terms. Let us be realistic. Let us frankly change our direction. Let us abandon definitely and forever the whole concept of the supernatural; and as men who will tolerate no illusions, comforting and inspiring though they may be, let us set ourselves anew to the church’s unfinished task. Which is—*what?*

But perhaps the case is not so simple as it seems. Say what we will, the stubborn fact remains that the Gospels are themselves the product of a community which already had “seated Christ at the right hand of God,” and that, failing that audacious act of their mind and heart, we had had no Gospels at all. If the dangerous expression may be permitted, it was “Christ” who saved “Jesus” to us. That is to say, although Jesus was saved to posterity by “the Christian community,” that community organized itself not around the fact that a man named Jesus had lived and taught and wrought and died, but around the belief that in that same Jesus had “dwelt all the fullness of the Godhead bodily.” But for that belief, Jesus would have disappeared from human ken, for not one single unimpeachable reference to Jesus of any independent value do we possess from the first century outside of the Christian literature. We may object to the faith of that early community. We cannot but admit, however, that it is to

this community that we owe the Synoptic Gospels. They produced for us and saved to us the very documents by which we propose to discredit their dynamic faith! They produced them, used them, loved them, circulated them, at the same time that they were integrating their Lord with the very being of the Godhead, saying of him that he *is* the Spirit, that he *is* the Ever-living One, that by him the invisible God is apprehended, and nowhere is there the least evidence that they felt any incongruity in doing this. By the Gospels they accounted for their historical origin and justified their claims, but the community preceded the Gospels. There was a Church of the Living Christ before there was any attempt made to collate the traditions respecting Jesus. Apply to the Gospel Portrait all the historicism and psychologism you will: you cannot thereby get rid of that confident faith in a Redeemer-God which is the sole reason why we have the Portrait at all. Take the Synoptic Gospels, discriminate their sources, lay bare their inconsistencies and contradictions, explain away their mighty works, find the Rabbinic parallels of their teachings, "reduce" Jesus to what level you will—and you have not destroyed Christianity thereby, because Christianity was born not of these documents but of contact with the Personality whom the documents attempt to describe. And be it added that although in the order of *time* the contact with him was "in the flesh" first and "in the spirit" second, nevertheless the *fundamental* contact was the second because it was through that that the first came to its full understanding and appreciation.

The Fourth Gospel therefore receives its justification. No attack on its historicity can rob it of its significance as a permanent obstacle in the way of those who, having duly sifted out of the Synoptic Gospels all subjectivism and supernaturalism, would take what is left as sufficient both to explain and to perpetuate Christianity. It would almost seem as though the Ephesian seer who wrote "the spiritual Gospel" anticipated the possibility of this proposal, and set himself the task of providing for its defeat. In any case, he re-wrote the Gospel history in the light of what had for long been the central conviction of the church, namely, that in a human life that had been "full of grace and truth" something of God's own self, called by him the eternal "Word," had "become flesh"; that the ending of that life in a shameful death was not the ending of the Word; that this Word, visualized to men in that perfect human life, was now active in the church as "Spirit"; and that he who now thinks of God and deals with God may think of him and deal with him as One in whose very bosom lay "the only-begotten Son." It is, of course, open to anyone who insists on it to say that in thus

re-writing the Gospel history "John" took such liberties with the "facts" as renders his work historically worthless. But one who says that will necessarily assume the completeness and the adequacy of the Synoptic Gospels. *What is the basis of that assumption?* Also, he will deny any absolute interpretive significance to the experience of the church in its most fruitful period, namely, the beginning. *And what is the basis of that denial?*

THE ORIGINAL CHRISTIAN MESSAGE

The Christian "facts" are not to be limited to what fell between Bethlehem and Calvary. What was then said and done was but part of a larger whole—of a movement taking place within the very being of God. Men believed that this was implied in the indubitable historical and experiential facts. They therefore wrought out the idea of "pre-existence" as applied to their Lord, identified him as the permanently active occasion of that life of fellowship in which the church as they knew it was constituted, and from this were led on step by step to formulate finally the doctrine of the Trinity. It is easy enough to complain that this was to transform "the simple Gospel" into a *Weltanschauung*, yet we have no evidence that the so-called simple Gospel was ever preached, even at the beginning, apart from at least some of the elements of this philosophy. Not that unlettered apostles suddenly found themselves possessed of a full-blown philosophy that answered all questions in the world and out of it. But they were making affirmations of such an astounding character as that inevitably before long took to themselves coherence, and the original Christocentric religion became a Christocentric philosophy.

As to this, the New Testament is the evidence, and the New Testament reflects the life and faith of the primitive church. Here we read of a God who had an eternal purpose respecting mankind, a purpose that had to do specifically with delivering men from the power of sin and bringing them to holiness. We read that such a deliverance could not be an arbitrary act upon the part of God, since in all that he does he must be true to the demand of his own holy nature. We read that God himself was so constituted that he could enter in the most intimate and personal way into the stream of human life both to experience all its limitations and struggles and to establish within the stream the principle of its purification, and that the point of this entry was the man Jesus, who would never have existed at all but for the eternal purpose of God. We read that the ensuing intimacy of relationship between the Eternal God and this human life was such that the experience of the man thereupon became the experience of God

—which makes it actually true to say that the Infinite knows finitude, that the All-Holy knows moral trial, that the Creator knows creatureliness, that the Deathless knows death. We read that therefore something has “happened to” God which makes his relation to men different from what it would have been had this *not* “happened.” And we read that henceforth in speaking of God men may speak of him as One who was in Christ reconciling the world unto himself: therefore the Christian God is God suffused with all the qualities men saw in Jesus, and a God so suffused and transformed is also that divine Christ who is the very source and center of the life of the redeemed.

What then is the object of Christian faith? Not a man who once lived and died, but a Contemporary Reality, a God whose awful holiness is “covered” by one who is both our representative and his, so that it is “our flesh that we see in the Godhead,” that “flesh” which was historically Jesus of Nazareth but is eternally the divine Christ whose disclosure and apprehension Jesus lived and died to make possible. I do not deny for a single moment that this overwhelming conception lent itself to all sorts of crudities of expression, impossible analogies, and gross materialisms. But he is blind indeed who cannot see what the New Testament is trying to say. Though language were not adequate to the thought, we can see what the thought aimed to be. It was that thought that created and sustained the church, and the church languishes to-day because it has substituted that thought with one of lesser power as it is of lesser truth.

THE REPUDIATION OF CHRISTIANITY

Many reasons are alleged for the modern turning away from Christianity as thus understood. Not one of these reasons can touch its intrinsic credibility. A philosophical view that precludes it is quite possible. A philosophical view that allows for it is equally possible. Why is the first view so generally accepted? Because Christianity, with the view of things it necessarily calls for, makes such a terrific onslaught upon human pride. We would fain be self-sufficient, and this means that we are not. We would fain be the masters of our fate and the captains of our souls, and this says that our fate is in another's hands and that our souls are not our own but have been bought with a price. We do not like Christianity, not because it is intrinsically incredible but because it is so vastly humiliating. We do not *want* it to be true that “the Son of Man came to give himself a ransom for many,” and so we find “critical” reasons for doubting that the words were ever spoken—as though by proving that Jesus did not say them we

should prove that they were not true! We do not *want* it to be true that "the Word became flesh and dwelt among us": therefore we get rid of one of the most profound, heart-searching, and revolutionary truths ever uttered—the truth which must always be the touch-stone of any proposed Christology—by the simple device of labeling it "Platonism." We do not *want* it to be true that "through one act of righteousness the free gift came unto all men to justification of life": this being so, we ask by what right Paul "distorted" the simple Gospel of brotherhood and service and good will by introducing into it misleading analogies from temple and law-court.

No; we do not like Christianity. We do not like its cosmic audacity. We do not like its moral pessimism. We do not like the way it smashes the beautiful orderliness of our metaphysical systems. We do not like its uncompromising insistence on the possibility of our being damned souls, whose only hope is in the sovereign grace of God—a God who voluntarily endured self-immolation as the cost of his own graciousness. We be *men*—men whose prerogative it is to stand before God, face him without a tremor, and *demand*; not slaves whose duty it is to kneel before him with covered face, humbly and reverently and gratefully to *accept*. Away with this doctrine of grace! Away with this whole mythology of Incarnation! Away with this outworn notion of Atonement! Make way for emancipated man!

THE PLIGHT OF THE CHURCH

But in this pride lies our shame, our weakness, and our defeat. What has it done for us? What has it done for the church—at least, for evangelical Protestantism? How far have we gotten with our various substitutes? Look over our churches: they are full of people who, brought up on these substitutes, are strangers to those deeper experiences without which there had been no New Testament and no Church of Christ. Thousands of clergymen will go into their pulpits next Sunday morning, but not as prophets. There will be no burning fire shut up in their bones, by reason of which they cannot forbear to speak. Those who come to listen will not be brought face to face with eternal verities. Hungry sheep will look up, but will not be fed. Men harassed with a thousand problems and seeking not inexperienced advice on how to solve them but the sense of another world in whose light they can see this one and find strength to cope with it and remold it nearer to the heart's desire, will go away as impotent as they came for anything the preacher has to say. Grievous is the hurt of the daughter of God's people, and slight is the proffered healing. They go to

Gilead, and there is no balm. They go to the fountain of waters, and they find there a broken cistern. They cry for bread, and behold a stone.

And to a large extent, this plight of the church is traceable to a weakening of its dogmatic basis. Whether the phrase, "humanitarian Christology," is defensible or not is a question. Unless Christ is conceived as one who "stands on the divine side of causality in effecting redemption," it is difficult to see why we need a doctrine of him at all. If Jesus is not specifically related to God's eternal purpose to enter sacrificially the stream of our humanity, to the end that he might thereby change its direction and set it flowing toward himself, then we no more need a doctrine of Jesus than we need a doctrine of Jeremiah or a doctrine of Paul. There is no permanent resting-place between *some form* of the Logos Christology and a "humanitarian Christology" (allowing the phrase) which in effect surrenders the whole idea of direct divine sacrificial saving activity. And what we mean theologically by a Logos Christology we mean practically by a Christ-centered religion rather than a "religion of Jesus." If the emulation of "the religion of Jesus" were presented as the possible end of a Christ-centered faith, that would be different. What we are actually doing, however, is supposing that unregenerate men can be "like Jesus"! Even a casual acquaintance with great sections of modern Protestantism makes it evident that it has departed very widely from the Christocentric emphasis. We must recover that emphasis, or perish. The divine Christ saved the human Jesus from disappearing, and if the human Jesus is to continue to mean for men all that he should, it must still be through the divine Christ. Christ must continue to save Jesus!

It is not that men cannot live "the good life" without faith in the divine Christ. It is not that there cannot be a profound appreciation of the character of Jesus without it. But Christianity does not consist simply in the good life and in moral appreciation and endeavor. It *is* this, of course. One of the incredible suppositions of our day is that the only persons who are interested in the wellbeing of their fellows are the so-called "humanists." No one who really knows what Christianity has done for the world could possibly make that supposition. It is sadly true that on countless occasions Christians have failed to recognize the logic of their own belief. They have professed to be "sons of God," and they have not seen that because of that they must also be "brothers" of their kind. It is that failure which justifies many of the savage strictures of the "humanistic" critic of Christianity. But the other side is there, as anyone may see who will take the trouble to read Charles Loring Brace's *Gesta Christi*. Did the

mediæval monks do nothing but sing psalms and pray—or squander and carouse? They who answer “Yes” simply do not know all the story. Was “the evangelical movement” entirely without social results? Were there no devoted Churchmen in Great Britain in the last century known as “Christian Socialists,” lay and cleric—Kingsley, Maurice, Hare, Hughes, Ludlow, Neale? Have not Weber and Troeltsch written of “the Protestant ethic,” and not altogether to its discredit? Has our time seen three men more thoroughly committed to “historical” Christianity than William Temple, W. R. Inge, and the late Charles Gore, and would anyone even suggest that they were not men of the clearest social vision? The sacramentarianism of the Anglo-Catholics may cause us some anxiety at certain points, but before you denounce them too severely, read of the sacrificial service that many of them are rendering the poor of their land. Certainly we need “humane religion,” but what could possibly be more “humane” than a Christocentric religion that accepted its own implicates? If anyone has surrendered a “high” doctrine of Christ in the interests of “the social Gospel,” then he has fully realized neither the meaning of the doctrine he has surrendered nor the staggering demands that his message makes both on himself and on others.

Yes; Christocentric religion means human devotion carried to its ultimate issue—say a Damien with a crucifix on his breast the while he dresses the rotting stumps of a leper, a Damien who, as R. L. Stevenson says in his noble defense of the man, “shut to with his own hand the doors of his own sepulcher.” But it means an “experience” as well—an experience falling within that “unleaguering fortress” of the innermost soul “whose keys are at the cincture hung of God,” and which is something one can better know for oneself than describe to another. And this experience, whence comes it? It comes of *belief*. If we are going to psychologize religion, well and good; but by what imaginable psychological process can there be “spiritual experience” completely independent of all intellectual assent? It were absurd to say that Christianity is *only* credal; to say that it is in no sense credal would be equally false. And to say that “it does not matter what one believes” so long as one “lives the good life” and “has a religious experience” reveals rather an amazing *naïveté* than any profound insight into the life-movement.

But what *does* the modern church believe? The church is becoming creedless as rapidly as the innovators can have their way. The “Confession of Faith”—what is happening to it? Or what about the “new” confessions that one sees and hears—suitable enough, one imagines, for, say, a fraternal

order. And as for the Apostles' Creed—"our people will not say it any more": which means, apparently, that "our people," having some difficulties over the Virgin Birth and the resurrection of the body, have elected the easy way of believing in nothing at all—certainly not in "the Holy Catholic Church." So we are going to allow them to be satisfied with "The Social Creed of the Churches," quite forgetful of the fact that unless the church has a "religious" creed besides a "social" creed the church as such will cease to exist long before it has had time to make its "social" creed effective in the life of the world. "But the social creed *is* religious." Yes; but has its religion proved dynamic enough, impelling enough, to maintain itself at the high point—the Himalayanly high point—necessary to make its creed effective? The church has set itself to do more at the very time that it is lessening its power to do anything.

"WHAT MUST WE DO TO BE SAVED?"

The church, especially the American evangelical churches, must re-enthrone Christ, the divine Christ, in the life and thought of the people, or cease to exist. Not that the church merely as an institution is the necessary desideratum. But the church in the high New Testament sense of "the body of Christ"—this *must* be saved for the sake of the world. Here is the world's one redeeming force because here is the world's one redeeming message—if the message be *complete*. It is that completeness whose lack is the secret of our impotence. Can we recover it? Nay rather, do we here highly resolve that we *will* recover it? Let us be done with compromise, and let us affirm—affirm magnificently, affirm audaciously. Let us affirm God—his unchanging love for men, his unchanging hatred of sin, his sacrificial presence in all the life and work of Jesus. Let us affirm Christ—Christ as the meaning of God, Christ as what God *is* in virtue of that mysterious "kenosis" by which he made himself one with a human life, and at the same time that he was doing the utmost he could do for men endured the worst—a Cross—that men could do against him. Let us affirm the Spirit—the divine concern to bring to bear upon the hearts and consciences of men the impact of what God in Christ has done and is forever doing on their behalf, to the end that they may be moved to repentance, to that faith which ensures forgiveness, to that love which brings moral empowerment, and to that surrender of the will which makes God's purposes their purposes. Let us affirm the church—the community of the redeemed, those who in all their life seek the regnancy of the spirit of Jesus, carrying on and extending the mystery of the Incarnation against that day when God,

the Christ-God, shall be all and in all. Let us affirm the Kingdom—the Christianizing of life everywhere, children with straight backs and happy faces, women released from drudgery and set free for creative living, industry conducted for the good of all, war and kindred evils done away, racial antipathies lost in a universal brotherhood, the rich heritage of culture made available to the last man. O there is no limit to the affirmations, and, better still, no limit to the dynamic needful to make them effective, once we grasp the profound structural coherence of Christianity, the wide sweep of its thought, the absoluteness of its demands, the revolutionary results of its consistent application. “That in all things he, who is the image of the invisible God, might have the pre-eminence.”

“O Church of Rome, would that thy creed were sound!” So cried Newman, distracted, uncertain, seeking a light amid the encircling gloom. But his lament was too narrow in its reference. O Church of Christ *everywhere*, on the avenue, down the side-street, in the town-square, at the country cross-roads, would that thou believedst as thou should! For of believing comes feeling, and of feeling comes being, and of being comes doing.

Not willingly does one write what has here been written. It may be so easily misunderstood, by friend and by foe alike. If there be any extenuation, it is in the prophet’s simile: “The lion hath roared: who will not fear? The Lord Jehovah hath spoken: who can but prophesy?”

Karl Barth Must be Heard

WILHELM PAUCK

KARL BARTH has written another book. This is by no means an ordinary event as it happens more or less frequently in the academic and particularly in the academic theological world. Few books of *this* man have been academic affairs. Almost with every new publication, he succeeded in stirring his readers to vivacious discussion, to enthusiastic support as well as to violent criticism. And this in spite of the fact that he claimed with each new book to express the same conviction in another way than before. Impartial readers will be inclined to believe that Barth underwent significant changes of thought, since the day when he emerged from a more or less obscure pastorate to become the spokesman of a Protestant revolution within Protestantism. But he himself is definitely convinced that—minor corrections excepted—he has presented the same concern from the first until now.

All this applies to the most recent book which has just come from the press. It is no new work, for it is nothing else but the first part of the first volume of *Dogmatics* in a new edition.¹ But just as the second edition of the famous *Commentary on Paul's Epistle to the Romans* was an entirely new work as compared with the first one, no page being left as it was before, so has this new dogmatics been entirely rewritten. It promises to be the *opus magnum* of the beginner of the theology of crisis. For the stately volume which is now at hand (531 pages!) is only the *first half* of the first volume of a work which is planned to comprehend five volumes!

I have read these five hundred pages with an attention which only few books ever have commanded me to give to them. I have been deeply challenged as the whole Protestant world will be when the full impact of the new words of Barth will be made known to it. All of us are here called to order, and we will have to listen. No one who thinks that he understands what Barth's concern is and who has made up his mind before, *pro* or *contra*, will be excused. For here is a voice which must be heard, and no one who hears it, can be silent about it. It forces controversy upon us. Whosoever has the future of the church at heart will have to take part in it. The days when we discussed the merits or demerits of the theology of crisis, or when we broke our heads over its "weird dialectics," are over. Friends or foes of Barth can no longer excuse themselves from very active discussion by taking notice—in a friendly, or indifferent, or hostile manner

¹ Karl Barth, *Kirchliche Dogmatik*, Vol. 1, 1. München, 1932.

—of the corrective dialectical theology with its challenge to take God seriously in his divinity. Conversations about God and discussion of the report of the Laymen's Appraisal Committee on Missions will be worthless until Barth's now mature theology is taken into consideration.

You will ask me for the reasons by which I could justify such predictions. Here they are:

1. Karl Barth declares—and this surely is not new—that the church has only one *raison d'être*, namely to proclaim the word of God, to give testimony to the revelation of God in Jesus Christ. The only message which he deems to be the valid message of the church is the gospel of the Bible. Theology, as he understands it, is therefore the endeavor to measure the preaching of the church at the one adequate criterion: the word of God, as given in the Bible. It is a fact, he says, that the church is confronted by the Bible and this fact and nothing else is the only reason and the only excuse for preaching and for theological labor. He quotes once from my book and only because this reference is indeed of fundamental significance, I repeat it here together with his remarks. He quotes the following sentences: "It is important to remember . . . that the difference between modern preaching in America and Protestant Europe is fundamental. The American sermon is seldom biblical and expository. Its reference to the Scripture is in the majority of cases casual or superficial. It deals generally with 'religious' topics. The European Protestant, however, follows the old tradition of preaching the 'word' whether he is affiliated with liberal or orthodox theology."² And these are Barth's remarks with respect to this observation, which cannot be questioned: "If this . . . is generally correct, then the confrontation of the church with the Bible which I presuppose as a fact, is no longer taking place in America. The problem which is caused by this confrontation therefore does not exist. Then I may not expect either interest or understanding for . . . the whole of this dogmatics from the descendants of the Pilgrim fathers. But perhaps they too have at least a dark recollection that the preaching of the church may stand in a significant relation to the Bible. And surely it will once also happen among them, that to some the 'religious' topics will seem so stupid and insipid that that dark recollection will be transformed into a bright one" (p. 268).

May both the modernists and the fundamentalists be warned! None of them, as he reads these words, is permitted either to rejoice or to be provoked. Barth has no intention of restoring the doctrine of the literal inspiration of the Bible (although the new dogmatics does not yet contain

² W. Pauck, *Karl Barth, Prophet of a New Christianity?* New York: Harper & Brothers, 1931. P. 99.

a chapter on the theological doctrine of the Holy Scripture). On the contrary, he desires that the Bible be continuously the subject of free critical investigation. He is convinced that when all has been said that can be said as to the history of the text or as to the cultural influences to which its content may and must have been submitted, the message of the Bible will still be perfectly and unavoidably clear: God has revealed himself to men in Jesus Christ. His revelation is an event, to which the prophets and the apostles bear witness. We can either accept it or reject it, but if we make the latter choice, we are no longer in the Christian Church, even if we should call ourselves Christians. And actually there is probably no congregation which does not allot a significant, if not central place to the Bible.

The first challenge of Barth is therefore—and I assure my readers, it is made more strongly than ever before—the challenge of the peculiar content of the Bible, of its gospel concerning the revelation of God in Jesus Christ.

2. Because this central theme is brought out so clearly, all true Christian theology is now understood as exegesis. (For this reason, Barth discusses, at the very beginning of his own theology, the doctrine of the trinity, and he describes it most convincingly, I think, as an adequate and necessary exegesis of the biblical message concerning the divine revelation in Jesus Christ.) In other words, Christian theology cannot devote itself to the development of a religious world-view or to the construction of a religious philosophy of life, even if its elements should be borrowed from the world of Christian thought. It is at this point, that Barth's new book marks a stage in the history of Barthianism. Up to now, Barth himself had given both his friends and his enemies ample opportunity to understand him on the basis of a certain view of life in which the word "crisis" occupied a prominent place. In this country in particular, the discussion of the Barthian theology has largely been concentrated upon its anthropological features. We have accustomed ourselves to deal with the "qualitative difference between time and eternity," with the "tension" which marks our existence as unredeemed, with the tragic outlook upon life which results from the recognition of God as the "wholly other." Some of us have applauded this "religious" philosophy and others have despised it. Certainly Barth himself as well as his friends, notably Brunner, have furthered such an understanding of their concern by their own words and pronouncements. They themselves have invited us to discover in their teachings two interests which seemingly could be reconciled only with difficulty. Because we found in their theology first of all this dark conception of the unredeemed

life, the teaching of the crisis as caused by the realization of the full and radical transcendence of God, we concluded that they affirmed the authority of Christian tradition and of the Bible in particular, in order to have something to hang on to. Or we suspected them of a curious loyalty to old theology caused by the similarity of their teaching with that of some of our Christian ancestors among the theologians of the church.

But now these understandings, misunderstandings, conclusions and suspicions are no longer permissible. If Barth ever gave occasion (and he certainly did!) to be approached from the viewpoint of the Kierkegaardian pietism which is qualified by the pessimistic or morbid world-view resulting from the recognition of the qualitative difference between time and eternity, he now forbids us to do so. If Barth ever led to the impression (and he certainly did) that he desired radically to follow through the meaning of the Calvinistic slogan that the finite is incapable of comprehending the infinite (*finitum non capax infiniti*) he now prohibits such an impression. An analysis of human life, he now declares, does not enable us to comprehend the message of God's revelation in Jesus Christ.

In other words, if Barth ever appeared to differ from the modernists among the contemporary theologians and preachers in so far as they depended upon a positive and optimistic evaluation of the possibilities of religious experience, while he saw only how religious experience reveals the brokenness of human life and how it leads to the breakdown of human self-sufficiency and to repentance, he now bids farewell to all such discussion. For, whether positive or negative in its conclusions, this analysis of human life has no primary place in Christian theology, because it enables man in no manner to hear God's word in such a way as it ought to be heard. It leaves man alone with himself, but does not lead him to Jesus Christ. It may cause some to find God in their hearts, in feeling, will, or thought; or others to find him in cultural enterprises, in art, or social living, or philosophical speculation; or others to find him in the crisis of life and in its tragic events. It may bring some even to the consequence of renouncing the thought of God altogether, because they find it easier and cleaner to live as human beings without concern for a God who may or may not exist. All this is Modernism—the theology of crisis as well as atheistic humanism. Barth now demands that it be forsaken as a theological method, all of it. To make the word of the Bible speak for itself—this alone is the true concern of Christian theology, nothing else. For through that word alone God speaks, and he speaks to those who *believe* that it is so.

Barth fights now more rigorously than ever against Modernism. But

this movement within the Christian Church represents only the left wing of the theological front against which he directs his attack. The right wing is formed by Roman Catholicism as based upon the decisions of the Council of Trent, which has determined the character of the modern Roman Church. It too has to bear the brunt of a strong criticism. Seemingly, it interprets itself as a church with biblical theology. But, in truth, it qualifies its dependence upon biblical revelation by the authority of ecclesiastical tradition. Thereby it has given a human encasement to the divine revelation which distorts and practically annihilates its absolute value. Furthermore it interprets the church not as a communion of believers, upon whom the word of God must again and again be permitted to impose itself, but as a sacramental institution. Thereby it imprisons the word of God and the grace of the free God who approaches men through the revelation of the word. In Roman Catholicism, sacramental grace becomes an almost physical entity which is given into the control of man. Thus the free revelation of God, which can be put into the reach of man only by the humanly incomprehensible act of God himself, is humanized. In the light of his understanding of the meaning of the revelation of God, Barth, therefore, observes the striking similarity between the otherwise so different theological groups of Modernism and Roman Catholicism. Both find in man as he is means and functions by which he can claim to know, to possess, and to control what can come to his knowledge only as he brings himself to the recognition that he is known, possessed, controlled by it.

In the name of a strictly theocentric theology, Barth campaigns against these his theological opponents. And the only theocentric theology which he recognizes is that which takes the unusual message of the Bible seriously that God (who is who he is!) has revealed himself in the man Jesus Christ, as the prophets divined and as the apostles believed and preached.

Of course, one can raise numerous questions concerning this theological theme. We refrain here from doing so, partly because the arguments here presented do in no way exhaust the material which Barth offers in his newest book and partly because he has reserved for himself the space of five more volumes in which to meet all the questions which may be raised. But let no one have the slightest doubt of one fact: The man who speaks in this apparently old, yea, antiquated language does so with full consciousness of what he is doing. Here is not a modernist who has been converted to Fundamentalism or Orthodoxy, but here is a modernist who could not and cannot close his mind to the very peculiar message of the Bible. Fully aware of the unusual and dangerous enterprise of writing a

book on biblical dogmatics in the year 1932, of which he is a contemporary in the fullest sense of the term, he therefore proceeds to restore this biblical message in the church, feeling himself in so doing in line with a never extinguished tradition within Christendom and deriving the courage for his endeavor primarily from the reformers, among whom he now seems to prefer the genius of Luther to the brilliance of Calvin.

In doing all this, this man calls for controversy. He will have it, and he must have it. For Protestantism will have to decide whether it can afford to continue in the ways of Schleiermacher and Ritschl and Harnack and Shailer Mathews and Walter M. Horton, understanding itself by an analysis of the human situation and depending therein upon the autonomous rational or irrational, psychological or social experiences of the autonomous man, or whether it must not, precisely in the age of science and the machine, of democracy and technocracy, still create and cultivate a preaching ministry and a theology which are based upon the acknowledgment that the Bible, that strange book which to this day occupies such a prominent place in its life, offers a message of an event which carries its validity and authority in itself alone, proclaiming salvation also to our God-hungry world.

May nobody be doubtful about it: It is not the discouraged mood of the depression which makes particularly the younger generation ask the question: After Modernism, what? but it is their concern for the life of the church, in which they will have to preach, to pray and to serve. May we modernists, especially we modernists, therefore, listen eagerly and with patient attention to the voice of Barth! If we can refute him, let us do so squarely and with unflinching power. *If we can!* And may the fundamentalists among our Christian brethren not too soon rejoice! It is not their battle that Barth is fighting and it is not their cause which we will have to refute, if refutation shall be the order of the coming day. For we cannot take a single backward step, and it is not the past and its glory which is to be defended or to be raised upon a pedestal. But the theme of the Protestant controversy of the future is again to be—as it perhaps always was in the history of Christianity—the question which the evangelist put into the mouth of Jesus: “Who do men say that I am?” The glory of man or the glory of God? The controversy over the *theologia crucis* as against the *theologia gloriae*—this is the problem of the future.

Barth forces it upon us. And if Barth would not do so, some one else would. For it is in the fate of Protestantism, in the destiny of the church of Christ, that there be constantly *this controversy*.

An Age of Power

MARY E. WOOLLEY

SEVERAL times this spring I have seen from the outside of the buildings, the Century of Progress, truly called a symbol of the Age of Power.

It is an age of power from many points of view. I sat at luncheon recently with Amelia Earhart and, as I heard her talk about feeling safer in the air than on the road, I thought of my father's interest in the experiments of the Wright Brothers and his prediction: "Some day we shall actually see men flying." I wonder whether he visualized a *woman* flying the ocean, alone and undaunted!

Sometimes when "speeding" with a speed-loving friend, I think again of that father when he came in after a drive behind a horse, for which he had a clergyman's traditional love, to report with outward modesty but inward exultation, that he had "passed everything on the road." How like running Alice-in-Wonderland-fashion in order to keep where he was, as compared with the roadster of our time.

"I heard the ringing of the bells in Rome over the radio this noon," said a friend when I came into lunch one day, and again my mind "switched" backward, to the first *telephone* I ever used, the first—I think—installed in my home town. Such a crude, awkward, clumsy mechanism; such vague, indistinct, intermittent conversation as was carried on over it!

An age of power indeed from the mechanical point of view. And yet, this age of power, we are becoming conscious—perhaps dimly but still *conscious*—is painfully deficient in the *kind* of power that it most needs.

What is the power that is needed? I have tried to analyze our day, realizing that if the same problem were given to you, there probably would result quite different conclusions. My answer, like all Gaul, divides itself into three parts. The first is, the *power of thought*. It is difficult to understand how any intelligent person can fail to see the problems which civilization is facing. Use as an illustration the United States of America. How is it functioning as a democracy? We have only to turn to the daily papers to convince ourselves that there are very real problems connected with the democratic form of government: problems of law enforcement; of Congressional support of administrative action; of party ambitions working against national welfare; problems political, social, moral—*real* problems, not imaginary ones—to which the last three years have added industrial, economic and financial difficulties raised to the nth degree.

"The American government cannot really balance its budget or plan national economic revival until it knows whether there is to be arms competition or arms reduction; tariff war or reciprocity agreements; a depreciation race between the pound and the dollar or monetary stabilization; observance of peace treaties in Europe, Latin America and the Far East or American preparation for war." Problems indeed!

If we turn from the national situation to the *international*, the problems become even more serious. We may be able as a nation to "muddle along" without actually going to pieces. We have had some practice—from time to time—in that line! We cannot much longer "muddle along" as a world without a crash which the future may characterize as "a breakup of civilization."

What has all this to do with us? As I was "thinking through" my subject a paragraph in the morning paper caught my attention, from which I will quote the beginning, leaving the completion to your imagination. "The saddest feature of all the past four years' discussion of remedies for the industrial depression is the utter failure of the so-called 'intellectuals' to offer any practical suggestions for abolishing unemployment and restoring prosperity to agriculture." It is a rather large order that the writer puts upon "intellectual" shoulders, but there is more than a grain of truth in the criticism. The educated are the privileged class of the modern world and there is question whether "privilege" has been interpreted as it should have been, in the historic sense of *noblesse oblige*. There are various ways in which to discharge this obligation. One of them—also subjected to the fire of criticism—is the "Brain Trust," neatly defined by a French publicist as "intellectual bodyguard." A mid-western Journal has sprung to the defense of the aforesaid "Trust." "The cry of 'professor,' like the cry 'socialist' or 'capitalist' or 'fascist,' is simply an appeal out of ignorance to prejudice. We raided the college laboratories during the war for professors to tell us how to detect submarines and make gases. If, in addition to the possession of needed technical knowledge and experience, a man has some ability in explaining his ideas to others, he does not thereby become less fitted for government work." If we need the expert in time of war, surely the need is not less in a day of even greater difficulty, the attempt to enthrone reason in place of *unreason*.

I should be sorry to leave this responsibility solely on the shoulders of the expert from whose ranks few are chosen, even if many feel that they are called. It is almost a truism that the future of a Republic is dependent upon the education of its citizens, a "truism" that is appallingly true. The future

of the *world* also depends, as never before, upon the education of its citizens. A day of singular impressiveness at Geneva last year was the second of February, 1932, with the public presentation of petitions from around the world, with their millions of signatures. The mobilization of public opinion is attaining a force never before experienced and it becomes of crucial importance to the future of humanity that that opinion should be intelligent and thoughtful. Does no responsibility rest upon those who have had peculiar opportunity to give out of the riches of their own resources, to increase and enrich the resources of those less fortunate?

In other words, what are we doing to increase the *thought* power of our own day? Like charity, this responsibility begins at home but—again like charity—it does not end there. Too large a proportion of the citizens of the United States accumulate their thoughts, as they do their clothes, ready-made, via the newspaper, or the periodical, or the latest book, or a popular lecture, or current gossip—there is a multitude of ways by which thoughts—so-called—may be “picked up” from the surface of things. To go beneath the surface, that is, to *think*, means “digging”! How can you help—you who have had opportunity to learn to think and are not truly educated unless you have improved that opportunity—how are you going to help in rectifying this conspicuous lack in our own democracy? I leave the question for you to answer, in your own home, in your own school or other profession, in your own social and political and religious group. It is a serious question, and unless it is answered and the problem attacked by you and hundreds of other young men and women of privilege, the future of a democracy is more than uncertain.

The second great need of to-day is the *power of beauty*. That may seem to some a strange choice of “needs.” “Beauty—why, beauty is a luxury, not a necessity.” I am not so sure that you are right and that I am wrong! Again, I am thinking primarily of a democracy and of the power of the people. What kind of people? What kind of food for the life of the mind, what kind of food for the life of the emotions, do you wish fed to “the people” who, in a democracy, control the destiny of the nation, shape its future? I am not thinking in sentimental terms, preaching a pseudo culture. Rather, I am basing my thought on a situation which has elements that may well give us pause for thought.

To illustrate, take the influence of the moving picture. May I quote from a recent editorial in a leading Daily? “An organization known as the Motion Picture Research Council has for four years been conducting an investigation of the movies in their relation to public morals and the educa-

tion of youth. That the latest investigation has been prosecuted with prodigious thoroughness is indicated in the announcement that the committee's data and conclusions are to be published in nine volumes. The university director of this elaborate research program states the investigators' conclusion that 'the motion picture is powerful to an unexpected degree in affecting the information, attitudes, emotional experiences and conduct patterns of children.' The films are found to have a profound influence on youthful conduct, leading to delinquency and crime. At a time when juvenile crime is on the increase, there is a social need of finding to what extent commercial entertainments accessible to children may be directly or indirectly responsible. The question, however, is not exclusively or mainly one of crime. As the investigators show, emotional attitudes of children are influenced by what they see on the films. It is the low standard of taste, manners and intellectual integrity which oftener vitiates adult films than definite incitements to evil."

The motion picture is not the only factor—although one of the most powerful—entering into the consideration of the power of beauty, or its lack, as an educational influence in a republic. All along the line of "Imitation, it enters into the very fastnesses of character" as truly in our day as in Plato's.

The third and by far the most important power needed by our world is the *power of a new spirit*. May I go to Geneva for an illustration of what I mean? Many times since my return from the Conference for the Reduction and Limitation of Armaments I have been asked why progress toward "reduction and limitation" is so halting. Two steps forward, one step back—if not the other way around! "Is it possible that the representatives of the nations are in Geneva as a gesture, without any genuine desire for disarmament?" To that inquiry, I should like to register an emphatic "no." It would be strange if, among the many, there were not some influenced by munitions interests, but singularly few. The world longs for a different order. Why?

First, there is the *financial* reason. "We *must* reduce armaments," said the leader of a leading nation. "We cannot afford to carry this financial burden." Mr. Hoover estimated that his plan of qualitative disarmament and approximately one-third reduction in quantitative disarmament, would yield to the world within ten years, a saving of from ten to fifteen billions of dollars—a strong appeal for its adoption.

Geneva wants disarmament because of *war-weariness*, a sentiment of which there are many evidences. The day following the presentation of

petitions in February, 1932, one urging disarmament was received from 100,000 ex-service men of France. This spring a delegation came to the Conference representing almost all the nations of Europe, a pathetic delegation, composed of ex-service men, crippled, blinded, mutilated—the “fruits” of the World War.

There is intense longing for disarmament because of the growing realization of the *futility of war*. “The eighteenth year of the war” last year was called, the nineteenth year of the war, the day in which we are living.

We may be pessimist or optimist in our reactions to Geneva, and what is going on there, but no thoughtful observer can escape the conclusion that mistaken human attitudes are the greatest obstacle to a more rational world order.

Alongside the effort for *material* disarmament went that for *moral* disarmament, the disarming of the mind, realizing that the system of warfare itself is based upon the armed mind, a mind whose arms are fear, suspicion, distrust, greed, ill will, and all the unholy brood which the mind of man has been only too ready to shelter.

I did not realize when I went to Geneva that among the many lessons that I should learn would be one in religion, that the most essential factor in a new world relationship as in all other human contacts, is the “fruit of the spirit,” the substitution of good will for ill will, of trust for distrust, of concord for discord, of friendliness for hatred. War springs out of the subsoil of the human mind and spirit and it is the cultivation of that subsoil—to quote Elihu Root—which will make possible a new world.

“Life is a search after power” said Emerson nearly a century ago. “What kind of power?” That is the crucial question which I leave for you to answer.

The Divine Omnipotence and Natural Evil

ALFRED E. GARVIE

"I BELIEVE in God the Father Almighty, Maker of heaven and earth." This is the first article of the Apostles' Creed, and belongs to an early stage in its history. To the revelation in Christ is due the description of God as Father; to current dualistic heresies, such as Gnosticism, Marcionism, Manichæism, is due the addition of the epithet Almighty. Christian theology has from the beginning affirmed God's omnipotence as an essential element in the conception of God. In this conception, as Ritschl maintained, philosophy and religion meet on common ground; and there can be no doubt that in the intellectual formulation of Christian faith theology has used philosophical ideas, more open to criticism than is the belief to which they have been attached. It is important to make this distinction because it may be found on closer scrutiny that it is not the religious belief in God as Father Almighty which is doubted or denied, but the philosophical ideas.

Our first task must be to distinguish the essential Christian faith from the accidental philosophical formulations. (1) It is belief in, and not knowledge of, God as Father Almighty for which a defense and a plea are being here offered. Belief is psychologically more and epistemologically less than knowledge. Intellectually knowledge claims certainty, belief probability. But the intellectual aspect of belief is not only associated with but complemented by the emotional and the volitional; it is an assertion of the whole personality; and it is an assertion often so intense emotionally and so vigorous volitionally that probability is raised to certainty. "I know whom I have believed!" That this is not an illegitimate assertion of the whole personality may be shown by a consideration of our modes of knowing. We have sensible evidence in perception; we have logical demonstration (conception, judgment, reasoning, deductive and inductive)—these together constitute general knowledge. There is besides the speculative construction of the philosopher; he thinks the data of his knowledge together, not in a strictly logical demonstration, for no philosophy has yet succeeded in being that, although philosophers may have indulged such a vain imagination, but in a system more or less consistent and complete, which commends itself as a reasonable interpretation of reality. Reason (*Vernunft*) is here used in a wider sense than reasoning (*Verstand*). In

recent years the conviction has been gaining ground, that man has for the completeness of his personal life an *appreciation of values*, a mental, moral, and æsthetic discernment, intuitions of truth, goodness, and beauty, of which his senses do not afford evidence, nor for which logic can offer any demonstration. Even more, in close association with these intuitions is the believer's vision of God, vividly realized by the mystics, yet implied in all religion. The belief in God as Father Almighty rests not on sensible evidence, logical demonstration, or speculative construction, but on such a religious intuition, mediated for the Christian by the revelation which Christ claimed to give of God as Father. Why the epithet Almighty must be added we shall endeavor to show when we have discussed what we mean by omnipotence?

(2) We cannot consider this conception by itself, but must regard it alongside the other philosophical ideas, which, first used as helps of faith, are now often felt as hindrances. (a) Sir William Hamilton and Dean Mansel, on both of whom Herbert Spencer was in his Agnosticism dependent, asserted that there must be belief in God, but could not be knowledge of him, because there could be no intelligible relation shown between God as religion believes in him and the philosophy of the Infinite and Absolute; more recently the possibility of conceiving God as personal has been denied on the ground of the incompatibility of those conceptions with that conception. In my judgment the objection is verbal, and rests on what I regard as a false definition of Infinite and Absolute. We must not give these terms the *negative content* of un-limited, and un-related or un-conditioned, for to do this is to empty the conception of God of all content. To put it in a homely way, if God must be everything-in-general, he can be nothing-in-particular. We may give the term infinite and absolute a *positive content*—self-limited and self-related or conditioned. It is God's nature, character, purpose, as recognized in the religious consciousness, as for the Christian revealed in Christ, which determine the limitations, relations, and conditions, and not something other and above God. Philosophical speculation cannot be allowed here to dictate to religious or Christian conviction. The Infinitude and Absoluteness of God in relation to the Universe are expressed in the attributes of *omnipresence*, *omniscience*, and *omnipotence*.

(b) The *presence*, *science*, and *potence* are the positive content; the *omni* asserts that God is not as man is, limited, related, and conditioned, but as he himself is by his own choice for his own ends (*a se* and *pro se*). His omnipresence does not mean that God is *extended* in space and *continued* in

time; as *immense* he is above the limitations of space, as *eternal* above the limitations of time; and yet as Creator (and still more as Father) he is so self-limited, self-related, self-conditioned in his creatures that in his dealings with them space and time have a relative reality for him. His Providence, his Revelation, his Incarnation can have meaning and worth for him only if time has relative reality. Man in his personality can transcend the limitations of time and space, while they remain real for him. Thus may we think of God in his nature as above time and space, and yet as in the fulfillment of his purpose present in time and space. If time has relative reality for God, we may get a glimpse of the solution of a problem which has bulked so large in Christian theology, that of foreknowledge and foreordination. The doctrine of predestination is now generally abandoned, as too flagrantly inconsistent with belief in man's liberty and responsibility. But many still hold by the doctrine of foreknowledge. I have been compelled to abandon the one as well as the other. I cannot conceive how an act, foreknown by God, can be a free act. But if God has limited his power so that man can act freely, may he not have limited his knowledge in relation to man, so that he does not know what man's choice is till it is made; in other words is time in this relation not real for God as well as man? God's omniscience may embrace the whole range of possibility, but not the momentary minutiae of actuality. It is from this broad standpoint that God, Infinite and Absolute, is self-limited, self-conditioned, and self-related in the Universe he has created, that we best approach the consideration of the one attribute of omnipotence.

(3) God's omnipotence does not mean that God can do anything or everything that we can conceive, desire, or expect of him, but only that he can do whatever it is *possible* to do. If God is God, if his nature, character, and purpose have not a negative general but a positive particular content, it is evident that it is possible for God to do only what is in accord with his nature, character, purpose. The kind of reality which he creates, conserves, governs, redeems and perfects must accordingly have a positive, particular content. At this point a brief reference to Leibnitz's *Theodicée* may be made. The motive of Creation, he argues, is the wisdom and the goodness of God; and therefore, God willed the best possible world, for even God can will only the *possible*. The world as it is exhibits three limitations of God's will as regards possibility: in it we find *metaphysical*, *physical*, and *moral* evil. The created cannot have the infinitude of the Creator; finitude necessarily involves imperfection—this is metaphysical evil. From this imperfection of the created necessarily follows *physical* evil, which is either

privative, the absence of the divine perfection, including divine beatitude, or positive, the evil resulting from the mutual operation of finite causes, each imperfect in its finitude. Moral evil is the conscious, voluntary disobedience of free persons; and even God's omnipotence could not from a moral world exclude the possibility of the wrong choice, or sin. But Leibnitz does not stop at this *static* view; he supplements it by a *dynamic*; God continues to be active in the world, and the history of the world is progressive; for "good is the final goal of ill."

On this justification of the ways of God to man some comments may be offered. (a) The first consideration is rather speculative; it carries us beyond the range of our possible knowledge. Whether the Creator could have reproduced his own perfections in a Creation differing from himself only in its dependence on him for its existence, who can tell? Whether Creation necessarily involves just these limitations is beyond our knowledge. We may concede the probability that to be created is in some way to be limited, limited by the purpose of the Creator. What that purpose is can only be indicated in the course of this present argument. (b) We must be precise in our definition of physical evil. Merely physical processes, even when they are destructive, cannot properly be called evil; the birth, growth, and death of a star, if we may thus figuratively describe its history, is not evil. It is only in relation to sentient creatures, creatures who can feel pain that any problem of evil arises, and we should avoid misconception by talking more definitely of the problem of pain and the problem of sin rather than so vaguely of the problem of evil. There are three sources of animal and human suffering—the *natural phenomena*, the *vital processes*, and the *social relations*. The last—man's inhumanity to man, or his cruelty to animals—passes over from the problem of pain to the problem of sin.

(i) As regards the first, there are physical catastrophes—earthquake, flood, tempest, famine, which inflict injury on man. Several considerations in relief of doubt can here be offered. *First of all*, as science can show us, there is a very rare and fine adjustment of physical and chemical processes necessary to allow the possibility of life. The operation of natural forces in accordance with natural laws is permanently and generally beneficent. It is only exceptionally and occasionally that nature destroys or injures what she usually preserves. These catastrophes appear inevitable results of the one system of nature, the general operations of which are beneficent, and only the exceptional injurious. That system shows so much wisdom and goodness that it is presumptuous for us with our limited knowledge and fallible judgment to say that God might, or ought to have willed a

system always beneficent, never injurious. *Secondly*, the seeming injury may prove a benefit. Man owes more to the severity than the mildness of nature. As a French writer, whose name I cannot now recall, has said, man languishes under her motherly smile, flourishes under her stepmotherly frown. It is in the struggle with nature that man has developed his knowledge and skill, his science and industry, his culture and civilization. Could man have become what he has in a safe, easy, and comfortable world? Have not endeavor, hardship, sacrifice a personal value in themselves apart from what is gained by them? It may be said that animals share the pain without the gain. But has not the struggle for existence resulted in organic evolution? The sufferings of animals, apart from the cruelty of man to them, for which there is no excuse, and which I regard as most damnable sin, have been greatly exaggerated by the psychological fallacy of imputing our consciousness, which can look before and after, to them. That animals prey on one another seems a necessary provision for the limitation of what would be too abundant life; but this brings us to the second source of suffering—the vital processes.

(ii) Birth, growth, decay, and death are not only an inevitable process, but an appropriate experience for any vital organism. If generations did not pass away, earth would soon not have room for all its inhabitants. In man death is not merely a natural event, it is a personal problem, "He thinks he was not made to die." Without the belief in immortality, the hope of eternal life, death would indeed for him be a dark enigma. But as God has implanted this hope deep in the heart of man, he has no right to impugn God's dealings with him in death, if he sets that hope aside. There is one kind of death which does offer a challenge to faith; it is the death in the fullness and freshness of life, what we call premature. To refer such a death to accident or disease, whichever the cause may be, is for Christian faith not enough. It seeks some meaning in the event. There is the consolation that the promise unfulfilled on earth is being more gloriously fulfilled in heaven. But there is also the hallowing influence on those who face this mystery. How many fathers and mothers, wives and sisters, were "baptized for the dead" in the Great War? Doctor Fairbairn in his admirable treatment of this problem in his book *The Philosophy of the Christian Religion* (pp. 144-146) writes of a friend whom he lost in early manhood at the beginning of his work as a Christian minister. "The one who died seemed to leave his spirit behind in the breast of the man who survived; and he has lived ever since, and lives still, feeling as if the soul within him belonged to the man who died." Turning from the prob-

lem of death to that of disease, we must recognize how much is due to disregard of or disobedience to the laws of health. The consequences of sexual self-indulgence are among the worst scourges of mankind. Man is meeting the challenge of disease; and is combating it with knowledge and skill. How large an influence in refining and developing the human affections suffering has! The sick-room is the sanctuary of many a home. I must admit that there are diseases so painful and so prolonged that the watchers of the suffering of a loved one can only be still in the presence of the trial of their faith, and yet not seldom the strengthening comes from the sufferer's quiet and brave confidence in God. If happiness be the end of life the problem is insoluble; but if holiness and love, faith and hope are its highest values, there is much which can be offered in relief of doubt.

(iii) While, as has already been indicated, man's inhumanity to man belongs to the problem of moral evil, yet a few words may here be offered regarding *social solidarity*, which is the condition of man's inflicting injuries, miseries, and wrong on others. Whether it be along the channel of physical heredity or social inheritance that the generations are bound together for weal, or woe, the balance is surely very largely on the side of good; else how had there been human progress? It is impossible to conceive how this solidarity could have been without constant miracle allowed to work for good only and never for evil. This same consideration applies to the relation of fellow-citizens to one another. Further, does not the realization that the evil consequences of conduct pass to others perhaps more than to the doer, impose a restraint, and evoke a sense of responsibility? How can we conceive a society that only rejoiced together, and never suffered? Would it not be more "a fortuitous concourse of atoms" and not a living organism?

(4) Although this essay is not dealing expressly with the problem of moral evil, or sin, it is impossible to isolate the two problems from one another. We cannot dispose of physical evil by the assumption that it is all the consequence of sin; there was physical evil in the world before there was sin. We cannot resort to the device of some theologians, who argued that God in anticipation of man's sinning so made the world as to have the chastening rod ready for the naughty child. But this we can reasonably say: That there was no physical evil until sentient creatures existed to feel pain, to experience disease or death; that it is in some measure the spontaneity (if in the absence of self-consciousness we are not prepared to speak of liberty) of living organisms, which is a factor in exposing them to suffering; that the struggle for existence has been a factor in organic evolution;

and lastly and most important consideration of all, that the time process must be thought of as unity in the eternal purpose of God. Accordingly the human development, in view of man's place as the consummation of the creative process, as the Universe coming as it were to self-consciousness and self-direction in him, is the interpretation of the cosmic evolution. We are, therefore, entitled to consider the problem of physical in relation to the problem of moral evil. It is as a condition of man's personal discipline and development that the physical evil is to be regarded even when we recognize as we do fully that there is a uniform natural order, and that physical evil is often the result of that order even as are the physical goods men enjoy.

As we are here concerned with the vindication of the first article of the Christian creed, it is from the standpoint of Christian faith that we approach the problem; and for that the moral solution is decisive. It needs no long argument to prove that there can be no moral personality without freedom, and that freedom involves the possibility of the bad as well as the good choice. The bad choice having been made by the race (when or how we need not ask, for we are concerned not with the origin, but with the fact of sin), what we now need to show is that God by his dealing with man in wisdom, goodness, and grace, is not only condemning and punishing sin, but is overcoming sin by redeeming man from it, and reconciling men unto himself in Jesus Christ. It is only the full Gospel of salvation from sin in him which offers a solution of the problem of moral evil, and indirectly, as has been shown in dealing with the relation of physical evil to human personality, of physical evil also. I do not pretend that there is possible a logical demonstration of such a conclusion; for here we walk by faith, and not by sight, we are saved by hope (Romans 8. 24). But in God as revealed as Father in Christ, in Christ realized as Saviour and Lord in his truth and grace in the Christian experience, in the cleansing, hallowing, comforting and perfecting working of the Holy Spirit, Christian believers have adequate grounds for the venture of faith and hope. If God be God, perfect in knowledge, wisdom, goodness and grace, he knows what is the worst actuality possible for sin in the human race, he knows what is the best actuality possible for his grace in man, he knows that where sin abounds, he can make grace abound more exceedingly (Romans 5. 20); he takes only on himself the responsibility of Creator, because he has in himself the resources to redeem and to reconcile his creation unto himself. We do not yet see all things subjected in God's purpose for man, but we do see Jesus crowned with glory and honor (Hebrews 2. 8, 9).

(5) Because these are my convictions, rooted in my own experience, nourished by my reason, my appreciation of the values of human personality and human history, I cannot accept the solution of the problem by the assumption of a *finite* God. J. S. Mill believed that in view of what the world and life are we must surrender belief in either God's goodness or his almightiness, and he preferred to hold by the first, and to give up the second. In recent years that conclusion has been gaining more general support, and I must close this essay by offering my reasons for rejecting it.

(a) Let us define terms: What do we mean by the finitude of God? Do we mean that God has not resources in himself to solve the problem of physical and moral evil, that we are, therefore, doubtful whether "good will be the final goal of ill," that we are engaged in a battle as God's fellow-combatants, in which we are uncertain of victory. If so, then are we of all men most pitiable, for our faith has failed to prove "the assurance of things hoped for, the proving of things not seen" (Hebrews 11. 1), and God has mocked us with a certainty and a security which are now lost to us.

(b) If we do not mean to abandon faith's confidence altogether, do we mean by God's finitude that in the fulfillment of his purpose he is encountering obstacles and delays other than those which man in his unbelief and disobedience opposes, and that we must ascribe these either to some power other than God which he is not able absolutely to overcome, or that in his own nature there is some impotence which he cannot transcend? Before we make that assumption would it not be wise and right for us to ask ourselves, whether our knowledge is so adequate, and our judgment so infallible as to entitle us to challenge what is, I believe, one of the fundamental convictions of theistic or Christian faith, that God alone is ultimate reality and that there is no contradiction within himself? Because God is sometimes fulfilling his purpose in ways other than our own wisdom would propose, or our own goodness desire, are we justified in thinking that there is something outside or within God himself which prevents his doing what he wills? Is it not a more modest, humble, and reverent conclusion, that not always "are his thoughts our thoughts, nor our ways his ways" (Isaiah 55. 8).

(c) Our experience and history afford so abundant evidence of knowledge and power, goodness and grace, as to warrant an unqualified trust, that he is the same in nature, character, purpose, where we cannot so clearly or surely trace these qualities as where we can. It is surely to ignore and to disown our own finitude in knowledge and judgment to

deny what we do not understand. In the preceding pages I have fully recognized that there remains mystery in God's dealings with men, that the problem of evil cannot be exhaustively solved; but that there is enough of the light of God's truth and grace falling on man's life to make the mystery tolerable for faith in God as Father Almighty. I suggest that confidence in God demands that affirmation of his infinitude, and that humility and reverence toward God forbid the denial. We do not assert that God could or would fulfill his purpose in any or every way we can conceive; but only that he can fulfill his own purpose in his own way at his own time with his own means.

(d) When I contemplate the two sublimities, which subdued the soul of Kant, the starry heavens above and the moral law within, and which the psalmist too conjoins:

"The heavens declare the glory of God." . . .

"The law of the Lord is perfect, restoring the soul" (Psalm 19. 1, 7), I must confess that I am distressed by such a conclusion. If we read such a book as Jeans' *The Universe Around Us*, must not the vastness of the Universe, the wonder of the making of the atom no less than of the star, make such denials of God's infinitude seem trivial? Still more, if we consider the moral law as realized in the teaching and example, the sacrifice and Saviourhood and Lordship of Jesus Christ in human history, it does seem to me at least irreverent to doubt or to deny that God can in his power do all that his wisdom proposes, his goodness desires, his grace intends.

For nearly half a century I have been engaged in theological study, meditation, and it may even be speculation! I have used my conscience and my reason in the things of God sincerely and courageously, and I have reached such measure of certainty as faith, hope and love toward God in Christ demand; but with Paul I end in a confession of mystery which is also a doxology: "O the depth of the riches both of the wisdom and the knowledge of God! How unsearchable are his judgments, and his ways past tracing out! For who hath known the mind of the Lord? or who hath seen his counsellor? or who hath first given to him, and it shall be recompensed unto him again? For of him, and through him, and unto him, are all things. To him be the glory for ever, Amen" (Romans 11. 33-36).

Gospel Dynamite

C. C. McCOWN

N EARLY half a century ago, in discussing the "Progress of the World," James Russell Lowell wrote, "There is dynamite enough in the New Testament, if illegitimately applied, to blow all our existing institutions to atoms."¹ The famous essayist was anything but a social radical. Indeed, while he expresses sympathy with the aims of Lasalle and Marx, the paragraph which follows his terse characterization of the New Testament reads like an argument for Mussolini. Yet he sensed the radicalism of the New Testament.

In Longfellow's "Sicilian's Tale," King Robert of Sicily hears the monks at Vespers chanting the Magnificat,

"And, as he listened, o'er and o'er again
Repeated, like a burden or refrain,
He caught the words, 'Deposuit potentes
De sede, et exaltavit humiles.'"

And when he learned their meaning,

" . . . King Robert muttered scornfully,
'Tis well that such seditious words are sung
Only by priests and in the Latin tongue.'"

Is there dynamite and sedition in the Gospels? One would not guess it from the appearance of the congregations which gather in our churches. Yet it would be a bold person who would claim that modern society embodies Christian ideals.

Jesus indicated that the new wine of his message would burst old wine skins. He "came not to bring peace, but a sword." He was accused of perverting the nation, of stirring up the people all the way from Galilee to Jerusalem. His followers were described as men who were turning the world upside down. To be sure, the reputation did not follow them long. In the second and third centuries, as the hope of the "Second Coming" faded, the task of evangelizing the Roman Empire, the shock of persecutions, and struggles over doctrine and church order occupied their attention. Within three centuries, during which Roman society had undergone no noticeable moral reformation or social reorganization, the religion of the Nazarene Carpenter was adopted as the last defense of the Empire, while the Church fashioned itself into another kingdom on the model of the

¹ *Latest Literary Essays and Addresses*, Boston and New York: Riverside Press, 1892, p. 181, from preface to *The World's Progress*, Boston: Gately and O'Gorman, 1886.

imperial organization, accepted power and influence as evidence that the City of God had already descended to earth, and settled down to a long internal trench warfare over creeds and ceremonies and ecclesiastical privileges and preferments.

Yet in spite of aberrant tendencies and competing interests, there ran continually through the Ante-Nicene Christian community the strong current of what, with Troeltsch, can be called a "love-communism" which went far beyond current ideals of social relationships. Again and again, in the long centuries of darkness and false dawn which succeeded, when men went back, over the heads of priests and ecclesiastics, to the words of Jesus, strange disturbances occurred. The Taborite movement in Bohemia, the revolt of the peasants, who appealed to God's freedom when Luther put the New Testament into their own tongue, the wild "millennium" of the Anabaptists at Münster, and the strange dream of the Fifth Monarchy Men in England would be amusing, if they were not tragic, examples of the dynamite of the Gospels unsuccessfully or illegitimately applied. How often, in more recent years, Christian communists and socialists have read the words of Jesus and insisted that the coming of the kingdom of God really meant that God's will should be done on earth. Yet the centuries wait in vain.

From various directions the application of the gospel to society has been attacked in recent years. There is not merely the natural economic conservatism which insists, as an admirable representative of Southern capitalistic Christianity expresses it, that

"The church should not meddle in industrial affairs. The mission of the church is to preach the gospel, instruct people in the word of God, and teach them the blessing of true Christian lives."²

The attacks upon the "social gospel" from other directions have been much more subtle and dangerous. They are not, like the opinion just quoted, blind, frontal attacks after the manner of the famous charge at Balaklava, but work by an undermining before which the defenses seem helplessly to crumble. One such attack may be seen in the diversion of the power of the gospel to the task of salvaging the wrecks and wastes of economic injustice and social oppression. Praiseworthy devotion to social service and philanthropy has prevented the progress of the social movement. We are perfectly willing to deal out cups of water without stint so long as we can keep control of the sources of supply. It seems safe to apply palliatives; a major operation appears to be a danger which must

² Quoted by S. Miller and J. F. Fletcher, *The Church and Industry*, New York: Longmans, Green & Company, 1930, p. 207. See the incident told by Rabbi E. L. Israel in *Religion in Life*, 1 (1932), p. 47.

be avoided at all costs. Therefore labor unions and social radicals object to company welfare plans. Unconsciously and unintentionally the welfare worker blinds his own and others' eyes to the desperate ills of society and diverts into ineffective channels the social sympathy and creative energy which ought to be engaged in reformation and reconstruction. The merciful and necessary sleeping draught, too often repeated, only brings a hundred-fold worse disaster in the end. Thus the true social gospel has been unwittingly betrayed by those who sincerely believed themselves its true repositories.

Open war has been declared upon the social gospel from two exactly opposite directions, one Fundamentalist, the other critical and historical. It is useless to discuss Fundamentalist objections, for literalistic dogmatism is beyond reason, as it often seems to be beyond good and evil. If Fundamentalists were logically consistent, no application, either legitimate or illegitimate, of the dynamite that is in the Gospels would seem to be possible. While millions upon millions of Christian citizens in the supposedly enlightened United States believe that a Calvinistic God has unalterably decreed that the world must grow worse and worse, and that, accordingly, all human schemes of reconstruction are valueless, progress promises to be slow.

The case is different with the other major attack upon the social gospel, which comes from the side of the scientific and critical study of the Gospel documents and their historical backgrounds.³ The present paper proposes to deal especially with this attack, in the belief that failure to understand and properly interpret the social and historical background has led to a radical misrepresentation of Jesus and has resulted in conclusions hostile to the social gospel when, upon this method of approach, exactly the opposite should have been the case. To put the hostile argument briefly and baldly, in the course of the search for the historical Jesus, indeed in the very success of the attempt to recover him as a living man among living men and women, the conclusion has been reached that he was so much a child of his own times that he can have no meaning for ours. Such is the unexpected and disquieting result of the study of the eschatology of Jesus and his contemporaries. That is to say, Jewish expectations as to the impending end of the age and the dawning of a messianic or divine kingdom are so plainly reflected in the preaching of Jesus regarding the coming of the Kingdom and the appearance of the Son of man on the clouds of heaven

³ The attack from the side of scientific social study based upon a mechanistic philosophy has been discussed by Professor Ellwood in *Religion in Life*, 1 (1932), pp. 169-178.

that one cannot find place for doubting Jesus' complete adherence to the dominant ideas of Daniel, Revelation, and Jewish apocalyptic literature in general.

The conclusions of the school of "consistent eschatology" can be accepted only in part. Schweitzer, the brilliant and versatile representative of this tendency, who is so deservedly popular in England and America as an exponent of the true Christian spirit, is guilty of defective research and false logic. He knows the modern *Leben-Jesu* literature far better than the ancient apocalyptic writings upon which his thesis is based. His fundamental historical error is the supposition that the Jews of Jesus' day were consistent eschatologists who believed only in a transcendental, or spiritual kingdom of God which would supervene when the present world had passed away. On the contrary, the "new age" did not mean a new universe. Probably a great majority of the Jews believed that a divine miracle would inaugurate a kingdom of righteousness upon earth. If Jesus' contemporaries in Palestine were not "consistent," that is transcendental, eschatologists, then Schweitzer is wrong in insisting that Jesus was, for the data of the Gospels are too uncertain to sustain his argument. There is excellent reason for maintaining, as Matthew's version of the Lord's Prayer assumes, that the kingdom of God was to come down to earth. If so, Jesus' social ideas, though not evolutionary—for he of course knew nothing of modern conceptions of social progress—were nevertheless concerned with human society on a material earth.

Schweitzer's error has been rendered doubly serious by his brilliant, but logically vicious "either-or" dialectic, which sets up two alternatives based upon false history and then insists upon the choice of one or the other to the complete exclusion of all other possibilities and all mediating hypotheses. Schweitzer abhors the middle of the road as nature is supposed to abhor a vacuum. But in life, if not in logic, a dilemma may have more than two horns. Schweitzer's dilemma, either a modern "Liberal" Jesus, who, he says, is only a good German *Pfarrer* with ardent social sympathies, or an "eschatological" Jesus who looked for the immediate catastrophic end of the present physical world and the inauguration of a transcendental, or heavenly, kingdom, is certainly false.

As a result of his misunderstanding of Jewish eschatology, then, Schweitzer's widely discussed idea that the teachings of Jesus are only "interim ethics," intended merely to prepare men for entrance into the heavenly kingdom and to tide them over the short but difficult period of the "last woes" before the new, spiritual age dawns, has been given undue

importance. The argument is logical that an ethical system based upon a transcendentalist apocalyptic conception of the world and future history can have little meaning for modern thought. As Burkitt has recently written, "This sort of doctrine does not, as it stands, fit the requirements of those who are attempting to formulate new rules of ethics suitable for present conditions."⁴ Thus, if Schweitzer were right, the nerve of Christian social action would seem to be hopelessly cut.

This last conclusion, however, does not follow. This is not the place for a detailed argument to show that Schweitzer, Burkitt, Warschauer, and their "school" are wrong in insisting that Jesus' conception of the future reign of God was thoroughly transcendental. The details have to do more with scientific accuracy and historical fact than with the practical matter of the social dynamite in the gospel.⁵ Whatever Jesus' world-view, it is his moral judgments that count. What is of practical importance, then, is the overlooked fact that, if the eschatological school is right, as they surely are, in insisting that Jesus' teachings are thoroughly saturated with Jewish apocalyptic ideas, then his social views must have been much more dynamic and revolutionary than is usually assumed, even by the most radical of modern interpreters.

Considered from the point of view of ethical philosophy or ethical religion, and, even more, from the point of view of Jesus himself, the discovery that his teachings cannot be used to formulate new rules of social ethics constitutes no loss whatever, but rather a distinct gain. Jesus proposed, not to lay down a new law, but to preach a gospel. He who criticized literalism and legalism with all the vigor and positiveness of which language is capable would be the last to ask that his own words be petrified into laws. At no point has the Church through all the ages been so unforgivably false to the Master whom it called Lord, Lord, as in its popular dogmatic use of his teachings as if they contained a final and unalterable system of ethics which exegetical ingenuity and theological quibbling could in some way bring to light and establish. It is strange that men have never seen clearly that Jesus' teachings are not systematic ethical treatises, much less moral codes, but brilliant and inescapable illustrations of the spirit which should motivate the child of the loving heavenly Father. As Schweitzer has truly said, Jesus is an authority for our wills, not for our intelligence.⁶

⁴ *Jesus Christ*, London, 1932, p. 21, separately printed from *The History of Christianity in the Light of Modern Knowledge*, London, 1929, vol. 2, p. 217.

⁵ See the writer's discussion in *The Promise of His Coming*, New York, 1921, pp. 144-153; *The Genesis of the Social Gospel*, New York, Alfred A. Knopf, 1929, p. 326ff., 369-77 and Chap. X, "The Social Gospel," in *The Church Looks Ahead*, edited by Charles E. Schofield, New York, Macmillan, in press.

⁶ *Geschichte der Leben-Jesu-Forschung*, fourth edition, 1926, p. 636.

If now we come to know him in all the primitive and creative power of the fragmentary Gospel pictures of that inescapable life, then, because he is an authority for our wills, we must understand what were his fundamental conceptions of God and the world. We must discover his ethical judgments in social problems. The forms in which he expresses his convictions may be transitory, but that does not necessarily affect the value of his convictions.

It is a commonplace that Jesus' fundamental idea was the fatherhood of God. Because eschatology is so foreign to our ways of thinking, the social applications of that basic idea as expressed in the words of Jesus have been covered up by their eschatological clothing and sadly misrepresented and misconstrued. Among the Jews of Jesus' day the only familiar vehicle for the conveying of social ideals was the apocalypse. The historical reasons for this are too complicated to present in detail.⁷ The process may be briefly indicated.

The beginnings of social thinking are lost in the mists of the third millennium B. C. The first reformer known to history, Urukagina of Lagash, lived almost 3,000 years before Jesus was born. In the twelfth dynasty of Egypt, about 2000 B. C., appears the first known outburst of social literature and already the pseudonymous apocalypse is to be discovered as a developed literary form, with the characteristic eschatological scheme, embryonic and slightly different from the Jewish, yet definitely related to it as a remote ancestor. The historical connections which link this crude beginning with the idea of the Day of the Lord in the prophetic period in Israel and so eventually with Daniel, Revelation, and the other writings of the apocalyptic period in Judaism run often underground, but can hardly be denied, for they appear on the surface again and again in a significant succession.⁸

Certain dominant ideas of Jewish apocalypses appear repeatedly in the literature of the Orient. Urukagina tells of the oppression of the orphan and the widow by the strong, of the evils of the corvée, of justice bought and sold, and of rapacious and unfair taxation. He relates how he undertook the case of the weak against the strong and put an end to innumerable oppressions. Assyrian monarchs claim to have brought liberty, peace, prosperity, and universal happiness to their people. Egyptian princes are portrayed in their epitaphs as the defense of the fatherless and the widow and as swift avengers of oppression and evil-doing. The nations that sur-

⁷ See *The Genesis of the Social Gospel*, pp. 184f., 280-291.

⁸ See "Hebrew and Egyptian Apocalyptic Literature," *Harvard Theological Review*, 18 (1925), pp. 357-411; *The Genesis of the Social Gospel*, pp. 103-118.

rounded the Hebrews were permeated with a faith in the justice of the Sungod in particular and of the gods in general. They held tenaciously to a tradition of an ideal prince who would eventually appear to reign in piety and righteousness and who would therefore be able to command the blessings of the gods upon his people. Then, with the disappearance of pride, wickedness, and oppression, all poverty and want also would flee away and all men would live in a paradise blessed by the propitious gods. Similar ideals of social justice, expressed in various forms and appearing in the mythology of the Golden Age, are to be found among the Persians and especially the Greeks.

Jewish conceptions of the reign of God, as they existed in Jesus' day, were the product of a combination of directly inherited nomadic ideals and of ideas borrowed from all of their neighbors. In the fires of their own political, economic, and religious experience, the Jews had forged out of these materials a unique philosophy of history. Paradise, the Golden Age, the reign of Saturn, was to return as the Hindu-Iranian-Greek myth of the recurring cycle of the four ages foretold. Man was living at the end of the fourth, or Iron, Age, when all was evil. Thereafter, when a new age dawned, there would come a complete reversal of present conditions: instead of want, satisfaction; instead of poverty, abundance; instead of oppression, justice. One outstanding idea the Jews shared with all their neighbors: the firm conviction that a righteous universe demanded a "new deal" in which the poor and unfortunate should receive their social and economic rights.

The dominant part which the struggle between the rich and the poor, between the strong and the weak, played in ancient society is not often realized. Our records come from the victors and they were usually the rich and the powerful. It is easy to understand why the "hope of the poor" figures rarely in ancient documents. The unusual social and economic democracy of the Jews, an inheritance from nomadic forbears which was preserved with little change because of their economic limitations, made it possible for the poor and the weak to find their voice in Hebrew literature as in that of no other nation. It is not necessary to say that the great Hebrew prophets of the eighth century were first and foremost social agitators, who championed the rights of the poor against the oppression of the rich and powerful, and that Hebrew law, especially in Deuteronomy, embodied these prophetic ideas in its codes. It is not so generally recognized that the Psalms, quite in contrast to modern hymn books, have a large proportion of social hymns which cry out against injustice and oppression and voice the com-

plaints of the poor and the exploited. The psalmists use language which to-day would hardly be considered polite, not to say lyrical.

"Thou hast been a helper of the fatherless,
Break thou the arm of the wicked."⁹

The righteous king

"Will judge thy people with righteousness
And thy poor with justice.
He will judge the poor of the people,
He will save the children of the needy
And will break in pieces the oppressor."¹⁰

The social ideas of the prophets and psalmists are expressed in even stronger language in the apocalypses and other popular books of edification from contemporary writers whom Jesus must have known and from some of whom he seems to quote. Their bitter criticisms of social injustice, particularly of the oppression of the poor and weak by the rich and powerful, can hardly be surpassed by the most radical communist of to-day. The pregnant phrases from the Magnificat, at which King Robert took umbrage, are a refined but unmistakable echo of ardent but frustrated hopes which again and again come to speech in that most Galilean of the apocalypses, 1 Enoch.

"And this Son of Man whom thou hast seen
Shall put down the kings and the mighty from their seats,
And shall loosen the reins of the strong,
And break the teeth of the sinners,"¹¹

and

"Woe to you, ye rich, for ye have trusted in your riches,
And from your riches shall ye depart,"

"Woe to you, ye mighty,
Who with might oppress the righteous;
For the day of your destruction is coming,"¹²

are quotations that might be indefinitely multiplied.¹³ Even the Psalms of Solomon and the Eighteen Benedictions represent God as the hope and refuge of the poor and as abasing the proud and judging the ruthless.

Jesus received his working man's inheritance from 3,000 years of economic struggle and social hope. There rang in his ears the repeated

⁹ Psalms 10. 14f.

¹⁰ Psalms 72. 2, 4; see also Psalms 37 and many more.

¹¹ 1 Enoch 46. 4.

¹² 1 Enoch 94. 8; 96. 8.

¹³ See *The Genesis of the Social Gospel*, pp. 280-291.

fulminations of Jewish prophets, lawgivers, psalmists, and apocalyptists who had proclaimed God's care for the poor and helpless and his sure vengeance upon their rich and proud oppressors. Surely then it is hardly reasonable to take Matthew's spiritualizing version of the Beatitudes as true to the intention of Jesus. Rather the short and blunt vigor of the Lucan Beatitudes and Woes has a much better claim to authenticity. The slave ethic and otherworldliness of Hellenistic mysticism might later read "spiritual" meanings into the social ideals of Jewish apocalyptic, but there is no warrant in either earlier or contemporary writings for thus emasculating Jesus' conception of the kingdom of the righteous but loving heavenly Father. The first Beatitude does not imply the blessedness but the wickedness of poverty. The poor are blessed because they are soon to escape it.

Jesus did not come to turn stones into bread. He made no appeal to cupidity or desire for material gain. But surely his language means that the hungry, naked, and eternally sorrowful, for long millennia denied their minimum of human opportunity, should not be mocked by promises of pearly gates and golden streets and resounding harps in heaven, while throughout all ages their rich and powerful exploiters would with the divine benediction enjoy the abundance of an earth presumably created and governed by a just and loving heavenly Father. Every Jew who had inherited a spark of the prophetic spirit believed in a God of justice and mercy. The apocalyptic expectation adds a strident note of urgency to prayer for the coming of the kingdom of God and a bitter poignancy to the sense of social injustice which go markedly beyond the prophet. In adopting the language of the apocalypses Jesus put himself squarely behind the complaints of the poor and oppressed who for 3,000 years had been crying for redress and who still, after 2,000 years more, look in vain for social and economic justice. He puts the seal of his approval upon their revolutionary hope. How it is to be realized is left for modern good will, ingenuity, and intelligence to discover. But, if his followers value Jesus' moral judgments, they can never rest in a social order which surfeits its few and starves its millions.

A Gift of God

JAMES MOFFATT

A HUNDRED years ago, when *The Last Essays of Elia* were published, the delighted readers of Charles Lamb found a piece upon the "Barrenness of the Imaginative Faculty in the Productions of Modern Art." Lamb had been viewing two pictures which were exhibited in London. One portrayed the vision of the writing on the wall to Belshazzar; the other was a delineation of Joshua's victory in the valley of Ajalon; in both the critic marked the failure of the artist. Instead of concentrating on the effect produced by the vision on Belshazzar alone, as the tale in Daniel narrates, the artist drew a sketch of the whole company being overcome by a vulgar panic or consternation, a "mere animal anxiety for the preservation of their persons." No concentration upon the awe of the monarch, which was the essential feature of the tale! Again, the other picture showed a battle scene, but the solitary figure of Joshua the leader did not strike the eye as it should; the artist made the miracle sink "into an anecdote of the day." Now, Lamb comments, if we leave out Hogarth, is there any painter of the past fifty years who "has treated a story imaginatively"? He proceeds to define "imaginatively" by arguing that a true artist is so impressed by his subject that "it has seemed to direct him, not to be arranged by him." The artist is dominated by the central points of the subject, so that he dare not let his fancy play around it, "lest he should falsify a revelation." In other words, he does not take the opportunity of showing off his own powers; he does not lose sight of the vital center of the subject, which ought always to dominate and to direct the mind.

Lamb shared the faith of the romantic movement which was then rousing men to perceive the crucial distinction between imagination and fancy, the distinction which is familiar to us in Wordsworth and Coleridge and later in Ruskin. Without entering into any philosophic analysis of the terms, we may recall that it reversed the Platonic view which had made fancy or fantasy the real power, and imagination the lower. That, however, was not much more than a verbal change. The substantial achievement was to show that imagination is intuition, or an insight into realities which do not strike the eye, whereas fancy is the uncontrolled play of the mind. It is supremely important for us to grasp this truth, for imagination is a gift of God which enters into our moral as well as into our mental activities; it is a quality belonging to our religion, as

most of us come to realize when we reflect upon experience or take account of our activities, whether we are artists or not. It is a good question to ask ourselves, do we make proper use of this gift, so far as we possess it, or do we appreciate it properly when it is provided for us by others?

Commonly people think and talk of mere imagination as the opposite of matter-of-fact truth. There is some excuse for this error, as so-called imagination has been often merely amusing, if not positively misleading. It has come to be distrusted by serious thinkers, just because it has deluded men and played tricks with them, in practical affairs or in speculative reconstructions of the world. But, as Wordsworth once urged, this is not imagination; it is fancy. Imagination is the ally, not the foe, of reason. Whilst fancy plays with the externals and superficial features of life, real imagination deals with the inner beauty and power of things under the surface. Fancy may indeed have its place; the sportive faculty which makes the mind play with things, is legitimate, as pages of Charles Lamb prove. But this is simply what Wordsworth calls the secondary grace of Nature, presenting us with no more than

Apt illustrations of the moral world
Caught at a glance, or traced with curious pain.

Imagination is serious, not merely the knack of making pictures but the capacity of seeing things as they are and of divining what they are to become. That is, imagination is equivalent to

Clearest insight, amplitude of mind,
And reason in her most exalted mood.

The scientific movement, which followed the romantic, furnished rich confirmation of this truth, as it set itself to interpret nature. For the scientific mind makes special demands upon the imagination. We speak glibly about the "scientific mind" as though it meant attention to what is perceived by the senses, and little more; whereas science is repeatedly warning us not to trust our senses implicitly. Astronomy and geology in particular require what in religion we call "sight of things unseen," a sort of faith which leads us actually to contradict the evidence of our senses or to transcend what we can verify by sight and hearing. So is it with history. All progress here depends upon the alliance of research with imagination. In this department also insight means wide thought and trained reflection, careful observation of data, and yet something which is more than mere accuracy. So far as literature goes, indeed, many people learn to appreciate imagination

in history even more readily than they do in poetry or in creative fiction. When we come across traces of it, like streams in the desert, we know that we are in touch with a first-class mind; we at once perceive the difference between the historian and the chronicler. Carlyle is an instance in point. He reveals the power of instructed imagination in his flashes of real insight, struck out of wide, patient research into the past as well as into the present. In a scene or in a decisive event he reveals the salient factor, the moving personality. He pierces to the vital core, and refuses to allow minutiae to obscure the central circumstance. Just as in science genius shows immense powers of observation combined with the insight of imagination—Darwin is a good illustration—so in the realm of history this principle, which is argued cogently in the third book of Mill's *Logic*, indicates the perception of the things that really matter, amid the welter of things that simply happen. In both cases you find imagination operating in a full mind. There may be fullness of knowledge without imagination. Do we not know learned persons who in ten minutes or in two pages will reduce any vital subject from gold to lead? Some of the most uninspiring books in the world have been written upon the inspired scriptures of the race? There may be learning without imagination, but there is never real imagination apart from fundamental brain-work, in literature or in life.

I venture to press the function of the imagination in history because it enters into a living faith and a serious hope, so far as religion is concerned. It was a wise Greek who said that "not to know what was done in the world before one was born, is to remain always a child." Now a child is imaginative, but its imagination is largely fanciful, just because it possesses insufficient experience, and there are people around us to-day, especially the self-styled prophets of our age, who in this sense are mere children, because, for all their well-meaning schemes of reconstruction, they have not penetrated into the inner realities of human nature as history discloses them. Many a program of social reform is childish; it is handicapped by nothing more than its lack of trained insight and by its impatience of any reflection upon the past. The forward look, as it is called in our jargon, never commands serious attention, if it is not taking account of what we mean by memory and tradition. Its generous, cheerful optimism has imaginative qualities, but they are too often impaired by a defective outlook upon the living past, with its witness to the eternal, significant forces that work under the surface of human nature in various nations.

At the opposite side there are discouraged people, disheartened by the appearance of things at present, who might find a source of renewed hope

and courage if they had enough of the scientific mind or of historical imagination to see that the Christian religion has always enjoyed the privilege of being in danger. Indeed the church, as any student of history knows, has rarely been in more danger than when it thought itself safe. It is a cordial for drooping spirits to look back now and then upon the long story of their religion, and to see or to be shown that the Christian faith has survived crises at least as serious as that of the present day. What takes the heart out of many people is no more than their lack of imagination. They allow things present to preoccupy their attention, instead of seeing them in their right focus and proportions. The vision of history which imagination reveals is an insight into the things which cannot be shaken.

Man is soon deprest—
A thoughtless thing, who, once unblest,
Does little on his memory rest,
Or on his reason.

Which of us does not know people who are starving their hopes by neglecting their memories? I am not contending that historical imagination is invariably accurate. It may degenerate into fanciful sport. It is not an infallible guide, for men may see what they want to see in the far past, and there is a perversion of this imagination familiar to us all, especially in the pseudo-biography of the present day—I mean, the trick of touching up the past with colors from the palette of prejudice. But this does not affect the argument. It is an abuse of the method, not essential to it.

It is not rhodomontade to say that all the finer qualities and loyalties of life depend upon some imagination. Thus, we see the beloved cause in its continuity as no outsider sees it. We see that it is bigger and better than ourselves, and as we enter into its inner meaning by a study of its career we realize afresh that it will survive our fears for its future. All religious faith, as it is real, is devotion to this unseen reality, which we imagine for ourselves until it calls out our allegiance and commands our service. For example, to say, "I believe in the holy, catholic Church" is an act of faith. It is never said truly by men and women who merely see the Church as an institution before their eyes; for the outward creed and organization count as they reflect inward powers of the living God. Christians believe in the Church because they see it with the eye of faith. "I believe in the holy, catholic Church"—that is not the recognition of something which strikes the senses, but the conviction which arises from insight into the realities of God under the surface even of things sacred, an insight, of course, ripened

by contact with the fellowship and by loyalty to the cause. One reason why people faint in hope and courage is in many cases because for various causes they are not allowing the unseen order of God to come within the eye and prospect of their souls, but are content to rest their confidence upon statistics or buildings or on something that meets the senses. They are failing to use the gift of imagination, and so they miss what is really significant.

One illustration of this failure may be found in our difficulty of conceiving how God can have any individual interest in human beings. How can one imagine that the infinite God, above space or time, the Lord of this vast cosmos, should care for specks like human individuals? So we tell ourselves or we are told. And the difficulty has been heightened by modern science, it is urged. Is it not absurd to imagine that our transient race on this tiny planet, as it swings through space, should appeal to God? What is man, small and unreliable and perishing, that He should be interested in each of them? It is a difficulty, but surely a difficulty not of reason but of an imperfect imagination. Once we grant, as we do in our faith, that God is not to be measured by considerations of size, and that moral qualities must reveal and appeal to Him more than any material display, why should we not be strong enough to imagine it possible that the living God should direct and care for those made in His likeness? May not the misgivings be due to a failure of imagination to think out the implications of our faith? The trouble with many of us is that we allow our imagination to be so dulled and daunted by influences of what we see and hear in our immediate environment that we are too feeble to think out our notion of God with the same vigor with which a scientist thinks out the action and interaction of molecules and atoms and cells. Why, knowing what we know about the Lord Jesus Christ, should it be thought incredible that God is the Father of spirits and interested in the souls He has made, one by one? I am not denying the immense problems of belief in a personal providence. I am simply asking whether these may not be due in part to a failure of the instructed imagination which constitutes faith.

"Instructed," I say, for to use the imagination rightly does not come by instinct in the religious sphere. One of the tasks falling to those who are responsible for their fellows within the church is often to stir and to direct this gift of God. Faith which is sometimes indistinguishable from hope is "the evidence or conviction of things unseen." As we believe, we are refusing to be intimidated or dominated by appearances or by any show of things, however contrary it may loom. Now in this exercise of our imagination some help is undoubtedly afforded by the very scriptures of the faith,

where we note how imagination, like the sense of beauty and the feeling for music, is given to men in various measures, pre-eminently to the seers, whose messages are conveyed through imaginative expression. The supreme words of the prophets, for example, and the parables of our Lord illustrate the truth that the most moving statements of faith do not invariably take the form of logical affirmation or formulas. They touch and thrill the imagination; the vision of inner realities comes through vivid, pictorial symbols. Well, the most effective preaching shares this quality. It reinforces argument or pleading with a touch of suggestiveness. Indeed we might go further and allow that in symbolism, in the sacraments and in religious art, there is provision for the imagination, a provision which ought to be at once rich and wisely handled. Why should it be supposed that the final or the only expression of a truth is some logical or theological definition? May not some truths about God be set forth now and then figuratively, rather than by way of formulas, inasmuch as faith is something more than belief in a fact or assent to an argument? Any knowledge of human nature convinces us that the deep values of life are frequently brought home to ordinary men through appeals to their imagination no less than by onsets on their reasoning faculties. The gift of imagination ought not to be left isolated from the sphere of abstract thought in our religious experience, if that is to be adequately served.

But we need to instruct ourselves also in this matter, for the abuse of imagination is almost as notorious as its neglect. In a youthful essay Napoleon observed that a disorderly imagination was the cause and source of human misfortune. He tried in later life to suppress the essay, but he had no reason to be ashamed of this particular statement, for his own career showed the power of orderly imagination in strategy and in legislation. As he once remarked, in the middle of his life, "the vice of modern legislation is that it makes no appeal to the imagination," or, we might add, makes a foolish appeal to it. In common life the disorderly imagination, which sits loose to reasoning, leads to day-dreaming, in youth especially, and as we grow older to idle fancies or to the habit of conjuring up apprehensions of evil. The latter is the curse of the sensitive mind, this "taking thought for the morrow," and one part of our self-discipline, or of real religious education, is to deliver ourselves and others from such morbid forecasts of the future. Another disorderly use of the imagination is the use of it to devise evil. How significant it is that, with only one exception, the term "imagination" is employed by the Bible in a bad sense! "God saw that every imagination of the thoughts of man was only evil." "He hath

scattered the proud in the imagination of their hearts." And so on. All men make pictures in their minds. Their devices and desires take shape and rouse them to fulfill aims that are often a menace to God and man alike. It is an object-lesson for ourselves. The children of this generation, it would seem, are wiser than the children of light, in their perverse use of imagination, for good people do appear dull, compared to those who display such amazing ingenuity in drawing up and forwarding schemes of mischief. The latter have an unhallowed insight into the weaknesses of their fellow-creatures; they see opportunities of selfish profit before the possibility of this ever dawns upon the eyes of the upright, and they are sustained in their evil courses by the vision of such ends. Sometimes one can hardly keep from admiring the originality of evil, the inventiveness and insight into human nature that characterize certain organizations. Around us are movements that stir suspicion in sane minds; they may outrage our sense of justice or shock our moral judgment or offend our taste. One may deplore their lack of principle, and yet does not one wish that the saints had anything like the same spirit of enterprise and initiative? Bolshevism, Gandhism, Communism, and the like may be a reproach and worse to any country, but they win their short day by means of a practical appeal to the imagination which is a challenge to many Christians.

Or, to take an example from sound activity, consider the imagination that goes to concrete enterprises in commerce or in pioneering. At the heart of such ventures there is a man of vision, who sees possibilities of developing trade or of opening up a country long before anyone else does. He dares to act upon his faith. Mr. Kipling, whose gift of imagination is so prominent an element in his own genius, is well justified in wondering whether "any eminent novelist, philosopher, dramatist, or divine of to-day, has to exercise half the pure imagination, not to mention insight, endurance, and self-restraint, which is accepted without comment in what is called the material exploitation of a new country," or, we might add, in the plans of those who have to handle food supply and finance. These men often have to exercise the same instinct of imagination as a great chess-player, who tries to forecast the results of his move on the board. There is the same need of looking ahead, of anticipating, with a sense of responsibility, the probable outcome of what has to be done. In practical life, a great business enterprise always means that some one has seen below the surface of things what matters and what was going to matter in the next few years. He takes risks, he commits himself to the venture; his imagination is a motive-power, swaying his judgment and nerving him to action. Is it not a lesson to

religious people, that the divine gift of imagination is intended to be set to work not in order to make pretty pictures of some ideal social order, nor of what Christianity might be if it were remolded a little nearer to our heart's desire, but to apprehend in a fresh way the possibilities of human nature as the sphere of God, to grasp the unexhausted resources of God's order so keenly that the realities of His power and purpose stir us to new ventures? Loyalty and patience and fresh initiative go back ultimately to a diligent use of the gift of imagination, which is comparable to the exercise of the same in things material. "Let us run, looking to Jesus." "We faint not . . . while we look at the things which are not seen."

So it is with love, for not only faith and hope but charity may be said to be reinforced by the imagination. Whatever widens the imagination is likely to deepen the ethical power of sympathy and render life less stolid and cold, bringing us to take a more genuine interest in our fellows. Why are some men unjust or cruel? Why do so many Christians fail in social sympathy? Is it not at bottom a failure in imagination? They do not recognize abuses at their very door, because they will not take the trouble to conceive how some of their fellow-beings have to live, in classes of society other than their own. It does not readily occur to them to think of the handicaps under which their neighbors may be suffering. Consequently it is a service to bring before their minds the variety of human life, in the hope that their sympathies may be quickened by a vision of their fellows in need or in want. What lies at the root of much social selfishness and indifference is nothing but a lack of insight. There are people so unimaginative, so provincial, constitutionally so dull and self-centered, that they may require to be shaken into a perception of life as it is being lived around them. The unselfish man is invariably a man of some imagination, who has learned to use this gift, not simply to forecast the consequences of any action for himself but to realize how what he does or leaves undone may affect his neighbor. "Evil is wrought by want of thought," Hood sang in one of the social poems by means of which he strove, not without effect, to rouse the conscience of England. "Evil is wrought by want of thought," that is, of imagination, "as well as by want of heart." Yet we may say that it is the thoughtless or unimaginative who are really heartless. There are indeed men and women who are deliberately cruel, but more folk are guilty of damaging others because they seldom or never seem to think of what their actions involve outside their own interests. When it is brought home to them, they will protest, "But I never thought of that! I never intended my conduct to produce that result!" Precisely. So it is one function of the

preacher, or anyone who has the ear of his fellows, to arouse them to a vital sense of what sluggish prejudice or hasty impulse may mean for themselves or for their neighbors. One of the moral dangers in life is to engage in some project of pleasure or profit without pausing to imagine the consequences. There is no way of avoiding this peril except by a cool use of the moral and mental faculty which we are accustomed to call our imagination.

The applications of this gift are obviously as varied as our temperaments, but the common point is this, that now-a-days we need to exercise our imagination in religion so that we may keep before our own minds and before the minds of others the unseen order of Goodness, Beauty, and Truth, which is at once the rich object and the source of our best intuitions, and far more real than any phenomena that may happen to impress or dazzle the senses. In the last analysis, what is faith but the confidence of things hoped for, the conviction of things unseen? When these become dull or unreal to us, the fault lies with ourselves, as, in Charles Lamb's words about the artist, we may "falsify the revelation" by introducing pretty fancies of our own into it, or as we fail to employ the divine gift of imagination, which is far from being a mere trick of style or language, and never to be confounded with an agile sentimental desire to evade the pressure of actual facts. The gift of imagination is a moral and mental faculty which has to be exercised. For men do not become assured of things unseen, unless they school themselves by prayer and meditation to receive and to retain the imprint of such realities, instead of allowing them to be smothered by a mass of less important details and interests in the passing show. The truest stimulus comes to us, not as we fix our eyes on fashionable fancies of the day, but as we permit the realities of God's eternal order to fill the mind until they become motive-powers of life, levers of energy in our environment, on which we are prepared to act, just because they reveal to us the supreme values of existence. It is only to a real life of mind and heart that Goodness, Beauty, and Truth ever become real. Otherwise they dwindle into abstractions. The things of God that belong to our peace are not disclosed to any life content to be governed by impressions and impulses of the hour, seldom looking below the surface of things or beyond the circle of immediate sensations. When we share the results of our gathering experience, do we not agree that it is only by steady thought, devotion, moral self-surrender, in our best moments, that we ever arrive at any clearer vision of the unseen order, such as enables us to hold on without flinching, when appearances seem to contradict our faith, and enables us also to speak, upon occasion, of these high matters with heightened insight and some vivid utterance?

The Totalitarian State

W. F. LOFTHOUSE

POLITICS after the Great War have brought into common use a crop of new and uncouth names. Fascism itself was unheard of before 1918; so, for most people, was Jugoslavia; while Russia has given us Bolshevism, Ogpu and the like, all the more weird because in our modern "Staatsanschauungen" we have to deal with complex organizations which we wish to be able to name with clearness and speed. Any abbreviation will serve our turn.

Germany, however, is giving us the beginnings of a vocabulary of its own. This was to be expected, since the German language, outwardly so like English in many respects, contains hardly a word in the field of thought or speculation which can be rendered adequately by another word in English, or indeed in any other tongue; and because German political and philosophical conceptions have a way of clothing themselves with a clarity and a subtlety which are both of them foreign to the genius of other nations. And if our simpler English minds are perplexed even by "mugwumps" and "stand-patters," what shall we say to *Volkstum* and *Gleichschaltung*?

Yet it is quite impossible to understand German politics or the deeper thoughts on which political action in Germany is built, unless we make the attempt to understand the terms, *Volkstum* especially. *Volk* is, by heredity, the same as the English *folk*. But *folk* in English, at least in modern English, is a more or less vague and easy-going word; "a kindly folk," we say, of the general disposition of a village or a town; "folk think," when we refer to a general popular opinion. And even when we talk about *folk*-lore or *folk*-dances, we refer for the most part to popular and traditional tales or the pleasant traditional gyrations of the countryside. In Germany, *Volk* is very different. It is a serious and solemn word. It denotes a community of people who have a common way of thinking, feeling, interpreting life, and even praying. It is based on the common elements of race and dwelling-place or territory. As such, it is something *given*. It has its definite roots in the past; it has developed owing to a certain inner necessity of its own; it cannot be interfered with save with great danger; it has a definite contribution to make to the life of the world; it is, in short, a "holy" thing. And to the German, while he will allow that there is an English *Volk*, an Italian *Volk*, and even a French *Volk*, the German *Volk* is the noblest and most important thing in the world. Its oppression or destruction would mean catastrophe and chaos.

Such a *Volk*, however, must possess and preserve unity. It is a *common* way of thought and feeling. But in this complex world in which we live, every actual nation is shot through with influences, aims, ambitions, of all kinds. Indeed, in any one territory, representatives of all races will be found making their home. America is naturally the most striking example of this unfortunate but inevitable fact. But Germany, because of its complicated and often distressing history, a history which was already old when the Indians were still ranging the plains and woods of Massachusetts and Connecticut, has suffered from the disease even more deeply. For her alien elements are not the result of recent immigration due to economic causes; they have grown up in her midst through centuries, only to be torn asunder like the warp from the woof.

Yet the *Volk* must be harmonized and unified if it is to do its heaven-appointed work. All the rough places and crooked ways that have resulted from the drums and tramlings and counter-marchings of centuries must be levelled out; inequalities must be removed; and, however costly and painful the surgical operation, foreign intrusions, deep-seated as they may be, must be gouged out. The *Volk* must be rejuvenated; uniformity must be gained and symbolized by uniform, the impressive dress of the mind, the faith, and even the limbs.

Thus we arrive at the real meaning of a second word in the modern German vocabulary, *Gleichschaltung*, "regimenting" into complete conformity. Every single institution—parliament, the press, the platform, the professorial chair, the sports field, and the pulpit—must be *gleichgeschaltet*. To outsiders, this sounds like tyranny, a tyranny which might move the respect or the envy of the Vatican. To its unfortunate victims, who have thus to be levelled down or squeezed out, it means distress and perhaps ruin; to the true son of the German *Volk*, who can understand the aspirations of the soul of his Fatherland, and has watched it trying to shake off the chains forged by centuries of political error and blindness and misfortune, it is the dawn of a new age; and even if it should come up like thunder, as the dawn sometimes will, it would herald the sun shining in his strength.

The state—that is, the *Volk* in its political aspect—thus becomes comprehensive; it includes all these various elements, since all the elements that are left are now in a fit condition to work together for a common aim. Partisanship, jealousy, friction even, are gone. The State is *total*, "totalitarian," one, complete and indivisible. Not that Germany can yet be said to be this, even by the warmest sympathizers of the new regime; it has not

attained (though the prophets would claim that it is far nearer to attainment than six, or even three months ago); but it presses on, beholding its goal ever more and more clearly.

The conceptions enshrined in these three words, thus briefly and summarily described, may be said to embody the phenomenon of modern or "Hitlerite" Germany. And it cannot be denied that "Hitlerite" Germany demands attention. The features of Adolf Hitler himself, whether caricatured in comic journals or depicted on the cover of his latest book, *Mein Kampf* (My Struggle), are not easily forgotten. The general idea of the "totalitarian state," indeed, is no discovery of Hitler's. Pope and Emperor strove by their grandiose but ineffectual methods to reach it in the Middle Ages. Tudors and Stewarts desired it, and would have welcomed it if they could have seen more than its fleeting shadows. Mussolini and Lenin have both grasped at it, the former with a great deal less talking than Hitler; the latter with even more. But only Germany, at all events since the Reformation, has buoyed it up with a philosophy. The Holy Roman Empire, though attacked by a hundred warring factions, possessed a magnificent strength because it could be supported by an Aquinas and a Dante. It began to totter when philosophy deserted it for the newer idea of nationality. Fascism has a philosophy of its own—rather a bastard philosophy, its critics would say. All careful and competent exponents of Bolshevism, like Julius Hecker in his "Moscow Dialogues," emphasize Moscow's debt to Lenin, and Lenin's to Marx, and Marx's to the Hegelian dialectic. Germany, too, goes back to Hegel, and to that wider philosophy of the Romantic movement at the beginning of the last century which, doomed to watch the downfall of all German political hopes under the hammer blows of Napoleon, fled for refuge to the spiritual regions where Napoleon could not enter, and where the German *Geist* could feel its powers and grow conscious of its destiny.

Yet even Kant and Hegel were not wholly reliable guides. Kant, so typical a German in his method of thinking, was yet too much of an internationalist. His category was humanity rather than *Germanity* (if the word may be pardoned as a translation of *Germanentum*); his "categorical imperative" was for all men rather than for all Germans, and he toyed dangerously with a project of universal peace. Hegel did better with his conception of an absolute state; but unfortunately this Absolute in the world of politics, though it might seem to have learnt its language from the parade-grounds of Prussia, was clearly meant not for a country but for mankind. The true and instructed German will beware of philosophy, as he will beware of the

Jews. The professors themselves will have to submit to the process of *Gleichschaltung*.

It will be clear, even from the above, that Hitlerism¹ is a new thing in Europe and in the world. It challenges our verdict. It claims our respect or praise. It intends to build a new Germany, a new Europe, a new world. It will have no neutrals. You must be for it or against it. And if it crashes, it is quite sure that the world will crash with it.

Clearly we cannot settle accounts with it by commendation or blame. Both are easy enough. The "hundred-per-cent American" must admire so thoroughgoing an assertion of the State against all foreigners and aliens and immigrants; and the English "fascists" cannot well refuse to admire one who has in so many ways "Mussolinized" Germany. On the other hand, one who has watched the boycott of the Jews, the expulsion of the professors, and the high-handed unification of the churches, may well rub his eyes and ask, "What next?" But mere praise and blame in matters of this kind are both of little value. The first, and the last, necessity is to understand.

The first condition of such understanding is to remember that Germany, right through the Middle Ages and indeed up to 1866, was not a country, but, like Italy before the *Risorgimento*, a "geographical expression." Germany had no kings, no parliaments. The so-called German Emperor was never an emperor of Germany. Germany was cut up into scores of more or less independent states, all of them naturally or absurdly jealous of one another. Her unity, like ancient Greece but unlike modern India, was based on language, culture (an emphatically German word), and religion; though in religion, since Luther, she has been divided between the Catholics and the Evangelicals or Protestants; and among the latter, the latest ordinance dealing with the Church by the new government has had to recognize twenty-eight separate groups. In the tempest of liberalism which swept over Europe in 1848, the German enthusiasts who met at Frankfurt dreamt that a German republic, one and comprehensive, was at last to arise; but their dreams were shattered. Yet what the tongue and the pen could not do in 1848, the sword really did accomplish in 1866

¹ The follower of Hitler would be the first to disclaim or to deprecate this term. He is a "national-socialist," a cumbersome term which he shortens to *Nazi*, just as Russia has coined its portmanteau-words of *Comsomol* and *Gosplan*. But *national socialism* is not a very informing term. Most German political parties since the war have introduced *social* or *socialist* into their nomenclature; and to the Nazis, the Social Democrats are as the devil. The element of *national* is clear enough, though other parties might lay claim to it. What the *socialist* will amount to is still obscure; for while the party has swallowed all the trade unions in existence in the country, the meal can hardly be said as yet to have been digested. On the other hand, Hitler is the undoubted leader and soul of the party, whatever his chief lieutenants may think about him and his position; and neither *national* nor *socialist* has any meaning save the meaning that Hitler chooses to give to the terms.

and 1871. Then at last true Germans could say "Deutschland über alles"; "over Bavaria, Hesse, Württemberg, Saxony, and even Prussia—Germany, the Mother of us all!"

Alas, even after the Versailles of 1871 came disillusionment. Bismarck, that valiant hater, had more to do with foes within the *Reich*, than foes without. Austria (German to the core, as all Germans hold) was distinct; and when the pilot was dropped and the Emperor took command of the vessel, socialists, Jews, Catholics, and "little-Germans" of various kinds broke his slumbers as constantly as the politicians of St. Petersburg or Paris or London. Encircled by her enemies outside, she was torn by factions within.

Then came 1914, when (at least to outside appearance) Germany was once more "above all." Prussians, Saxons, Rhinelanders, all fought side by side; and if the march on Paris had been completed as it was planned, the Hall of Mirrors at Versailles might have given birth to a yet more compact Germany—unless perhaps it should have been doomed to offer another example of Sir Norman Angell's generalizations about victory.

But the war did not go "according to plan." In the long-drawn out agony of the struggle, Germany suffered miseries that were unknown to England and even France, and wholly unimagined by America, on whose abundant breakfast-table no hand was ever laid; miseries that were intensified by the brutality of the subsequent blockade. Even before the armistice, a revulsion of feeling had grown up against the war, comparable to that which heralded the Revolution in Russia, and which really paved the way for the early successes of Mussolini in Italy. The returning soldiers—poor wretches—were despised; the army became a by-word; the uniform was scoffed at.² Even during the war the profiteer (as in all other countries) had been busy. In Germany he was generally a Jew (though Jews had also trooped to join the colors); and in the black days after Versailles, it was only the Jew who had money to spend; he not only spent it; he flung it about.

After Versailles! Those days gave the socialists also their chance. They had been duped in 1914. War was a gigantic folly. So was all this "hurrah-patriotism." Brotherhood, peace, internationalism, were the true watchwords of mankind. And with the example of Russia just across the frontier—Russia with its "third international," and its appeal (made far more confidently then than ten years later) to the "proletariat of all

² All this is well described in the second of Remarque's two war-books, *The Way Back*, a book that could be bought anywhere in Germany two years ago, but is unobtainable now.

nations" to unite—Communism sprang into a vigorous youth. To Communism, Germany, German history, German ideals, German literature and German religion meant—nothing. Meanwhile the Jews, always skilled (so well had they been schooled by the Christians through the ages) to fish in troubled waters, seized their new opportunities. To them, as to the Communists, with whom they began to recognize some twisted affinity, Germany was nothing. But profit and advancement were much, and they found their chances in the press, in commerce, in literature, in the professions (especially law and medicine), in the laboratory, on the stock-exchange, of course, and in the new industry of the cinema. Wherever you looked there was the Jew. And where you found one Jew to-day, you would find three to-morrow. The Jew was alert, he was efficient. He might be entirely conscientious, but he was an alien; he did not profess to be anything else. He did not exist for the State, the State existed for him. And though, for the most part, his family life was quite respectable (in contrast to a great many modern developments in the German towns), he was quick to see the promising markets for pornography and the like in literature and the cinema—has not *Jew Süß* itself been one of the most successful of recent novels?

All this is no exaggeration of the confusion in Germany after the war. And it was increased by events which outside Germany received little attention, but which inside Germany will not be easily forgotten—the "black shame," as it was called, when France insisted on quartering her native African troops (drilled and uniformed savages) in the German occupied towns; the ruthless measures of disarmament however well-deserved they may have been; the insistence that Germany should take upon herself the whole guilt of the war (of course she never did so conscientiously; but what nation ever would?); the loss of all her colonies and her shipping; and finally, to crown all, the dreadful "inflation period," in which the savings of all the middle classes were swallowed up. She was driven forth, as she was made to feel, a "pariah among the nations." What wonder that with all the best and most promising of her sons lying dead on the battle-field, she became a prey to confusion and bewilderment, ready to listen to any political quack, shuddering as she surveyed France on one side of her and Poland on the other, like a man in pyjamas between two foes armed to the teeth, and certain only that all her past hopes and convictions had fallen around her in irretrievable ruin.

We are now in a position to understand the rise, at first slow, then rapid, but always steady, of Hitler. Not a German by birth, but an

Austrian (and therefore watching what he felt to be the progressive "de-Germanization" of that half-German, half-Slav state), he managed to enlist in the German army; fought honorably through the war, and came out of it, as he had gone in, an enthusiast, not for the Kaiser, nor for the old government, which had fallen, never to be revived, but for the German race and German ideals. The eastern half of Central Europe is the home of a medley, a *pot-pourri* of nationalities, as every discriminating map makes clear, but as few English or Americans trouble to reflect. To Hitler, this meant war—not necessarily the war of the knife or the bomb, but a struggle which could only end by the subordination or even the expulsion of the alien. To this end he formed the "National Socialist German Workers' Party." It was dissolved (as later he himself was to dissolve so many parties) in 1923, and he was himself imprisoned; but before long he had caught the imagination of the German youth. Half the vague idealism which had gone, immediately after the war, to build up the German "Youth-movement," found its true home with him; and in 1931 it could be said that in Germany everyone under forty was either a Nazi or a Communist.

He was no Mussolini; he did not leap into fame or power by a triumphant march on the capital. He could never have treated von Hindenburg as Mussolini treated the Italian monarch. Nor was he a Lenin, prompt to travel across Europe with a philosophical gospel and a revolutionary scheme ready to be applied at a moment's notice in the wreck of an ancient civilization. He was rather a man of one idea, with an extraordinary power of getting that idea (the colloquialism is perhaps appropriate here) "across." Not that he is merely a man of words. His writings, quite numerous considering his active life, and especially the book already referred to, *My Struggle*, would be enough to disprove this; and now that he has reached supreme power, there has appeared in him (or is it in his lieutenants Goehring and Goebbels?) a faculty of swift and decisive action which suggests the working out of a plan formed long since.

None the less his whole political activity can be summed up in one word, "race." He is the champion of the German race,³ the German blood, the German *Volk*. The Germans are Aryans, "Nordics"; the truest representatives, indeed of this ancient and magnificent stock, the finest upon earth. Englishmen have not been wholly blind to its glories; both the

³The German word is *Rasse*, and a convenient and suggestive antithesis can be formed between the Hitlerite conception of *Rasse* and the Leninist or communist conception of *Masse*, or *mass* (as opposed in Bolshevik language to *class*). Communism is international, and cares nothing for race or descent. It is what the ancient Greeks would call "ochlocratic," the politics of the crowd, with the inevitable consequence of the domination of one commanding intellect. But such despotism lies in wait for the exaltation of race and of mass alike.

Bishop of Birmingham and the Dean of Saint Paul's have dallied with them. But Hitler takes them in dead earnest. He has found a symbol for them in the *Swastika* or hooked cross (the *Hakenkreuz*, as the Germans call it). This, to English eyes an ancient Indian device, familiar on the title-pages of Kipling's books, is to the Nazis almost what the Cross is to Christians, the venerable sign of all that is most sacred to them. They connect it, not with India (save in so far as the Indians too belong to the Aryan race), but with the original Germanic religion which their scholars have begun to study afresh—it must be confessed with a good deal of imaginative facility. This hoary faith, disinterred from a forgotten past, with its emphasis on the course of the sun from solstice to solstice, is even held to have originated the conceptions which are characteristic of Christianity. Before the war, H. S. Chamberlain and Paul Haupt (who surely would have rejoiced to see Hitler's day) had concluded that Jesus himself (*salva reverentia*) was an Aryan; and now a certain Doctor Wirth contends that Calvary itself points to the Germanic runes, to the ancient monuments at Extern, and even to Stonehenge.

We must not credit Hitler himself with all this foolery; but there can be no doubt that it falls in very conveniently with a conception which the German language, with its love of compound adjectives, might well call mythical-material and fanatical-practical. It is the fulfillment of those deep-seated aspirations of the race which attest their own validity, and with which neither Jews nor Frenchmen can have anything to do.

Hitler, however, is no dreamer. Though he speaks of race and blood like a prophet, he lays down the way to his new regime like a priest. If the comparison were not likely to be odious to his anti-Semitism, we might even call him the Ezekiel, the prophet-priest, of the new Jerusalem. From the first, his followers were drilled with military precision. Nor did he leave his public in any doubt as to the plans to be carried out when he gained power. He has but performed his promises and his threats. The Communists have stood for all that is anti-German. Away with them! The Jews are aliens and interlopers. Away with them too! The other parties in the State can only make for division and paralysis. They must be crushed, with all their leaders, however learned, or influential, or religious! The churches, as the most powerful guardians of the spiritual life, must be turned into supporters of the new Germanism; and in the name of Socialism—"National-Socialism," that is—the power of the great industrial and commercial magnates, smacking painfully of Semitism, must be broken.

With regard to the Church, indeed, Hitler has not had it all his own way. The Vatican, the guardian of the Catholic faith all over the world, has refused to be dictated to, and a *concordat* has been drawn up, with which Hitler, like Mussolini on a similar occasion, has expressed himself well pleased. At the bidding of the Chancellor, a new sect, the "German Christians," has arisen, which is to dominate and absorb all the Protestant regional churches or *Landeskirchen*; a ukase to this effect was published as recently as July 14, after the churches had shown a good deal of opposition to the plan; and it may be that before these lines appear in print Hitler's nominee will have become *Reichsbischof*, or head of the Imperial Evangelical Church.

"Omelettes cannot be made without breaking eggs." This is a revolution, and revolutions are rough things. That there have been acts of deplorable brutality and outrage, and of studied cruelty and oppression, is undeniable. There is a certain element of brutality in the German character (as in that of most nations); and the Allies have done their best, at Versailles and afterwards, to intensify it. Yet the revolutionaries claim, with some justice, that they have been far milder, than, for example, the Jacobins. Hitler, they say, is another Cromwell; and they express some surprise if by English people this is not accepted as an excuse.

Mild or severe, this process of Germanization, this cult of race and blood, is a dangerous one. No nation can afford to expel numbers of its most learned and capable citizens, even if they are not hundred-per-cent German. Doubtless Louis XIV mistrusted the loyalty to his idea of the state in the Protestants who fled to England after the Revocation of the Edict of Nantes. Some of the Jewish doctors are already being reinstated. Even more ominous is the interference with philanthropists and social workers on the score of their "pacifism." Brotherhood among the nations is not a word to be spoken in Germany to-day.

England, indeed, is viewed by Hitler with respect and admiration. He makes no secret of the fact that he regards France as the "mortal foe," *Todfeind*, of Germany. Of the League of Nations the less said the better. Germany indeed disclaims all idea of aggression. But, like France in 1789, she has stamped her proud foot and said she will be free; and that freedom she hopes to win only by the sword. In such a mood, the nation cannot afford to take risks; and any one, however public-spirited his life, however unselfish his work, if he is under suspicion of not being a Nazi, will look in vain for employment or toleration.

What of the morrow? No one can say. At present, Hitler's writ runs everywhere. But there are those among his followers who would like

it to run still faster; and no one knows whether he or they will have the last word. Moreover, he is clearly holding the wolf by the ears. To-day, not a communist dares to defy him. But how many of his foes have been soundly converted? Let the pinch of poverty and unemployment tighten during the next winter, and who knows what sudden revulsion of feeling may come about?

But this much can be said. Ever since Versailles, that dreadful "improvisation," the victors have done their best to goad Germany to despair. Hitler stands for self-control, unity, sobriety, devotion to the State. If Communism is the great foe of all Western social ideals, Hitler is Communism's relentless enemy. Germany has given many noble gifts to the world. She has many more to give. After these fifteen years of humiliation, thwarting, and confusion, the stability, the permanence of the Germany we know, is in the hands of Adolf Hitler. He demands what England or America, had they experienced what has been meted out to Germany, would also have demanded, perhaps more loudly. As the Germans say, if Hitler falls, Germany will fall, and if Germany falls, Europe will once more be in confusion. Let us be just! Justice does not mean the vain attempt to pronounce an adequate verdict. Who can indict a nation? Are we so sure of the guilt of the millions of men, women, and little children who make up the Germany of to-day? Justice means so to treat your neighbor, or your rival, as you would wish in like case to be treated yourself. That is sound religion; it is also sound politics.

Religion in the Third Reich

JOHN LOUIS NUELSEN

IT is an evidence of the vitality of the Christian religion that the three revolutions that are changing the face of Europe find the religious problem as serious as any issue they have to deal with. The claim, sometimes made, that religion is no longer a dominant power in present day public life finds no support in revolutionary history of the last few years. The appraisal of the religious concept depends upon the underlying philosophy of life. It is philosophical. The attitude toward organized religion is to be explained by the relation of the existing types of church organizations to the former regime. It is historical. Different as are the philosophic and the historical attitudes, the revolutions themselves, especially the Russian Communist and the German Nazi revolutions, must be studied as religious movements, if their full significance is to be understood. They are not merely political or economic.

The Russian Revolution is aggressively opposed to religion. The historical reason is to be found in the fact that the Orthodox Church in Russia, the only form of organized religion known to the Russian, was inextricably bound up with the Czarist regime. It supplied the religious foundations of despotism. If Czarism was to go, the church must go likewise. Moreover, from the materialistic viewpoint of Communism every religion is considered "opium for the people." It has no place in the new humanity that is to be created upon the basis of materialistic collectivism. Hence the unrelenting efforts of the Russian revolution to liberate the mind from the handicap of the religious concept. But also the paradox that Communism has developed into a religion.

Italian Fascism is indifferent toward religion. The organized form it had to deal with is Roman Catholicism, Protestantism in Italy being a negligible quantity as far as its political influence is concerned. In Italy, however, the church was not the tool of the monarchy. On the contrary, the antagonism existing between Church and State made it possible for Mussolini to play the one against the other. Hence it was expedient to preserve both. Moreover, Roman Catholicism, unlike Russian Orthodoxy, is not a national, but the strongest international force, more compact and better organized than international Socialism or Communism. There was no reason for Fascism to deal with the Roman Catholic Church as Communism treated the Orthodox Church. The practical thing to do was to conclude a concordat granting the church freedom to function on condition

that it refrain from any political interference or activity. The restitution of a semblance of a Papal state was the price paid for the concession.

German Nationalism, far from being opposed or indifferent to religion, claims to be the best friend religion has to defend it against the attacks of communism, materialism, liberalism. It affirms its adherence to "positive Christianity" as represented by the Roman Catholic Church and by the Churches of the Reformation, and avows its desire to support the activities of the Christian Churches. The concrete ecclesiastical situation that German Nationalism faced was much more complicated than the situation in Russia or Italy. Forty-two per cent of all the citizens of Germany are members of the Roman Catholic Church. The Jews number about one-half per cent of the total population. Protestantism claims the balance. However, the Protestant forces do not form a single organization. They are divided into twenty-eight separate national churches (Landeskirchen), each independent of the other, connected only by the very slender bond of a Church Federation (Kirchenbund). Most of these twenty-eight autonomous churches are Lutheran, some are Reformed (Presbyterian), others, especially in Prussia, are Unionist Churches, that is to say, they form a Union between the Lutherans and the Reformed branches, more the result of compulsory measures enacted by King Frederick William of Prussia than of voluntary action on the part of the churches. Then there are free churches, such as the Methodist, Baptist, Evangelical Association and numerous local Free Churches. Until July, 1933, there was no German Church. That is to say, ecclesiastical legislation was not a function of the German Empire, but was left to the separate states constituting the Reich. Hence, while Bolshevism and Fascism were confronted by but one form of ecclesiastical organization, National-Socialism faced a variety of them.

THE MYSTICAL FACE OF THE THIRD EMPIRE

There are two reasons why the rulers of the new Germany should be tremendously interested in the religious question. One is a practical reason. The Roman Catholic Church in Germany was not only a spiritual communion, but formed a political party. The Center party was, next to the Social Democratic party, the strongest and by all odds the best organized party. It was the most compact political block and it held the balance of power. Its membership was held together not merely by political or economic interests but by religious persuasions. The Center party must be reckoned with and the Center party really meant the Roman Catholic Church. The Protestants did not form a political unit. They were to be

found in the various bourgeois parties; in fact they constituted the bulk of the several conservative parties. Among the Social Democrats there were only a very few church people. The very conservatism of the Lutheran Church and its loyalty to the monarchy had driven the labor movement into an attitude of hostility to the church. Both the Catholic Church and the various Protestant Churches being tax supported, there were constant jealousies and bickerings regarding State subsidies, prestige and privileges. Hence every government while of necessity dealing with the Catholic Church as an organized political party could not afford to ignore or to discriminate against the Protestant Churches if it did not wish to stir up opposition in the other parties. But more than that. National Socialism advances an ideal which is definitely religious. The Third Empire, as the new Nationalistic Germany is called, is a mystical religious conception. The Nazis consider it not a mere form of government which men according to their likes or dislikes may elect or discard, may change by popular vote. It is, as it were, a divine revelation; not an historic evolution but the consummation of the history of the German race; the divinely granted fulfillment of the longings and the dreams of former generations. The first Empire was the Holy Roman Empire of the German Emperors, culminating in the Hohenstaufens. The second Empire was the German Empire founded in blood and iron by Bismarck, culminating in the Hohenzollerns. The Third Empire is the new Germany. A new creation upon the foundation of racial purity, of social service, of the fear of God, of absolute obedience to the leader, of the sacrifice of personal liberty for the good of the whole nation, of the utter abandonment of self in the interest of the power and glory of the State. The Third Empire is a mystic concept. It is the realization in history of the eternal purposes of the Almighty with the German nation. The human instrument which God used to carry out his plans is Adolph Hitler. He is next to Martin Luther the greatest German; the most wonderful timely gift of God to the nation. This is the creed of the Nazi.

Many elements enter into the making of National Socialism. It is full of contradictions. Not all of its adherents are religious folk. Not all of the motives are pure and unselfish. Allowance must be made for the whole gamut of low and selfish, even criminal motives. Nor can we overlook the immense power of mass suggestion of which the Nazi leaders are past masters. But when everything is said the fact remains that National Socialism has infatuated the very best minds of the nation, that it commands the enthusiastic support of the whole student body, counts among its faithful

adherents thousands of pastors and teachers, representing theological liberalism as well as pietism and fundamentalism; and the only explanation for this fact is to be found in the spiritual power of the mystical face of the Third Empire.

It must be borne in mind that the Nazi revolution is the work of the younger generation whose whole make-up, physical, mental, emotional, moral, is the product of the war and its aftermath. The leaders are the boys of 1914 and the following years who were thrown from the school room into the trenches. Many of them are still younger. The leader of the German youth, who is in absolute control of all young people's organizations, is a man of 26 years of age. His lieutenant in one of the largest cities has just passed his twentieth milestone. They are a generation that never knew the security in which their fathers grew up. They are not accustomed to the processes of slow evolution. Their lives have not been built upon any enduring foundations, neither political, nor economic, nor moral, nor religious. They grew up in an atmosphere of sudden, sweeping changes brought about by brute force. Wholesale destruction of human lives by Gatling guns, bombs, gas. Revolution. Humiliating, grinding peace conditions imposed by relentless victors. Hunger and starvation as a result of that terrible hunger blockade enforced by the Allies. Occupation of German territory by Negro troops. Inflation, when money lost its value and they had to reckon with millions and billions, until they had lost all appreciation of the value of money. Talk of universal peace and disarmament and at the same time stupendous military preparations on the part of all the nations round about their own country. Grinding poverty, a growing inferiority complex, increasing unemployment, with hardly a chance to emigrate to some foreign country in order to make a living. Tens of thousands of young men and women who had spent years at the expense of their parents to prepare for a useful and productive life found themselves without the slightest prospect of obtaining employment. Life, to them, had lost its meaning.

Neither the republic nor the church helped them to solve their problem or held up to them any inspiring ideal. The Republic was a makeshift gotten up in haste. It never commanded the respect or love of the upper and middle classes. It never received more than lip service from the landed aristocracy, the militarists, the intellectuals, the church. It was considered the product of "godless revolution" and the cause of infamous betrayal of the "unconquered army," the direct result of the "accursed dictate of Versailles." It had no constructive program aside from paying

reparations. The only hope it held out was the gradual, very, very gradual lessening of the burden. Its parliamentary life was dominated by the unseemly wrangles of a bewildering number of parties. The whole life was dull, small, hard, bitter. No spark of hope. Nor did the church kindle any flame of enthusiasm. There were excellent scholars among the theologians, splendid Christian characters. But Lutheranism had nothing to offer except the hope of heaven for the individual and the consummation of the kingdom of God by the manifestation of divine power at the end of days. Even Karl Barth, than whom no theologian wielded a larger influence, insists that man can do absolutely nothing to bring about the kingdom of God. The very expression "building the Kingdom" is antichristian. Social reforms have no place in the program of the church. The Anglo-American conception of a "Social Gospel" was stamped by German Lutherans as evolutionary humanism, foreign to the Gospel of Christ. Pray, where was the young generation to turn for inspiration, for a compelling ideal?

Enters Hitler. One of the common people. A laboring man, a student, a volunteer in the army, a hero of the front, wounded, gassed. A martyr of his conviction, having been sentenced to prison on account of his political activities. A man with an idea. One idea. The idea of a new strong, victorious, glorious Germany, built upon the old foundation of the great and glorious First and Second Empires. But an Empire with a new content. Not a reprobation. A modern, national, and socialistic Empire, where there should be work for everybody, where the clash between classes should cease, where every private interest should be subordinated to the common weal: The kingdom of God in Germany. Hitler is a man of magnetic personality, a born orator, a spellbinder, a visionary, a fanatic. Personally a clean man. He neither drinks nor smokes, lives very abstemiously, is a lover of nature and of children. He is not married, but never has a breath of scandal touched his moral character. Moreover he is a keen student of human nature, an organizer, a master in handling masses. He is at home with the crowd. He is the "drummer of a new order" and he knows how to sell his goods. His promises are quite ample, so as to satisfy everybody; his program is sufficiently vague to repel no one. His denunciations of the enemies of Germany: the godless communists, the corrupt socialists, the unchristian pacifists, the French and especially the criminal Jews are unsparing, fanatical, so as to please those of lower instincts. His genuine, all consuming passionate love of the coming Third Reich, his firm expectation that it is at hand, that it merely requires faith, courage, daring,

to establish it and thus bring to the German Nation absolute deliverance and a glorious future: all of this gathers up the minds and wills of the emotionally unbalanced, nervously debilitated crowds before him into one uniform mass mind and will. All inhibitions are swept away. Here is an ideal, here is something worth living for and worth dying for: the Mystical Third Reich!

Every student of conditions in Germany has known for a number of years that a revolution was in the offing. The younger generation had lost confidence in the bourgeois leadership. The youth of the laboring classes turned to Communism, the white collar proletarians to Hitler. The important question was who should strike first. Hitler struck in the nick of time, "Ten minutes before midnight."

THE GLEICHSCHALTUNG

The Nazis have enriched the vocabulary by a number of new expressions. One of the words very frequently heard is the verb "gleichschalten," and its corresponding noun, "Gleichschaltung." The English word "co-ordination" does not fully express its meaning, but it may do for the lack of a better term. The new Germany stresses the idea of centralization, unification, totalitarianism. The Nazi Government has strengthened the central power of the Reich over against State rights. This was very good. It did away with the various political parties. Only one party is allowed. State and Nazi Party are synonyms. It dissolved the labor unions and other unions and created in their places State controlled Unions, "Fachschaften," of the different professions, as lawyers, doctors, teachers, pastors, engineers and of the trades as laborers and dealers, thus reviving the old guilds. It likewise wanted to centralize and make uniform the churches. The slogan of the radical Nazis is one Nation, one Religion, one Church. Catholics and Protestants, however, could not be welded into one organization. But if Germany is to have two churches, she is certainly not to have more than two. All the Protestant churches must be united into one "Reichskirche." The idea met with universal approval, especially since Chancellor Hitler had solemnly affirmed that the doctrinal foundations should remain unchanged, that the inner life of the churches should in no wise be touched, that the Gleichschaltung should be merely a matter of administration. Among the younger clergy were many members of the Nazi party. They and their friends organized the party, or as they prefer to call it a "Movement of Faith" (Glaubensbewegung) of the German Christians." They insisted that the new constitution of the church be worked out and put into

effect without any delay. The older churchmen wanted to proceed cautiously and slowly. Hitler appointed his friend, Chaplain Mueller, a member of the party, as his personal representative and plenipotentiary. The churches created a Commission of three, the President of the Church Federation, D. Kapler, who is a lawyer, and besides him a Lutheran and a Reformed theologian to draft a new constitution. The German Christians clamored for the appointment of Chaplain Mueller as Reichsbishop at the head of the Reichskirche. Dr. Kapler and his commission designated Pastor von Bodelschwingh, who was not a Nazi. Now the fight was on. The Government appointed ecclesiastical Commissars or Dictators who dismissed or retired recalcitrant churchmen. Bishop designate Bodelschwingh was thus forced to resign. President von Hindenburg took a hand by writing to the Chancellor. Hitler charged the Minister of Education and Cults to settle the difficulties. A general church election of members of the local administrative bodies was ordered to take place within two weeks. The German Christians were accorded the full use of the press, of the radio, of public meetings and demonstrations. Late on the eve of election day, Hitler broadcasted an appeal which left no doubt as to his wish. The result was as foreseen and predetermined: an overwhelming victory of the "German Christians." In many places their opponents, realizing the uselessness of opposition, withdrew their candidates. The new Reichskirche is in complete control of the Nazis. Chaplain Mueller has since been made Bishop of Prussia. His appointment as Bishop of the Reich is merely a matter of time. It may be accomplished before this article is in print.

How about the Free Churches? Pending the trouble in the large National Churches, the comparatively small Free Churches were left undisturbed. Extreme Lutheran pastors have publicly proclaimed from their pulpits that now all these foreign sects, those importations from England and America like the Methodists and Baptists, must be wiped out. Chaplain Mueller, in a personal interview, has assured representatives of those churches that the Government recognizes the value of their spiritual work and has no intention of suppressing them, on certain implied conditions. There are two possibilities. Either the Free Churches will be allowed to form a "Union of Free Churches" which will be recognized as a branch of the Reichskirche under the general supervision of the Reichsbishop, or if the more extreme leaders predominate, they will be "gleichgeschaltet"; that is to say, they will lose their identity and be made part of the Reichskirche. A writer in the latest issue of the *Christliche Welt*, the most influential church paper in Germany, states that the constitution of the Reichskirche

makes it possible to admit the Methodist Episcopal Church as an integral branch.

RELIGION IN THE THIRD REICH

These are matters of administration, at least so the Nazis claim. How about the inner life, the message of the Gospel of Christ? Let me state again: the Nazi Government and the "German Christians" insist that they are friends, defenders and supporters of the Christian Religion and of the Christian Church. One of the main accusations against the former Catholic party is, that for political reason it denied its religious principles and allied itself with the Social Democrats who were atheists, scoffers of religion. As a matter of fact, at every occasion the Socialists showed their hostility to religion. They prohibited the reading of the Bible and prayers in State institutions, they banished religious instruction from State schools. Socialistic trades unions discriminated against members of the church and advocated withdrawal of their members from the church. All of this has changed. Religion and church are again in favor. To many Germans this is a real relief for which they are devoutly grateful. It must also be admitted that among the "German Christians" (using this term in its political connotation) are many sincere, devoted, zealous Christians, men and women. Some principles of their "Social Message" are excellent. They show an understanding of the social duty of the Christian Church which goes far beyond the purely individual message of the Lutheran creed. Their determination to win "the nation to the Gospel" by instituting missions to the masses, and to demonstrate genuine brotherhood in daily life is highly commendable.

The Third Reich is to be a religious nation. That is very good, so far as it goes. But the question arises: What kind of a religion is this religion? The radical Nazis demand a purely German, nordic religion. A few quotations must suffice. Says Dr. Michel: "Our religious home and the source of life must be in Germany, not beyond the German mountains." Professor Bergmann of the University of Leipzig demands that "the German soul must be freed from the dead weight of an ill-fitting religion," and goes on to say: "Our main objection against the Christian religion is that its origin is not in the soul of nordic men. Christianity is foreign to us not only in point of time but by its very nature." He sums up the German creed in these words: "I believe in the God of the German religion who is at work in nature, in the noble spirit of man, and in the strength of my people. And I believe in the helper-in-need, Christ, who fights for the nobility of man,

and in Germany, where the new humanity is being created." R. Müller states: "Religion, like art, philosophy, must be the emanation of the soul of one's own race. Each race has its own highest values and compelling ideas. With the Nordic races there are honor and freedom. Opposed to them are the ideas of Jewish—Oriental—Roman Christianity, namely, humility and love. This means a clash between two fundamentally different worlds." One more quotation from Dr. O. Michel, "Our religious thinking must be in harmony with refined Germanic morality. Forgiveness of sin in any form and shape is out of question. Moral guilt cannot be atoned by any substitution nor by punishment but solely by free moral deeds of repentance and betterment. It has always been the character of the religious nobility of the German nation to acquire religious values by meritorious deeds but not to go begging for them to outside sources. Self atonement by the help of God." Albert Rosenberg, Hitler's right hand man in charge of the department of foreign relations of the party, demands that: "the Catholic and Protestant Churches put in place of the Old Testament stories of cattle dealers and keepers of mistresses the Nordic fairy tales and legends. Not the dream of murdering messianism but the dream of honor and liberty must be fostered by means of the Nordic legends, beginning with Odin and the old fairy tales down to Eckehard and Walter von der Vogelweide." And he indulges in the prophecy: "The coming German Church in its constituent bodies will in course of time present in the place of the crucifixion the teaching of the fiery spiritual hero." One of the Church Commissars stated in his address to the churches: "The appearance of Jesus in world history is in its last analysis a flaring up of the Nordic type in the midst of a world that was tormented by decomposition. German type and Gospel will, therefore, find the way one to the other and a union as has yet not been given to the people."

The "German Christians" repudiate that kind of Nordic religion. They protest that they are firmly planted on the foundations of the Gospel of Jesus Christ as interpreted by the German reformer, Martin Luther. They affirm that opinions like those quoted, even when advanced by high Party officials like A. Rosenberg, are but private opinions; they stress the declaration contained in the official Party Program: "The Party adheres to the standpoint of positive Christianity without being bound to any definite confession"; and they quote Hitler's declaration before the Reichstag: "The National Government considers the two Christian Confessions important factors in the promotion of our national life (Volkstum)."

No doubt the German Christians are sincere in their assertion. But

are they not laboring under self-deception? The Third Reich is a Totalitarian State, that is to say, its aim is to control the life of its citizens in all its aspects. Not only the economic and political life, but also education, culture, ethics, religion. There is to be but one world view, there is to be but one opinion, but one will, one conscience. No individual liberty is to be tolerated. That would be a manifestation of the "exploded western liberalism and individualism." Dr. Joseph Goebbels, the Minister of Propaganda, has declared again and again that those Germans who will not voluntarily accept the doctrine of the total and absolute domination of the collective will of the nation, in plain words of the will of the leaders, must be compelled to do so. The National Socialistic Party is no longer a party; it is the state, he asserts, and "while we do not force anybody to join the Party we demand of those who do join it absolute surrender: they must be ours without any reservation, body and soul." The highest, absolute, unconditional loyalty belongs to the state, not to God. Religion, worship, church are not independent in their own sphere. They are part and parcel of the totalitarian state. The one great aim of the state is the power and glory of the German nation. Religion is a means to accomplish this one end. A valuable means to be sure; but nothing but a means. The "inner life," the liberty of which Lutheranism has always claimed, which in true Lutheran fashion President von Hindenburg stressed in his letter to the chancellor, cannot be exempt from the claims of the totalitarian state. It is not a separate preserve. Lutheranism has from its very beginning made the fateful distinction between the secular domain which belonged exclusively to the state and the spiritual or inner life which was the domain of the church. Now the Third Reich has also grasped the inner life. The German Christians vehemently protest that the newly organized church of Germany is not to be a State Church. They are mistaken. To all intents and purposes it is nothing but a department of the Totalitarian State.

The first test came through the policy of the Government to eliminate the Jews. True to the old Lutheran view-point, the measures of the Government are explained as "merely political matters which are not to be criticized." In one of the leading evangelical periodicals, *Auf der Warte*, which represents the pietistic movement, a Methodist preacher published an article on the Jewish question, showing the position of Israel in biblical history and prophecy and closing with an admonition to all Christians to show the love of Christ to his own people. The editor of the paper, in a footnote, commended the views expressed, but hastened to add that they were solely the religious aspect, that if the Government found it necessary

to expel the Jews from Germany it acted within its own rights and no criticism of its actions was intended. Other writers find in the ousting of the Jews the outworking of the divine curse resting upon the people of Israel and Hitler as the agent of God in compelling the Jews to settle in Palestine, thus fulfilling the prophecies and preparing the way for the Lord Jesus to return. These are not the views of some erratic premillennialists. They represent the bulk of the Evangelical opinion in Germany.¹

It is nothing less than pathetic to see how German theologians try to justify their nation and clear their consciences. There are brave and faithful men who raise their voice of warning. To mention but a few: General Superintendent Otto Dibelius, Professor Karl Heim, Professor Heiler, Professor Karl Barth, who is a Swiss National, Professor Adolf Koeberle, a German, teaching in Switzerland, Professor Sigmund-Schultze, and others have pointed out that this new religion is not evangelical, but mere humanism, made by men, not revealed by Christ.

In a sermon, preached in Potsdam, General Superintendent Dibelius said: "If he who is represented on the cross on this altar is not the Son of God, but merely the representative of the Nordic race, then take away this cross, pull down this church, we remain lost mortals chained to our humanity." Dr. Dibelius was promptly suspended, shortly afterwards reinstated, then retired upon his own request. The same fate befell others.

On the other hand there are many sincere but labored efforts on the part of churchmen to find a biblical and theological basis and justification of the racial theory and the national demands. The foremost task of theology as well as of science now seems to be to undergird the claims of the Third Reich with the required philosophic and theological arguments.

The Third Reich desires religion and makes great efforts to show its high appreciation of the Christian religion. The German people is to be a religious people. But the official state religion is not the Gospel of the crucified, divine Redeemer. It is pure humanism. Not in a universal aspect as the humanism of the great German idealist, like Kant, Lessing, Goethe, Schiller, but humanism of an exclusive national, racial, Nordic type.

The acid test as to the power of this Third Reich religion to curb the

¹ At the beginning of the Nazi rule many papers outside of Germany were filled with sensational stories of atrocities. I read of gouged out eyes, of chopped off hands, read reports that Jewish girls were massed in public places and violated, that opponents of the Nazis were clubbed to death and similar stories. They looked like the atrocity stories circulated at the beginning of the war. My personal investigation convinced me that they were either purely fabricated or highly exaggerated, and I gladly joined the German district superintendents in a cabled denial to America. Very different are the maltreatment of many Jews and the relentless measures adopted since that time and aiming at the elimination of the Non-Aryans from the economic and cultural life of Germany. These measures cause much hardship and intense suffering. The apparent callousness of the Germans I ascribe to the fact that thousands of their own nationals have received like treatment in the territories separated from the Central Powers by the peace treaties.

selfishness of human nature and to accomplish a lasting spiritual uplift of the whole nation, as the German Christians hope for, will come in from ten to fifteen years, after the boys and girls of to-day have been educated exclusively in the principles of the Totalitarian State. To them religion and church will be mere side issues, subservient to the state just as school, press, literature, theater, art, movies, radio. What chances will there be for the claims of Jesus Christ to be the only and absolute Master and Lord? The German Christians are very optimistic. They see the face of the Third Reich illuminated by the light shining forth from the triumphant Christ. Will the next generation see the eternal light of the Son of God? Or will they merely see the fleeting flicker of national self glorification?

Dogma, Dogma, Who's Got the Dogma?

EDGAR SHEFFIELD BRIGHTMAN

SMUGNESS invites reprisals. A snob is a natural target. Hence, in assailing any form of smug snobbishness I am following a human bent. If I am wrong, gentle reader, you will set me right.

There are too many snobs. Why not inflate the verbal currency by adding that there are too many smugs? The noun is mean enough to fit mean persons to a T; and smugs are mean, whoever and whatever they may be. A smug, a snob, an airily superior dogmatist (they all mean the same), is defined not by what he believes, but by how he believes it. One may believe in capitalism, in communism, in the Immaculate Conception, in Amida Buddha, or in the New Deal, without being a smug. On the other hand, one may hold any of those beliefs so snobbishly as to be a perfect smug. This, as Aldous Huxley says in *Texts and Pretexts*, although in another context, "is the price he has to pay for being intelligent, but not, as yet, quite intelligent enough." One may be a conservative smug or a liberal smug; a socialistic smug or a capitalistic smug; a Hitlerite smug or a Jewish smug. The streets, traffic, the newspapers, the books, the churches, the universities, the counting houses, the legislatures, all swarm with smugs.

But it is not to smugs in general that I now invite the reader's attention. Let us rather examine together the nature of a particular kind of smug, that is, the smugness of the brilliant atheists who are writing current articles and books. Let's be frank and admit that this topic is not going to be so good for the souls of readers of *RELIGION IN LIFE*, or for that of the writer, as would be the examination and excoriation of a few well-selected, theistic, Protestant, liberal smugs. Yet I am going deliberately to declare a "moral holiday" and thus forego the greater edificatory good in the interests of a lesser good. I hereby refer the reader to Mr. Henry L. Mencken for such services of the greater sort as he may urgently require.

If Mr. Aldous Huxley really meant it when he said that "our time is afflicted with a strange incertitude," no one could charge him with smugness. Incertitude is a natural and tragic state of the thinking mind. But when in the same article (in the January, 1933, *Harper's*) he arrives at his conclusion, a large part of the incertitude has vanished. "A realistic—that is to say, a pessimistic—Humanism is the only philosophy to which a modern mind can give its assent." There is no incertitude here. He knows that theism is not true, and that humanism is true. He goes on, indeed, to admit that humanism is "unassimilable in its present form." This is the ghost of

his incertitude. Knowing that there is no God, he is uncertain what to do next. But about his denial of God he has no qualms, no doubts. On the rock of that negative certainty he will build his church. That is his dogma.

Mr. Huxley is a specimen of a widely distributed type of person. At present unbelievers seem to be more certain that there is no God than believers are that there is one. If you talk with an educated Catholic priest, you find at least a willingness to discuss both sides of the question and you find him informed about the other side. But the typical unbeliever in a personal God is usually unfamiliar with the literature and the arguments on the other side, and is unwilling to examine them. It is not worth his while. His attitude is well illustrated by the remark made to me by a philosopher friend. We were discussing Kagawa. My friend had never heard of him. My method was to tell the story of Kagawa's life and achievements, omitting all reference to the religious until the last minute. Then I added casually that Kagawa had become converted to Christianity. My friend was almost stupefied. "Why," he cried, "should such a great man be a Christian?" It did not seem credible to my friend that an educated person would voluntarily embrace Christianity. Dogmatism, accordingly, seems to have become the special property of the religious skeptic. The problem which forces itself upon my mind when I contemplate this fact is why so many educated men can be so certain and so smug, so unchangeably dogmatic, in a field in which they are supposed peculiarly to resent dogmatism. If, in response to my questioning, they say that they have contracted this dogmatism from their dealings with theists, I can only reply that such lack of immunity to environmental influence betrays weakness on the part of a cultured modern. No intellectually independent person need partake of the errors of his fellows; if he does, he is not so independent as he thought he was. How can they be so sure?

Looking over a few of the recent utterances of the deniers, I have searched diligently for the reasons which they assign for their certainty. Although the writings of these men are pretty familiar to me, I must confess that I was surprised by the total impression. There is a strange sparsity of reasons, almost a failure of the intellectual crop. What these men say or imply can be classified under four heads. They are sure that there is no God, first, because the modern mind believes that there is no God; secondly, because of their "cult of science" (to borrow a phrase of Ralph Barton Perry's); thirdly, because they have an insufficient sense of mystery; and fourthly, as I have intimated previously, because they have not seen fit to examine the case for theism. Let us look at these reasons in detail.

The first reason for the dogmatic certainty of our atheistic friends is, as I have said, that the modern mind believes that there is no God. This reason is dangerously near to being the tautologous platitude that atheists are atheists, and that they have passed a unanimous vote that they are modern. But there is more to it than that. After all, certain beliefs are so thoroughly refuted and so completely antiquated that any modern man feels justified in rejecting them without any particular examination. Such, for example, is the belief in fairies or in demons. Why not also the belief in God? May not a modern sincerely believe that the intellectual work which has been done in the past century has absolutely excluded the possibility of there being a God? Might not such a man breathe atheism as naturally as the lungs take in air? Thus spake Zarathustra, "God is dead." Thus speaks Joseph Wood Krutch of *The Modern Temper*, which has no less power over him because he substantially admits it to be a modern dis-temper. Walter Lippmann takes "the humanistic view because, in the kind of world I happen to live in, I can do no other." Even so keen an intellect as Lippmann's feels it unnecessary to do other than to appeal to the intellectual fashion of the day. His moral and political theory is a revolt against the mores. His religious foundation is a crass surrender to them. Lillian Symes in *Harper's* for March, 1932, writes that "the ranks of the unbelievers, or at least of those with no active belief in either an Omnipotent God or personal immortality, are growing steadily, notwithstanding such little counter-eddies as are represented by the conversion of a G. K. Chesterton or a T. S. Eliot." And we may refer back to the earlier quotation from Aldous Huxley to the effect that pessimistic humanism is the only philosophy for the modern man.

But the appeal to modernity is so shallow, so groundless, taken by itself, that it alone constitutes no reason for any belief whatever, certainly for no absolute stand on any question. If one moves from Moses to the mores, it is by no means certain that an advance has been made. At any rate, it is necessary to prove that there is an advance. The popularity of a belief, even in the best circles, constitutes no evidence whatever for its truth. The fickleness of the mores is well illustrated by the recent collapse of moral stamina in the attitude toward prohibition. What the intellectuals believe may be true, but not because they believe it. It is true because there are good reasons for it. If there are enough good reasons for atheism, then it is true. The certainty with which any belief is held, however, ought to stand in some relation to the quality of the reasons for the belief.

The second reason to which I referred, namely, the cult of science,

stands on a different intellectual level from the first. Science is not merely a fad or an entertaining custom. It is a serious observation of fact and its generalizations go only as far as the facts allow. If the human spirit has ever undertaken a dignified and austere discipline, science is that discipline. If science requires atheism, then the atheistic dogmatists have a right to be smug. Doubtless many unbelievers are convinced that science is thoroughly atheistic. They maintain that our only knowledge of the real world comes from science, and that science does not discover God. Even a brilliant economist like John T. Flynn cannot write on "The Wall Street Debt Machine" for *Harper's* (July, 1933) without getting in a dig at any possible theistic belief. He tells us that eminent economists give forth opinions about speculation when they "have never given a dozen hours of thought to the matter and then only, like theologians and philosophers, evolving notions out of their inner consciousness at a safe distance from all perplexing data." In this statement Mr. Flynn has come nearer to giving a theoretical basis for atheism than many writers who have composed entire volumes. Science deals with facts; hence it is true. Theology and philosophy deal with fancy; hence they are false. Here at least is an argument. Something similar to it is stated by Henshaw Ward in his article, "Science Has Not Gone Mystical," in the *Atlantic* for August, 1933. Science, he tells us, does not "deny that the mind may be different from matter, or that a personal God directs the universe. But neither does science affirm these statements. For denying and affirming are warlike actions, suitable only for creatures who are unconscious of their ignorance, who are devoted to private dreams and empty logic. Science is the activity of persons who realize what ineffable mystery is, who are curious to explore it." On Mr. Ward's premises one may assert positively that we have no right to affirm a personal God.

Any intelligent person will make haste to grant that science does not discover God. But here the problem only begins. In order to infer atheism from science one must show that science is the only possible approach to truth; and this opinion is the difference between science and the cult of science. It is not proved by asserting that philosophers and theologians ignore facts and spin their fancies out of inner consciousness alone, nor by ascribing all belief to unconscious ignorance, private dreams, and empty logic. One must reiterate fundamentals pretty often, and I shall try to state briefly some of the reasons for rejecting this cult of science. This does not mean rejecting science, which would be folly; it means, rather, rejecting the claims of those who regard science as the only approach to

truth and who suppose, as someone has said, that the only reality is what can be observed in the German university laboratories.

The fundamental fact is that science presupposes, but ignores, personality and value. Physics cannot exist without a physicist who has some moral and intellectual ideals; yet physics as a science contains no reference to the physicist or to his ideals. Chemistry may, it is true, be used by evil persons for evil ends or by good persons for good ends; but no chemical formula says anything either about persons or about ends, about evil or about good. Even psychology (if psychology be a science) has a hard time saying anything about personality as a whole; and it is helpless in determining what experiences are truly valuable and what are not. It can describe our consciousness of value, but it cannot tell which values ought to be chosen and which avoided. The method of science is to be impersonal and to avoid all judgments of value. To draw any inferences about the place of personality and of value in the universe from the conclusions of science is like inferring that there is no equator because an expedition to the North Pole failed to find it there. The expedition was not looking for the equator; it was purposely looking in another direction. Likewise science is not looking for personality and value; it is purposely looking in another direction. The question as to whether a superhuman, value-creating personal God exists is not investigated by any science. This does not mean that the search for God can go on independent of science. Far from it. But it does mean that an intelligent judgment about God can be passed only by one who is at least trying to investigate the problem of God. Perhaps science does not need God within the field of any specific investigation. But this does not prove that man does not need God when the whole field of experience is rationally understood.

The cult of science takes scientific knowledge as absolute. This is in two respects faulty. The progress of science shows that no state of scientific knowledge is absolute, and the true scientist is the first to acknowledge this fact. Further, our scientific knowledge rests on presuppositions which are not themselves capable of proof by scientific method. Henshaw Ward to the contrary notwithstanding, science could not survive for a moment unless the scientist believed in the existence of other scientists, in the possibility of knowledge of the past and the future, and in the existence of a world. Now, the mind of another person is not open to scientific observation, the past and the future can never be experimented on as such, and the world as a whole cannot be perceived or be dealt with in a laboratory. The scientist accepts those presuppositions because they "work"; that is, because they

make his observations and explanations into a rational and connected whole. (The reader will perceive that I am not relying on any vague pragmatic sense of "work" to render the defense of theism easy!) All this leads to the point we are interested in, namely, that scientific knowledge is not absolute, but hypothetical. The method of science is not merely to observe and state facts; were that so, then the sum of scientific wisdom would be the law of identity: "pigs is pigs." Science does far more than state facts; it postulates theories to account for the facts, although no science tries to solve any problem save its own. In the broad sense, the scientific method first confronts the facts of experience, then proposes a problem regarding the facts, then seeks an hypothesis to solve the problem, then tests the hypothesis by its logical consistency and its consistency with experience. This is also what religion, philosophy, and theology do. But the difference between science in the narrow sense and the attitude of religion is in the problem proposed. The problem of science is: What is the law by which phenomena succeed one another? The problem of religion is: What is the ultimate value of existence and what the existence of value? Neither science nor religion gives absolute knowledge; both science and religion seek rational hypotheses about experience; neither one can solve the problem which the other deals with. Here I differ from Professor Henry N. Wieman.

Therefore, when a worshiper at the shrine of the cult of science says, as does Mr. Flynn, that theology and philosophy are spun out of the inner consciousness, he derives that extraordinary piece of misinformation, not from science or from philosophy, but from his cult-attitude, which leads him to infer that, since theology and philosophy are not science, they can't be based on facts. No theologian or philosopher ever based his thinking on anything else than a view of the facts, interpreted by reason. He may have seen the facts wrongly; that is a matter for debate. But to assert that there is no rational way of seeing the facts except the scientific way "is magnificent, but it is not war." It is dogma, not science; assertion, not argument.

Thus far we have taken up two of the reasons which lead the atheistic literati to deny God. The first was "the modern mind," which, unless it is supported by further reasons, is merely a name for the latest fashion in ideas. The second was the cult of science, which is based on the assumption that scientific method is the only method and scientific knowledge the only knowledge the mind can rightly lay claim to; but it overlooks the whole problem of the place of personality and value in experience and reality, and it ignores the intellectual contribution of philosophy, while at the same time

asserting a materialistic philosophy that is supposedly derived from science. That Plato or Kant or Hegel or Lotze or Bowne ever existed is unknown or unimportant to a dogmatist of the cult of science; but it is refreshing to observe that the great scientists are too wise and too observant of the riches of experience to join in a cult which betrays the very spirit of science itself.

The third reason for current atheistic dogmatism was said to be an insufficient sense of mystery. At this point, a critic who is familiar with the problems might interject an emphatic doubt. It is not the atheists, he would say, who suffer from disrespect for mystery; it is the theists. It is the latter who avow a knowledge of the inner workings of the psychology of the ultimate, while the atheists are humble enough to disavow a knowledge they do not possess. Is not this the very point made by Henshaw Ward? Did he not say that "science is the activity of persons who realize what ineffable mystery is, who are curious to explore it"? His assertion is both beautiful and true; but, in the context of his *Atlantic* article and of this one too, it is incomplete and misleading because of the tricky ambiguity of the little word "the." Is science the only activity of persons who realize what mystery is and seek to explore it? Or is it one activity among others? Ward's whole tone implies the former interpretation. But if anyone tells me that there is one way and one way only of realizing mystery and of exploring it, I am sure that he has, to say the least, a limited respect for the mysterious. It is well to proclaim that mystery is mystery; but if you add that Mohammed or Einstein is its only prophet, you are out of the realm of mystery and in the realm of revelation and dogma. True science respects other attitudes than its own: the moral, the æsthetic, the religious, the philosophical. The cult of science either denies any right whatever to these other attitudes or seeks to reduce them to a form of the scientific. The cult of science, moreover, demands a monopoly of mystery; and the firm of Mystery, Inc., Ltd., is a self-contradiction, even if the cult of science is its silent partner (who insists on being the whole firm). One cannot in the same breath assert that he knows positively that there is no personal God worthy of the slightest consideration by the modern mind and still at the same time lay claim to a profound reverence for the mystery of the universe. How can he know so absolutely that the mystery is wholly unconscious, unintelligent, purposeless, and blind? For the atheist, such knowledge about the mystery is real. How can he know so well what it is not, if he has not banished mystery about what it is?

The atheist, then, who talks about mystery and refuses to consider the possibility of there being a God has erected what Professor E. G. Spaulding

might well call one of his "self-refuting systems." "But," the atheistic critic might reply, "are not you theists caught in the same trap? Do you not call God a mystery, yet claim much knowledge about him? What logical or moral right has a dogmatic theist to throw stones at a dogmatic atheist?" The theist here must hang his head for a season in repentant meditation. He cannot deny that there has been and still is dogmatism among theists. He cannot, he dare not, defend that dogmatism. Dogmatism is an insidious foe of any cause on which it fastens itself. Any form of bigotry, even about the truth, is detestable; it makes truth seem untrue, beauty seem ugly, goodness seem wicked. Nevertheless, for all its mistaken adherents and false friends, religion has usually made a pretty clear distinction between knowledge and faith, and has recognized humbly that "now we see in a glass darkly." It is not religious, any more than it is scientific, to lay claim to the possession of complete and final knowledge. Whether there is or is not a God, it is nothing short of absurd to pretend that any man knows all he needs to know about God.

The fact remains, however, that a sense of the mystery of things actually prevents many persons from believing in a personal God. Every human being, no matter how great his knowledge, is surrounded by a mystery which his knowledge cannot penetrate. The fundamental question, then, is this: What is the honest, the sane, the rational attitude to take toward that mystery? Shall we forbid every attempt to approach that mystery save by the methods of descriptive, physical science, and infer from our prohibition the certainty that there is no God? Or shall we consult the methods of religious faith and philosophical reason, which raise problems that science does not, and by its nature cannot, raise—problems about the value of existence, and the meaning of the whole of which scientific knowledge is but an incomplete part? The first alternative leads to atheistic dogmatism. The second leads, not to theistic dogmatism (which in principle is as abhorrent as atheistic), but to a willingness to try the best possible hypothesis about the meaning of our universe until experience and reason compel us to modify it. Religion is the adventure of the soul in searching for the Best, testing its hypothesis by every means at its disposal, never giving up until there is solid proof that the adventure is hopeless. The atheistic neodogmatists have given up the search, like the religious dogmatists. But true religion always has more to learn, which it cannot bear now. Religious faith is no dogmatic certainty; it is rather the confidence that the search has been rewarding thus far, and indeed that the Real has anticipated the searcher. When one stops searching for the Unseen, and

clings only to the seen, negative dogmatism has set in and spiritual power has departed. Religion peers hopefully, adventures courageously, into the mystery; atheism knows it is useless to search. Which attitude is truly worthy of man, whether he bear the label of "modern" or not? Which corresponds the better to the inexhaustible capacities of man's nature?

The three reasons which we have considered all play their parts, but taken together they fail to account for the singular witness of the spirit of the present generation of journalistic scribes to the infallibility of the One True Unfaith that there is no God. Before going further, let me remind the reader that I am not dealing with the whole problem of atheism, or with the total spirit of the age. I am considering only a few of the men and women who write against God in our respectable magazines, or who have composed books on the theme. It is the blasé assurance of these which constitutes my problem. In order to answer it plausibly to myself, I can only repeat as my fourth reason for this neodogmatism a brazen charge which I hinted at earlier in this paper, namely, that these persons are not very well read in the literature of modern theism. At least, this charge would be brazen if there were no evidence to support it.

Can it really be true that ignorance of the case for theism lies back of much vocal atheism? There are no few reasons for giving a sad but firm "Yes," in reply to this question. Whether one examines the writings of the group under consideration or the policies of magazine editors, one is driven to believe that both editors and writers assume that everyone who can dot his i's and cross his t's is an atheist, with the exception of Harry Emerson Fosdick, Bernard Iddings Bell, and Joseph Fort Newton. William Ernest Hocking is known to the clan only as a fighter of a rear-guard action called "Rethinking Missions." Eddington is thought of as a physicist and astronomer who had the hard luck to be born a Quaker. Whitehead is regarded by many who have never read *Process and Reality* or *Adventures of Ideas* as an admirable mathematician who has become soft in his old age. There is dearth of evidence that the great ideas of these intellectual giants have been mastered, or the theistic trend of their thinking understood. And there is equally little evidence that the solid, systematic theistic argument of recent writers like A. C. Knudson, F. R. Tennant, and E. W. Lyman, has been grasped. Do the neodogmatists know who Arthur Titius is? Have they read the clean-cut Catholic, G. H. Joyce? Are Max Scheler and Rudolf Otto even names to them? Have they heard of Bergson's latest book? The evidence is against them. Their speech bewrayeth them.

Odd facts picked up here and there confirm this regrettable diagnosis. Compare the writings of theists with those of atheists. One point stands out conspicuously. Theists always go to great pains to state and refute the arguments of atheists; but atheists are usually so confident of their position that they rarely state the arguments of theists, save some absurd *faux pas* which a theist has committed in a state of lapsed intelligence. As a teacher I am embarrassed by this fact; for when I am asked for a good examination of the theistic position by an atheist, all I can say is, "Well, there is McTaggart's *Some Dogmas of Religion*, and . . . there is . . . McTaggart." I do not know of any other solid attempt by an atheist to face the details of the case for theism, and even McTaggart's treatment is not complete. The only honorable explanation of the paucity of atheistic treatments of this sort is that it is so long since the atheist has done any reading on the other side that he has forgotten what he read. This does not evidence intellectual impartiality. It is the method of the propagandist. An amusing illustration of the scant philosophical background of some of these journalists came to my attention recently. A writer for the *American Mercury*, whose name wild horses could not drag from me, stated that the whole social service movement in modern America was due to the influence of Borden Parker Bowne. Much as I respect Bowne's memory and his work, I can only regard this statement as absurdly laudatory; it was intended by the mercurial writer to be insulting. Later I learned by chance that this writer had failed in the only college course he had taken in Bowne's philosophy. Of course one may fail in college and succeed later; was not this man's work accepted by the *American Mercury*? But his success had not improved his mastery of Bowne!

I have wrestled with one of the many puzzling phenomena of the attitude of the contemporary world toward religion. My conclusion is that more genuine dogmatism is to be found among atheists than among literate theists, and that this is particularly true of atheists who write for our best periodicals. These atheists are influenced by what they believe to be the fashion of the modern mind; by a cult-attitude toward science; by an insufficient sense of mystery; and by their failure to give the case for theism any careful examination. The charge of dogmatism cannot any longer be hurled against theists by their opponents. In the game of "Dogma, dogma, who's got the dogma," the atheists are just now the guilty party.

What My Religion Means to Me

EDWIN GRANT CONKLIN

I

THE topic assigned me is a personal one and this must be my excuse for what would otherwise be a too personal treatment. I am one of those rather rare birds—a biologist who is at heart religious. Lists of distinguished astronomers and physicists who are deeply religious have been published, but for some reason not entirely apparent to me the majority of biologists of my acquaintance are indifferent or hostile to religion. Others who cherish religious sentiments hesitate to say so lest they may be thought to approve theological doctrines which they consider obsolete or untrue, or for fear of giving offense to persons whom they respect but whose philosophy and theology they cannot approve.

To many persons religious creeds and doctrines are peculiarly precious and they resent any criticism of them. In an age of scientific, social and religious revolution they wish to preserve entire and unchanged the faith of their fathers. This feeling is very human and understandable. We all want sure foundations in material, intellectual and social affairs. Earthquakes and revolutions are uncomfortable, and yet new knowledge is continually shaking old systems of science, philosophy and religion.

The antagonism of many scientists to religion is largely antagonism to ancient creeds. They sometimes identify religion with every absurdity of religious belief in every hole and corner of primitive ages and stages of culture, but it is only in so far as such absurdities persist in important places to-day that they are worthy of attack. However there are many current religious doctrines that scientists find it difficult if not impossible to accept. Let us consider briefly some of the reasons for this.

II

Science is a severe discipline. It laboriously seeks to distinguish truth from error, fact from fancy, reality from unreality. Its approved methods are detailed observation, critical experimentation, collection of verifiable data, the balancing of probabilities where proof is not possible, careful generalization of results, and in general the avoidance of all assertions that outrun evidence. It demands absolute freedom in the search for truth and recognizes no authority but that of evidence. Its aim is to understand and ultimately to be able to control, as far as possible, natural phenomena.

Scientists have learned that strong emotions are apt to warp the judg-

ment and frequently to vitiate the results of observations and experiments. In general the more emotion any scientific communication contains the less confidence it inspires. In the search for truth wishful thinking must be avoided as far as possible. Nevertheless scientists are human and emotions play a part even in research. It is the *desire* to know, the *love* of truth, even the spirit of *emulation* that inspires them to laborious days and thoughtful nights, and most scientists have known that tragedy of which Spencer and Huxley spoke, "A beautiful hypothesis killed by an ugly fact." However, the uncompromizing discipline of science begets a cautious and critical habit of mind which usually carries over to all other fields of both thought and experience.

Religion, on the other hand, concerns primarily beliefs and emotions. Its chief aim is the cultivation of the noblest emotions of which man is capable and thereby it seeks to inspire him to noble action. Millikan says "Its chief function is the development of the consciences, the ideals and the aspirations of mankind."

As thus defined there is no conflict between science and religion and no reason why any serious scientist should not be truly religious. But there are many doctrines and creeds of religious organizations which have to do with natural phenomena and which are not based upon scientific evidence, but upon assumed authority, and these frequently conflict with the methods and results of science.

There is no need here to dwell upon the old battles between science and theology, concerning for example the age of the earth and its position in the solar system, the significance of fossils, the method of creation, the evolution of species of animals and plants, the origin and nature of man. Wherever the issue has been between evidence and tradition the former has won, and progressive theology has found it possible to adjust itself to the new knowledge.

But scientific inquiry has gone much further than to challenge the cosmogony of the Old Testament. It has gone far toward establishing the universality of natural law and consequently the non-existence of supernatural or contranatural phenomena. Professor Brooks, one of my former teachers, once said, "The idea of the supernatural is due to a misunderstanding; nature is everything that is." If this be true there is no wonder-working God outside of nature who suspends the order of nature when he pleases or in answer to human prayers.

The great laws or principles of nature, so far as known, are never violated. Much religious teaching ignores this and still believes in miracles

and magic. When a child prays for a sunny day for its picnic or churches pray for rain at a particular time they call upon God to interfere with the order of nature, and thus to create chaos and confusion in an orderly and dependable system. All this represents a return to the ideas of a pre-scientific age when it was thought that miracles were wrought in answer to supplication or magic. Such beliefs were general in past ages and are widespread in secular as well as religious circles even to-day. A proper sense of reality and respect for natural law would show the futility and danger of such beliefs. This is a universe of law, not of miracles, and mankind would benefit enormously if it could be made to realize the universal truth of the ancient warning, "Be not deceived, God is not mocked, for whatsoever a man soweth that shall he also reap."

The demand of this age is for reality in theology and religion as well as in science and secular affairs. College and university students are asking, "What, if anything, is real in religion?" Faith founded on what is improbable, if not impossible, does not commend itself to the modern mind. No one trained in science could say with Tertullian, "*Credo quia impossibile.*" Faith must have a basis in fact, whether it be faith in a friend, a bank or a religious doctrine.

Many truly religious persons cannot recite the Apostles' Creed without mental reservations and figurative explanations that rob it of much of its original significance, and therefore, according to Bishop Manning's recent announcement (*New York Times*, March 13) they are not Christians, although they may recognize the teachings of Christ as our highest ethical and religious ideals. But if they are thus "read out of the party" and may not claim to be Christians in the Bishop's sense, may they not at least claim to be followers of Christ, even if afar off?

Of course religious instruction must be adapted to the mental capacities of those taught. Religious teaching is full of symbolism, allegories and parables and is thus adapted to children as well as to philosophers, but nothing is gained by insisting that these symbols shall be interpreted literally by persons of mature mind. The real problem in such teaching is to adjust religion to science, faith to knowledge, ideality to reality. Never again will this process be reversed and science be compelled to adjust itself to religion, knowledge to give way to faith, or reality be based upon ideality.

The English scientific weekly, *Nature*, has for more than sixty years carried as its motto this line from Wordsworth:

"To the solid ground of nature
Trusts the mind that builds for aye."

Modern religion, no less than science must be founded on the solid ground of nature. It must distinguish fact from fancy, reality from unreality.

III

These are in brief some of the considerations which have led many scientists and scholars to an attitude of indifference or hostility to certain aspects of religious doctrine. In common with many others I have gone through the storm and stress of adjusting my faith to increasing knowledge. My religion has undergone many changes in the course of my life, but these changes have concerned the head rather than the heart. Religious emotions remain with me much the same as they were, but intellectual concepts have greatly changed owing in large part to the discipline of science.

What then can religion mean to a scientist? What does it mean to me?

1. First of all it must be a religion based upon the solid ground of reality, but it must reach up into the atmosphere of high ideals. Realism without idealism usually ends in pessimism. Knowledge without faith and hope leads to despair. "Where there is no vision the people perish." The general experience of mankind is that one must have some form of religion, and that taught by Christ seems to me the best the world has ever known.

2. Honesty compels me to admit that I see no evidences of a God who stands outside of nature and now and then interferes with its workings. However I do see evidences of an intelligible plan in the system and order of nature, an order so perfect that it can be expressed by man in the form of great natural laws, such as those of physics, chemistry and biology. I see evidences of such a plan in the long ages of evolution which have led from the simplest living things to the most complex, in the great principle of the elimination of the unfit and the survival of the fit, in the very fact that environment has been of such a nature that it has led, in the main, to progress. Most of all when I consider the evolution of man and mind and society, of the highest ideals of truth, beauty, and love and the almost universal aspirations for social justice and progress, then most of all does it seem to me that there is an intelligent plan and purpose in all nature.

Some scientists will reply that all this is the result of natural laws and mechanisms. Yes, but laws are merely our formulations of this order of nature, and mechanisms that lead to such purposive results themselves require explanation. I for one cannot think it probable that they are the results of blind chance in this otherwise "*grandly ordered world*."

Science can neither prove nor disprove the existence of God, but it

does prove that this is an intelligible universe, that in the course of evolution man has appeared with an intellect capable of appreciating this order of nature and with ideals and aspirations that are ever drawing him on to something better; it does prove that in the human world at least reason, purpose and values do exist, and it leads to the conclusion that the system and order of nature out of which all this has developed cannot be the result of mere accident. Science therefore leaves us faith in an infinite Spirit that pervades all nature,

"Whose dwelling is the light of setting suns,
And the round ocean, and the living air,
And the blue sky, and in the mind of man;
A motion and a spirit that impels
All thinking things, all objects of all thought,
And rolls through all things."

3. Science leaves us faith in the worth and dignity and almost boundless possibilities of man. The evolution of man from lower forms of life, and of modern races from earlier and more brutish races, does not destroy our faith in the dignity of man any more than does his development from a germ cell. Nature and human history love to proclaim the fact that a humble origin is not inconsistent with a glorious destiny. Indeed the very fact that such development has taken place justifies our faith that it will go on to still greater results. We are still children in the morning of time slowly attaining to reason, freedom and spirituality.

I confess that exhibitions of brutality, irrationality and superstition among classes, races and nations sometimes shake my faith in human progress, but then it is comforting to remember that evolution has been a long and slow process and that mankind as a whole came out of such brute conditions and is gradually leaving them behind.

When a fellow biologist and I saw the apparently crazy religious ceremonies and coroborees of Australian aborigines he suggested that insanity was the original condition of man from which certain races are slowly emerging. Similarly the incredibly revolting religious ceremonies of millions of people of India made me feel that they must be the products of insane minds. And yet I think rather that primitive man, like his animal ancestors, was probably non-rational rather than irrational. Furthermore these revolting and apparently insane customs are results of bad education and training rather than of bad heredity, for these same people when educated from childhood in Christian schools are capable of developing rational and spiritual types of behavior. No better illustration could be

desired of the great influence of education on the development of character. Indeed we are all to a great extent the products of our environment, and this is one of the most hopeful prospects for human betterment, for it is much easier to control environment and education than heredity.

4. One of the chief functions of religion is education, as it is also the chief hope of human progress. Even if great importance is placed upon heredity, as it should be, there is no way of improving heredity except indirectly through education. We must learn the laws of human inheritance and we must then teach through the schools, the churches, the legislatures the principles of eugenics to the people in general. Whether human improvement is sought through eugenics or eutenics or both, it can be reached only through education.

Education is the great hope of mankind. Man alone of all creatures on earth is able consciously to conserve the experiences of the past and to pass them on to future generations, and this more than anything else accounts for the relatively rapid development of knowledge, inventions, social institutions, and indeed the whole of civilization.

Education must be our chief reliance in avoiding the dangers that now threaten civilization. Education not only conserves past experience and passes it on to future generations, but it also conditions the development and character of those generations. Heredity determines only the capacities and potentialities of any organism, the realization of those potentialities comes through development. In the heredity of every human being there are the potentialities of many different kinds of personality; which of these will develop depends upon environment and training. Some of these potentialities are good, others bad; some social, others anti-social, and it is the aim of good education to develop the former and suppress the latter. Of course I am using the word education in a broader sense than the conservation and transmission of knowledge. I mean all those agencies that stimulate and direct development. This kind of education is not limited to the schools; it is the most important function of the home and the church, and unfortunately it also includes the evil influences of streets and slums and gangs. Education is chiefly habit-formation and good education stimulates the development of good habits of body, mind and morals. It is the chief function and highest duty of parents and teachers and churches to stimulate the development of rational, unselfish and moral habits. If civilization is to endure and advance, education from the earliest years must teach love rather than hate, human brotherhood rather than class or race distinctions, peace rather than war, service rather

than selfishness. It must instill reverence, not only for truth, but also for beauty and righteousness.

5. Science leaves us faith in the ethics of Christ and in its applicability to all men and nations. It has been the fashion in certain scientific circles to deny that man is a free moral agent. He has been represented as a mere automaton, or mechanical robot, the product of fate and circumstance, otherwise of heredity and environment, over which he has no control. It is certainly true that no one can change his own heredity or early development, for these were determined for us long ago, and the changes in our personalities which we can effect at present are relatively slight. "Which of you by taking thought can add one cubit to his stature?" And yet some of us know that by taking thought we can add or subtract several pounds of weight. "The Ethiopian cannot change his skin nor the leopard his spots." But we know how to put on or off several shades of tan or freckles. "Though thou shouldst bray a fool in a mortar with a pestle yet will not his foolishness depart from him." And yet some of us know that by taking thought we can get rid of some of our foolishness. The fact is that we are not absolutely free nor absolutely bound. When intelligence and thought are factors in determining behavior we do have all the freedom that is necessary to make us responsible moral agents. However speculative philosophy may explain this, we know that common experience and common sense assert that it is true. Heredity and environment have set bounds about us that we cannot pass, but within those bounds we have a considerable degree of freedom and responsibility.

Whatever the ultimate basis of ethics may be, whether supernatural commands or the decent social instincts and intelligence of mankind, the content is much the same. Whether written on tables of stone or on the tables of our hearts the "cardinal virtues" are still virtues, the "deadly sins" are still sins, and the commands of a God within are no less binding than those of a God without.

Some scientists as well as many so-called "practical men" have looked upon the ethics of Christ as too idealistic for this very real and rude world. But many centuries of hard experience have been demonstrating that there is no other way of permanent social progress. If civilization is to endure and advance it must be by the route of the golden rule, the universal brotherhood of man, and the subordination of selfish interests to social service.

Evolution has taught us the superlative importance of the race or species as compared with the individual. Among all organisms the one lives for the many, the individual reproduces and labors and dies when

necessary for the race. In man no less than in lower organisms the welfare of the species is of supreme importance. Science no less than religion looks forward to the evolution of a better race and a better society, where wars shall be no more and where he shall be greatest who is the servant of all.

Professor Einstein closed an address in New York on March 15, 1933, with these words: "As I myself am no nationalist, the meaning of a people, in my opinion, lies in this—that it achieves something for humanity. . . . The only worthy attitude of an individual, as of a nation is this—to serve a greater whole and to strive for improvement and ennoblement." This is the ethics of science and it is also the ethics of Christ.

6. A well-rounded life consists not only in thinking but in feeling and doing also. A proper combination of all of these is necessary for the most happy and useful living. Science properly seeks to eliminate emotions while engaged in the search for truth. For this very reason the scientist more than others needs to cultivate the emotions that find their highest expression in art, music, poetry, religion. Charles Darwin in his autobiography, written a few years before his death, confessed that formerly he took great delight in poetry, pictures and music, but that now for many years he could not bear to read a line of poetry, and that he had lost his taste for pictures and music. "My mind," he says, "seems to have become a kind of machine for grinding out general laws. . . . If I had to live my life again I would make it a rule to read some poetry and listen to some music at least once every week. . . . The loss of these tastes is a loss of happiness, and may possibly be injurious to the intellect, and more probably to the moral character, by enfeebling the emotional part of our nature."

Other scientists have had a similar experience, but, unlike Darwin, some do not regret it and seem to be proud that they are superior to æsthetic emotions. One can only pity them for a loss which they do not realize. Ruskin once said, "I do not wonder at what men suffer, but I do wonder at what they lose." Religion is art and poetry and music and inner harmony. It combines thinking, feeling and doing and thus ministers in unique measure to a more abundant life for all classes and conditions of men.

7. Finally we recall the well-rounded life of reality and ideality, of reason, emotion and action, of him of whom Richter said: "Among the sons of men there hath not appeared a greater than the son of Mary." The older I grow the more do I recognize the depth of his insight into human nature and human needs, the breadth of his ethical and religious teachings, and the heights of his courage and love.

The Origin of the Lord's Supper

CONRAD HENRY MOEHLMAN

THE well-known Lambeth Quadrilateral regards the acknowledgment of two sacraments, namely, baptism and the Lord's Supper, as one of the four conditions of Christian unity. That the varying interpretations of the eucharist have constituted a major divisive element within Christianity and particularly within Protestantism is universally admitted. The Reformation began to disintegrate when agreement could not be reached regarding the significance of the sacraments. There is but one path to unity in the sacramentarian controversy. It is the frank abandonment of selectivism and particularism and the acceptance of the historical origin of the Lord's Supper. Such an attitude would make it necessary to build upon a much broader and firmer foundation than an appeal to the New Testament, since no existing interpretation of the eucharist is in complete accord with what occurred at what proved to be Jesus' last meal with his disciples.

I

During the century which witnessed the birth of Protestantism, one-half dozen or more differing views of the Lord's Supper are encountered.

For the Roman Catholic, then as now, the communion is a sacrament. A valid sacrament requires institution by Christ, a visible sign, the "production of interior grace," and the conferment of that grace *ex opere operato*. The sacrament in, of, and wholly by itself *does* what the church says it does. If an outsider should be so bold as to identify this conception of sacrament with magic, the Roman Catholic reply would be that there is in case of each of its seven sacraments a sufficient cause for the assumed effect.

According to the Roman Catholic theory of the eucharist, there is no bread after the consecration of the bread. The wafer may look like bread, may feel like bread, may taste like bread, when chemically analyzed would still be found to be only bread, but actually the substance of the bread has been removed and the *host* is truly the body, blood, soul and divinity of Christ. The Eternal God is contained in the wafer. The worshiper partakes of God. The mass is theophagy. As Boyd Barrett so graphically puts it in his *The Magnificent Illusion*:

"On the snow-white altar cloth before me lay a chalice of wine and on a paten a wafer of unleavened bread. Presently *at my words*, at my repetition of the eternal formula of consecration, the wine would become the blood of Christ, and the bread

the body of Christ. My hands, soiled and sinful though they were, would be privileged to raise aloft in adoration the Son of God, the Saviour of the world. My hands would carry to the altar rails, and place upon my mother's lips the sacred host, giving to her, who gave me life, her eternal God. The blood of Christ, I myself should consume together with the large wafer now changed into His Body."

Again, Christ is wholly in the wafer. Whence the cup is unnecessary to the laity. To demand the cup for the layman would be to doubt or deny that Christ is totally in the host. Such an insistence would therefore constitute a heresy.

Moreover, the eucharist is not only a sacrament but also a sacrifice. The mass is Calvary, not a commemoration of Calvary. The host is a true, real, actual sacrifice offered continuously upon the altars of the church. Christ offers himself for the faithful every time mass is said. The Victim on Mount Calvary and in the mass is the same. The priest is the same. Christ offers himself in the mass through his priests.

The communion also effects union with Christ, increases sanctifying grace, is an "antidote whereby we may be freed from daily faults and preserved from mortal sins" and a pledge of immortality. It is for both the living and the dead.

As for praying souls out of purgatory, the church affirms that "the mass is a propitiatory sacrifice for the living and the dead; the souls in purgatory are helped by the suffrage of the faithful but chiefly by the acceptable sacrifice of the altar," yet "*the particular application of the infinite merits of Christ are known to God alone.*" The church does not pretend to know which particular soul receives the benefit of a particular mass. A thousand masses may be said for A but applied by God to Z and others.

In summary, transubstantiation, the miracle by the priest, the adoration of the host, the propitiatory nature of the sacrifice, the denial of the cup to the laity, the sacramental nature of the transaction, and inability to state to which of the faithful dead a certain mass is applied are essential emphases in the Roman Catholic construction of the eucharist.

The Longer Catechism of the Eastern Church teaches that Christ is really present in the mystery but the "word 'transubstantiation' does not define the manner in which the bread and wine are changed into the body and blood of the Lord; for this none can understand but God." The holy eucharist is adored as the Saviour himself. It is a propitiatory sacrifice in behalf of both the living and the dead. The priest must intend the change of the substance of the bread and of the wine into the substance of the body and blood of Christ. The wine must be mingled with water in the course of

the rite. The bread when prepared for the Communion is called the *Lamb*. The faithful communicate in both kinds. The clergy communicate within the altar. The appearance of Jesus after his resurrection is set forth by the drawing back of the veil, the opening of the royal doors, and the appearance of the holy gifts. The table on which the Sacrament of the Communion is consecrated is known as *the throne*, because Jesus Christ as King is mystically present on it. The communion is administered to newly baptized infants immediately after they have received the chrism. Communication is by intinction.

Erasmus, while remaining a Roman Catholic, nevertheless, like the Eastern Church, emphasized the mystery surrounding the real presence. His doctrine left "this subject in the sacred mystery with which God had enveloped it."

Although Luther rejected transubstantiation, communion in one kind, and the idea of sacrifice, he forcibly insisted that the essence of the communion was the real presence. The miracle of transubstantiation was replaced by the miracle of consubstantiation. The substance of the bread and the substance of the wine exist together with the body and blood of Christ. This support of the doctrine of the real presence necessitated subscription to another doctrine, namely that of the ubiquity of Christ's body. Jesus Christ is at the right hand of God, but "the right hand of God is everywhere" and therefore on the altar. Christ's body is not confined in heaven.

"We believe, teach, and confess," says the Formula of Concord, "that the body and blood of Christ are taken with the bread and wine, not only spiritually through faith, but also by the mouth, nevertheless not Capernaitically, but after a spiritual and heavenly manner, by reason of the sacramental union."

That Formula rejects the proposition

"that unbelieving and impenitent Christians in the Lord's Supper do not receive the true body and blood of Christ, but only bread and wine."

The Zwinglians could not understand how more than actual bread and actual wine were involved in the Lord's Supper. The eucharist for them was a commemoration of the death of Christ and a time of Christian fellowship. The bread and the wine were only figures, similitudes, types of the body and blood of Christ, since he himself was far away at the right hand of God. How could Christ promise or impart the substantial presence of his body and his blood, when "the essential property of the human nature itself which he had assumed could by no means bear or admit of this." Faith alone appropriated Christ. The celebration of the Lord's

Supper was a sign or a pledge of allegiance on the part of the individual and of the group to Christ. Thus the sacrament of the eucharist was reduced to the ordinance of the Lord's Supper.

Calvin regarded Christ as present to a contemplating faith. The bread and the wine are *exhibiting* signs of the body and blood of Christ. The bread and the wine seal, offer, present the body and the blood of Christ but these can be embraced only by the believing heart. The body of Christ is not everywhere but only in heaven. But Christ is dynamically, virtually, and efficaciously present during the communion for the believing souls of the predestined. The Lord's Supper is an actual means of grace because Christ thereby strengthens the Christian's real living union with him.

"Our Lord Jesus, in the night wherein he was betrayed," says the Westminster Confession of Faith, "instituted the sacrament of his body and blood, called the Lord's Supper, to be observed in his Church, unto the end of the world; for the perpetual remembrance of the sacrifice of himself in his death, the sealing all benefits thereof unto true believers, their spiritual nourishment and growth in him, their further engagement in, and to all duties which they owe unto him; and to be a bond and pledge of their communion with him, and with each other, as members of his mystical body."

The ancient Paulicians in their opposition to the sacraments of the church had taught that "whosoever shall make any water, any mere bread, or any moistened morsel, and distribute deceitfully to the simple people, it is their own flesh and blood and not Christ's." The Paulicians apparently insisted upon the spiritual partaking of the body and blood of Christ by the believer.

The Quakers completely reject the medieval idea of sacrament. The communion becomes thus a wholly inward and spiritual occurrence. For the sake of the weak, the early church had used the external symbols of bread and wine. But these were merely shadows of better things. "They cease," said Barclay, "in such as have obtained the inheritance."

II

Until recently the method of procedure in dealing with the varied and contradictory data of the New Testament upon the Lord's Supper has been either to ignore them completely in the interest of a particular ecclesiastical tradition or to employ the magic of harmonization. Two opposite statements can be resolved by assuming a third which includes both. A Christian group with peculiar practices and views regarding the eucharist assumes that these are in agreement with the New Testament. Its experts

thereupon so examine the New Testament materials and sort them over and finally construe them as to make them agree with current custom. The approach to the New Testament is of course along traditional lines. The references to the Lord's Supper in the gospels are assumed to be older than those in Acts or in the letters of Paul. Actually any modern church custom involves not merely a New Testament point of departure but the accumulation of a considerable tradition plus modification by environment and pressure growing out of the new cultural milieus encountered. No practice of twentieth-century Christian worship exactly parallels the primitive Christian basis. As far as the eucharist is concerned, the narratives of the institution of the Lord's Supper now found in Mark 14, Matthew 26, and Luke 22, are much later than the materials in Acts or the letters of Paul.

The oldest references to the Lord's Supper in the New Testament make of it a simple "breaking of bread," a fellowship meal. No remembrance of the death of Jesus is associated with it. It is a joyous anticipation of the parousia just around the corner.

"And they continued steadfastly in the apostles' doctrine and fellowship and in the *breaking of bread*, and in prayers."

"And they continued daily with one accord in the temple, and *breaking bread from house to house* . . . praising God and having favor with all the people."

Jesus was considered spiritually present and would shortly be visibly present to establish the kingdom of God with power. The daily companionship with Jesus is thus being continued. Hence, Jesus did not become a mere memory.

Paul does not associate the origin of the Lord's Supper with the eating of the Passover. The Gospel of John and a letter of Paul locate the crucifixion upon Nisan 14, while the synoptic gospels in their latest strata assign it to Nisan 15. At the Passover unleavened bread was eaten but the various New Testament writers let Jesus and his disciples eat leavened bread at their final meal together.

The Gospel of Luke has a very puzzling description of the last meal of Jesus, involving two cups of wine and the breaking of bread. Moreover, in Luke 24, there are two allusions to the *breaking of bread* which support the references in Acts to the Lord's Supper:

"And it came to pass as he sat at meat with them, he took bread and *blessed it, and brake it* and gave to them . . ."

"And they told what things were done in the way, and *how he was known of them in the breaking of bread.*"

According to 1 Corinthians 10, some Christian churches seem to have preferred the cup-bread order to the bread-cup order.

Most significant of all, Paul in 1 Corinthians 11 asserts that his view of the Lord's Supper was not transmitted to him by the tradition of the church but that he received it from the Lord Jesus. Long ago this remark should have suggested that the *breaking of bread* in the primitive church cannot be equated with the celebration of the Lord's Supper in the Gentile churches founded by Paul.

III

The publication of part of the Revised Version in 1881 stirred all Christendom. Two newspapers reprinted the new text. Within a few weeks tens of thousands of copies were sold. The revisers were charged with making 36,000 changes and "spoiling the English of almost every sentence." One solicitous soul exclaimed: "Alas! how many a deadly blow at Revealed Truth hath been in this way aimed with fatal adroitness which no amount of orthodox learning will ever be able to parry much less to repel."

A marginal note in the Revised Version at Luke 22. 19 caused consternation:

"some ancient authorities omit *which is given* for you to *which is poured out* for you."

This was serious, since the Third Evangelist's narrative of the institution of the Lord's Supper now became:

"And when the hour was come, he sat down, and the twelve apostles with him.

"And he said unto them, With desire I have desired to eat this passover with you before I suffer.

"For I say unto you, I will not anymore eat thereof, until it be fulfilled in the kingdom of God.

"And he took the cup, and gave thanks and said, Take this and divide it among yourselves.

"For I say unto you, I will not drink of the fruit of the vine, until the kingdom of God shall come.

"And he took bread, and gave thanks and brake it and gave unto them, saying, This is my body."

The alarming nature of this revision was discerned forthwith. The New Testament collection came into existence toward the end of the second century. The argument regarding what books should be included in this new canon continued until the close of the fourth century only to be

renewed at various subsequent crises in the history of the church. The four gospels now in the New Testament were not selected until well into the second century. Hence for a century and one-half after the death of Jesus various Christian churches possessed only one or two gospels. Those churches which were reading this form of the Gospel of Luke understood that what is now known as the last meal of Jesus had been only a simple eating together. There is here no command to repeat the meal. There is no reference to dying but only to suffering. The later familiar equations are lacking. After a slight interval, during the week of the approaching passover, the kingdom of God would be established. The literalist had to resort to new processes in harmonization. The difficulties in this text of the Gospel of Luke could not be waved aside.

IV

In 1875 Bryennios came upon the Didache in a library at Constantinople. The publication of its text in 1883 added to the confusion of the literalist. For although the Didache contained several references to the eucharist, not one of them confirmed the institution of the eucharist according to the synoptic gospels. Where was there a detectable reminiscence to the death of Jesus? There was no hint of a mystical relation between cup-bread and blood-body. The order was cup-bread. There was emphasis in the prayers of the Didache upon Jesus' revelation of the Father and the approaching unity of the church in the kingdom of God.

"We give thanks to thee, our Father, for the holy Vine of David thy child, which thou didst make known to us through Jesus thy child; to thee be glory forever.

"We give thee thanks, our Father, for the life and knowledge which thou didst make known to us through Jesus thy child. To thee be glory forever.

"As this broken bread was scattered upon the mountains, but was brought together and became one, so let thy Church be gathered together from the ends of the earth into thy Kingdom . . .

"We give thanks to thee, O Holy Father, for thy Holy Name which thou didst make to tabernacle in our hearts, and for the knowledge and faith and immortality which thou didst make known to us through Jesus thy Child."

Thus the Didache seemed to be supporting 1 Corinthians 10 and the shorter text of the Gospel of Luke as to the order, namely cup-bread and not bread-cup, and Acts and Luke 24. 30, 35 as to the original significance of the last meal of Jesus. The Acts-Luke-Didache tradition was pleading for a re-examination of the orthodox hypothesis of the origin of the eucharist.

V

Strange to relate, the Christian eucharist is not rooted in the Jewish passover. To be sure, the tradition of the Eastern Church in the course of time incorporated slight reminders of the Jewish passover, but the elaborate ceremony of Roman Catholicism with its over 300 directions for the officiating priest does not preserve any of the major elements of the passover. No lamb is slain or consumed. The Christian rite is of daily, weekly, monthly, bimonthly occurrence; the Jewish celebration is annual. The Christian eucharist lasts a few minutes or an hour; the Jewish feast is now for eight days. The Jew conducts a search for leaven and removes it or burns it, eating mazzoth; the Eastern Church and Protestantism on the whole use leavened bread. The Jewish church also makes much of bitter herbs, a dish of nuts, apples, raisins, almonds, etc., four cups of wine. The four questions of the Jewish ritual, the discourse, the opening of the door to admit Elijah are not paralleled in the Christian ritual.

Probably the best proof that the Lord's Supper of the Christian church does not continue the Jewish passover is the fact that the early Christians continued their participation in the keeping of the Jewish passover while also "breaking bread" in their own circles.

VI

Even more astonishing is the fact that what proved to be the last meal of Jesus with his disciples was not a passover.

The Gospel of John locates the death of Jesus before the slaying of the passover lamb:

"Then led they Jesus from Caiaphas unto the hall of judgment: and it was early; and they themselves went not into the judgment hall, lest they should be defiled; *but that they might eat the passover.*

"And it was the *preparation of the passover*, and about the sixth hour: and he (Pilate) saith to the Jews: Behold your king.

"The Jews, therefore, *because it was the preparation* that the bodies should not remain upon the cross on the sabbath day . . ."

Paul describes Christ as our passover: "For even Christ our passover is sacrificed for us."

A closer study of the synoptic gospels uncovers strata with the same content, for example, Mark 14. 1ff., 22; 15. 42 and Luke 23. 54.

The arrest of Jesus, the alleged sessions of the Sanhedrin, the participation of orthodox Jewish leaders in the trial, the condemnation and crucifixion of Jesus on the day of the passover would have been illegal. Such

a good Jew as Simon of Cyrene would not have been at work on the holy day of the passover. Righteous Joseph of Arimathea could not have purchased a linen cloth or removed Jesus from the cross upon the holy passover. Neither would stores have been open for the purchase of spices and ointments during the holy feast.

VII

What, then, was the last meal of Jesus with his disciples. Over and over again the suggestion has been made that it was a *kiddush*. Contemporary Judaism was accustomed to celebrate a domestic ceremony in the course of which a cup of wine and some bread were blessed and thereupon distributed to the household. Such a *kiddush* might take place just before the beginning of the sabbath or prior to such festivals as the passover. By this observance, the "holiness of the sabbath or of a festival was proclaimed" and magnified. The prayer of thanksgiving concluding such a service might begin, "Blessed be thou, O Lord, our God, King of the world, creator of the fruit of the vine." Jesus' death occurred in close proximity to the passover. He had a meal with the inner circle before the passover which subsequent events dramatically turned into a *last meal*. But Jesus that night was hoping for the immediate establishment of the kingdom of God, his own vindication, and the renewal of companionship with his disciples. In Gethsemane Jesus finally concluded that he must die.

VIII

As the discussion regarding the origin of the eucharist continued, some New Testament scholars like von Soden and Moffatt returned to the traditional text of the Gospel of Luke. Other students of the problem began to point out that, since the gospels were composed about A. D. 70 and thereafter and the epistles of Paul had been written before A. D. 64, I Corinthians 11. 23ff. was not only chronologically earlier than Mark 14. 22-25, Matthew 26. 26-29, Luke 22. 17-20 but might represent a tradition which had revised the earlier gospel story. The agreements between the accounts of the origin of the Lord's Supper in the synoptic gospels and I Corinthians might, therefore, be accounted for by the influence of the Pauline writings directly or indirectly upon them rather than as had been assumed by the influence of the synoptic tradition upon Paul. The synoptic narrative of the institution of the Lord's Supper, in this case, merely reflects the practice and faith of Gentile Christians four decades after the death of Jesus. The convictions and psychology of Gentile Christianity are recorded

in the synoptic accounts of the last meal of Jesus. The true origin of the Lord's Supper lies imbedded in such passages as Mark 14. 25, Matthew 26. 29, Luke 22. 15, 16, 18. Hence, the original description of the last meal of Jesus with his disciples was about as follows:

"And he said unto them, With desire I have desired to eat this passover with you before I suffer.

"For I say unto you, I will not anymore eat thereof, until it be fulfilled in the kingdom of God.

"For I say unto you, I will not drink of the fruit of the vine until the kingdom of God shall come."

What became the last meal of Jesus with his disciples was not a sacrament. The equations bread=body and wine=blood were not present to his thought or to their thought. They were not anticipating Jesus' death upon the cross or any repetition of this simple meal. Under these circumstances there could not have been the institution of a memorial meal much less of a sacrament of the body and of the blood of Christ. The members of the inner circle were awaiting the immediate establishment of the kingdom of God in power. The first Lord's Supper is incommensurable not merely with transubstantiation, consubstantiation, theophagy but also with either the Pauline soteriology or the Johannine mysticism. The slowly developing theology of the church is responsible for all these. Here is the theme of a great epic: the transformation of a simple meal of Jesus and his disciples in the night in which he was betrayed into the dogma of theophagy and all the persecution, schisms, and surviving bitterness attending that unanticipated reconstruction.

IX

Zwingli, Calvinism, the Baptists and other modern Christian groups had converted the sacrament of the eucharist of the medieval church into a semi-sacrament or into an ordinance. They had built a solid biblical foundation for its symbolical or semi-symbolical explanation.

The new-old point of view had been bolstered by the recognition of immersion as the original form of baptism and the persistence of adult baptism for centuries. Victory seemed assured for the symbolical interpretation of baptism and the Lord's Supper.

Of course there still remained some unexplained texts such as Acts 2. 38, Romans 6. 1ff., 1 Corinthians 10. 1ff., 16ff., 11. 27-30, and John 3. 5. But the usual harmonistic assumptions took care of these passages for the time being.

Thereupon, the deluge! The extensive study of the mystery religions of the culture of the Mediterranean world contemporary with the beginnings of Christianity demonstrated beyond any question that the sacramental construction of religious rites and ceremonies was at that time well nigh universal. The mystery cults were shown to be religions of redemption. The way of salvation was union with the deity. This union was sacramental not ethical or spiritual. The mysteries had solemn initiation ceremonies. Their immersions washed away sin. In the mystery, the old man died and a new man was born. Immortality was bestowed upon the initiate in the course of the ceremony. Union with the deity was actually accomplished. The consumption of consecrated bread and of a consecrated drink produced changes in the flesh and blood of the novitiate assuring the candidate of the resurrection of the flesh. He became not merely like the god but a god.

Hence the New Testament investigator could no longer escape such haunting questions as, was Christianity a sacramental religion from its origin, did Christianity become sacramental through the influence of Paul when it turned universal, or did Christianity become sacramental only toward the end of the first century?

The long discussion has made it practically certain that Jesus' view of salvation was ethical not sacramental. Jesus' confession of faith as preserved in Luke 15 points very clearly toward a forgiveness of sins altogether ethical. Because what proved to be Jesus' farewell supper with his disciples was not the institution of a memorial sacramental meal, there was no longer any pertinent reason for attributing sacramentalism to him. And the earliest church had followed his trail.

Regarding Paul's attitude toward sacramentalism there is much difference of opinion. Only letters of Paul, not a system of his theology, survive. His scheme of salvation has been described without any reference to the sacraments. On the other hand, Romans 6 and 1 Corinthians 11. 23ff. cannot be effaced by the magic of harmonization.

X

The sacramental interpretation of the Lord's Supper originated with Paul and was transmitted by him to Gentile Christianity. Paul converted the simple final fellowship meal of Jesus with his disciples and the "breaking of bread" of the earliest church (as Acts, the Didache, and the shorter text of the Gospel of Luke indicate) into a sacrament. The road to theophagy was not taken after Ignatius but in the age of Paul. The account

of the institution of the Lord's Supper in 1 Corinthians 11 is not only the earliest extant description of the institution of the eucharist but profoundly revised the "breaking of bread" rite of the Jewish-Christian church.

"For *I have received of the Lord,*" says Paul, "that which also I delivered unto you, that the Lord Jesus the same night in which he was betrayed, took bread:

And when he had given thanks, he brake it, and said, Take, eat; this is my body, which is broken for you; this do in remembrance of me.

And after the same manner also he took the cup when he had supped, saying, This cup is the new testament in my blood; this do ye, as oft as ye drink it, in remembrance of me.

For as often as ye eat this bread and drink this cup, ye do shew the Lord's death till he come.

Wherefore, whosoever shall eat this bread and drink this cup of the Lord *unworthily shall be guilty of the body and blood of the Lord.*

For he that eateth and drinketh unworthily, eateth and drinketh damnation to himself, not discerning the Lord's body.

For this cause many are weak and sickly among you and many die."

Paul emphatically states that his view of the Lord's Supper was not derived from tradition but revealed to him by the Lord. The ceremony is for him and the Gentile churches a cult-act exhibiting the Lord's death. *Is* here is not *represents* but *is*. The bread *is* the body and the cup *is* the blood. Unworthy participation in the eating and the drinking of the eucharist is followed by untoward physical as well as eternal consequences. The causal connection between unworthy participation in the Lord's Supper and the weakness, sickness, and dying of members of the First Christian Church of Corinth cannot be denied successfully.

Thus a view of the Lord's Supper altogether impossible for the disciples in the night in which Jesus was betrayed originated. Paul transformed a simple meal into a sacrament and within a few decades Paul's hypothesis became something like a dogma in the Gentile Christian churches. The institution of the Lord's Supper has until recently been ascribed to Jesus of Nazareth. Actually, what proved to be the last meal of Jesus with his disciples became, because of the crucifixion and the conversion of Saul, the point of departure for a sacramental reconstruction of a simple fellowship meal. Paul must be held responsible for the institution of the eucharist. But much water will go over the dam before the various modern denominations admit the facts.

The Preaching Function

HAROLD B. KERSCHNER

IT is little wonder that most ministers have an inferiority complex to-day. Nor is this due to the fact that as a class they are inferior. Primarily it is due to the fact that, when it comes to spiritual things, the average man has a superiority complex. The man of low standards, always the central concern and natural opponent of the preacher, is still with us. But now he is flanked by outspoken champions of two present-day schools of thought, both of which challenge his message. On the one hand are the materialists, who, believing that the physical alone is real, view with contemptuous haughtiness the preacher as he deals with spiritual things; and on the other hand are those who, accepting the behavioristic attitude toward life, simply feel that the preacher is well-meaning, but uninformed and naïve in suggesting that it is possible for a man to be the master of his fate. The preacher is still tolerated and respected, but he has been shorn of his authority. Those who feel that the well is deep are none the less convinced that the preacher has nothing to draw with. Said one of my ministerial friends recently, "I never preach in a college chapel without having something of the feeling that I am being laughed at."

Even more unsettling than these two aspects of the preacher's problem—for these will pass—is the increasing readiness of people to criticize the quality of his work. There seems to be general agreement that his best could be greatly improved upon, and there has been no concerted effort to keep the information from him. A few years ago, Mr. John Spargo published an article in which he said, "The weak spot in the church to-day, its Achilles tendon, is the pulpit." It was, he thought, very doubtful whether all the preaching that would be done in this country during the next twelve months would add as much to the well-being of America as the work of one humble, efficient farmer or of one honest school-teacher in some little red school-house. "Preaching," he went on to say, "is not a man sized job." Thus do men think and speak. Paul found that the Greeks regarded preaching as foolishness. Practically every minister has found that there are no end of detractors who are ready to insist that preaching—at least as practiced—deserves to fall in that category. Every congregation includes members who feel that they know more about preaching than the preacher. And sometimes their criticisms are so caustic and cruel that the preacher becomes utterly bewildered and unsettled.

The preacher does well to give heed to every judgment, whether fair or

foul, that people make concerning his work. Some of the criticisms are wise and some are foolish. Many of them contain only a half-truth, but even this may suffice to stimulate his thought and challenge his practice. It really is to be regretted that "Elmer Gantry" is dead—or nearly so. Even its author, now grown distinguished, is reported to have said that he didn't mean it—that he wasn't depicting the clergy generally; just one. Well, he never knew even one such person. No preacher so contemptible and carnal as the one he described ever occupied a place of prominence in the church. Nevertheless, every minister should have read the book. It was robbed of much of the usefulness it might have had because the ministers who should have benefited most from it haughtily refused to read it. We believe that the book should have been kept from the public, and made the recommendation of the Religious Book Club instead. And we think that it ought to be on the required reading list of every theological seminary in its course in Pastoral Theology. There was just enough truth in the book to stab the honest preacher awake and to cause him to give serious thought to the pitfalls to which we are all liable. It was only half-truth, but it did present a conception of the preacher and his function current in some quarters.

In like manner, other conceptions of the preacher and his function merit his consideration. Many are only half-truths, too, and for that reason all the more deadly. But they should not be ignored; they should be dissected. The preacher must face them fearlessly, but he must also keep his balance. He may be analyzed so much that he becomes tantalized and completely unsteadied. It is the purpose of this discussion to consider three of these conceptions.

I. *In the first place, there is the demand that every sermon should be a great sermon.* This is a demand highly insisted upon not by those in the ministry, but by those who have no appreciation of the involved nature of the preacher's task. It seems to be one of the pet subjects of itinerant lecturers and others in positions of a like general character who are not under compulsion to turn out in the neighborhood of ninety new sermons a year. No minister in a parish church ever passed this opinion. He knows better. It is not given to him to enter into a contract to preach a given number of sermons a year, and do practically nothing more, as is the occasional arrangement of a few men. It is not possible for the average minister to limit his pastoral work almost exclusively to a Confessional to which people are invited to *come*. He must *go*—he must visit the sick, feed the poor, comfort those who are bowed down and bring courage to those who have

faltered. It may be that the organizational life of our churches ought to be changed so that, with larger congregations, it would be possible to maintain specialized staffs, including one minister who would devote himself almost exclusively to the work of preaching. However, since this has not been accomplished, no preacher should be disheartened because he has discovered that every sermon cannot be a *magnum opus*.

This notion that every sermon should be a "great effort" is a snare and a delusion. No man, of course, should do less than his best. And every true minister, as a consequence of honest and legitimate industry, will, when the spirit is upon him, now and again preach *great* sermons. But sermons to be really great must come of themselves out of moments of exalted inspiration. The man whose ideal it is to cause all of his sermons to bristle with rhetorical figures and carefully turned phrases, so that they may be gathered together like essays in a volume and regarded as classics because of their timelessness, has forgotten the true purpose of preaching, which is to do good. The test of a sermon is not its timelessness but its timeliness. Sometimes a sermon ought to be so direct and immediate in its appeal that, although it may influence vitally those to whom it is preached, it may not appear great anywhere else—in fact, it may perhaps appear to be insignificant and unimportant. Preaching should always be good—and sometimes great—but when real need and urgency are sacrificed to homiletical method or other consideration the true purpose of a sermon is defeated. Of sermons of this kind, Beecher said: "They are like steeples without any bells in them; things stuck up high in the air, serving for ornament, attracting observation; but sheltering nobody, warming nobody, helping nobody."

A preacher who is really thoroughly in earnest will not be everlastingly saying things that the press regards as quotable. He will not be thinking about how anything he says will look in print. He will be thinking only of his congregation and their needs. He will be feeding his flock. He will be leading and guiding them. He will remember that for the most part they are like little children, who do not need something profound, but something that will assure them of protection and friendliness, and give them courage. He will present week after week the simple, vital truths that are the same yesterday, to-day and forever.

Now the newspapers are not interested in this. They are not interested in things that last; it is their business to chronicle the events of the day. How many of Jesus' utterances do you imagine the newspapers of to-day would be eager to print? Oh, occasional passages, such as those in which

he denounced the Scribes and Pharisees, and uttered his woes against certain villages! But utterances such as "Whatsoever ye would that men should do unto you, do ye also unto them;" "Judge not that ye be not judged;" "Blessed are they that mourn" would not constitute good copy. He called himself the "Bread of Life." What do newspapers care about bread? That's an everyday dish. Compound some fantastic dish and the paper will give it space; but not bread. Jesus did not care. His concern was not with the daily news, but with the good news. His message touched life deeply at vital points—in those areas where sustenance and inner strength are involved. That is why, though he was killed, his influence has lived on.

In this connection, it ought to be said that the preacher will do well to be less worried about the so-called "intellectuals." To have a better furnished intellect should of course be the aim of every one. A minister must ever give the impression of thoughtfulness, that he is bending every effort to have something worth-while to say. The preacher who insults the intelligence of his hearers will soon be without hearers. But there is a type of intellectual who cannot be permanently influenced by anything that the preacher says or does. People of this sort may be impressed by some chance utterance and for a time appear to be responsive. But it soon wears off. They are quickly satiated. It is characteristic of them to seek every new thing—but not vital religion. They have no appreciation of the value of corporate worship; they have no deep concern about the program to build a better and more brotherly society; they are unmoved by the challenges to render service. Be not deceived by them; sermons great enough to satisfy or influence them vitally cannot be preached. Any modern Paul who sets out to preach to those who gather on Mars Hill may expect that his efforts will have a like consequence.

II. *In the second place there is the demand that every sermon should be prophetic.* And when people say this what do they mean? They mean that sermons should deal with controversial topics—with international issues, economic maladjustments, sectarianism, lynchings, war, public corruption and so on. The preacher should be especially frank in dealing with the Bible, exercising no reserve or caution in pointing out such primitive and pre-Christian concepts as are to be found within its pages. If thereby, more doubts are raised than settled, never mind—every sermon must be prophetic! If suspicion is cast on the very existence of God, never mind—every sermon must be prophetic! If people in the congregation have had reverses and need comfort, never mind—every sermon must be prophetic! If his sermons are nothing more than a series of negations, never

mind—every sermon must be prophetic! Those who hold to this position would have us believe that unless every sermon is at least mildly inflammatory it is not worth preaching.

The trouble in this instance is not with the conception, but with its definition and interpretation. Every sermon *should* be prophetic. It must be direct and positive. It must deal with great themes. It must challenge low ideals of thought and action. It must, like the sentinel on duty, say to the casual thinking of people, "Halt! Who goes there?" It must ever involve on the part of the preacher a wholesome courage which makes him indifferent to his own security. With this conception of prophetic preaching we are in complete accord—and according to this standard we agree that every sermon should be prophetic. The preacher does well to ponder Phillips Brooks' words: "So often we are only trying to be mutually harmless. We are like steamers lying in the fog and whistling, that we may not run into others nor they into us. It is safe, but commerce makes no great progress thereby, and it shows no great skill in navigation."

What we differ with is the notion that every minister must always be in a belligerent mood and that every sermon must attack some outcropping evil in the social order. There are, to be sure, plenty of issues that need to be handled boldly and with outspoken candor, and when the need presents itself no true prophet dare be a duty-dodger. But the primary function of the pulpit is not controversy and the primary function of the preacher is not to be a controversialist. His primary business is to declare those eternal counsels of God which he has learned do bring to people abundant living. In doing this he will be positive rather than negative, uttering truth far more than denying error. There is nothing, for instance, that would be more likely to diminish his influence than for him to turn from preaching Christ whom he does understand to a protracted discussion of scientific or economic questions which he does not understand. Some of the best ministers the Cross has had have been those who have not been controversial in spirit, but who, in their preaching and lives, have exemplified a thoroughgoing devotion to those qualities of truth and beauty and goodness which make men the salt of the earth. Preachers will do well to recall from time to time the occasion when John the Baptist, discouraged because he thought Jesus was too mild-mannered and not aggressive enough in condemning social ills, sent messengers to him asking him if he were the Messiah. And Jesus simply told them to return to John with an itemized list of those they had seen helped. And that is the way of life. First the blade, and then the ear, and then the full-corn in the ear. The engage-

ment in behalf of righteousness, in which the ministry is joined, is not a battle but a campaign.

Young men, especially just out of the theological seminary, will use the controversial method sparingly. Not uncommonly they enter upon their work, fresh from the Department of Social Ethics in the seminary, with an overpowering conviction that they are called upon to denounce individual and social evils Sunday after Sunday. This feeling tends to be accentuated by articles that appear in religious publications and by free-lance speakers who view the struggle from a distance and assure them that the world is hungering and thirsting for real religion if ministers will only preach the truth without fear and trembling.

Well, there may be some men who may enter upon the task of preaching without fear and trembling, but if so, the young minister is not included in their company. The new minister needs first to save his own soul. He must needs discover the light with which to find his way around in the dark. He must earn the confidence of his people by convincing them of his own sincerity and that the things which he is declaring have found verification in his own life. And if, failing in this, he finds that, because of his ill-considered boldness, his usefulness has been terminated, he will also find that, far from regarding him as a martyr, his pseudo-adherents will leave him and flee. His theological seminary, instead of supporting him because he has been prophetic, will be suspicious of him because he has been indiscreet. The Pyrotechnic Department and the Supply Department of the seminary are not one and the same thing. Do I seem to be suggesting that safety should be the standard which regulates a minister's utterances? Not so! I am merely making the point that those ministers who enjoy the longest and most influential usefulness are not those who limit themselves by making every sermon controversial.

There are ministers, who after long pastorates, have earned the right to say almost anything. They may be controversial, or even inflammatory, if they desire so to be. The reason they have earned this right is because they have disclosed that they do not desire so to be. They have learned that their people need to be strengthened and encouraged quite as much as they need to be goaded into social action; that they have nearby problems as well as great social problems; that men and women with open sores don't deserve to be irritated and rubbed raw every time they come to church.

A few years ago sickness took me from my pulpit for a time. When, after a number of weeks, I was able to attend public worship, I had a most unusual and unsatisfactory experience. The first five services I attended,

nearly all in different churches, dealt with some specialized phase of the Kingdom's program, but gave me absolutely nothing for my own hungry soul. The first time it was an Armistice Day Service; the second was Parents' Day; the third a Thanksgiving Day Service, in which our national ills were thoroughly ventilated; the fourth was addressed by a denominational executive who spoke on the program of the church; and the fifth was a missionary occasion. Now all of these were important and dealt with real situations, but they left my own spirit, weary and dry, unrelieved and unrefreshed. They served to remind me, as nothing had ever done, that it is the preacher's business to vary his utterances so that one and all may be helped by the ministry which he brings.

III. *In the third place, there is the charge that preaching is a waste of time anyway.* Those who take this position hold that people are not permanently influenced by preaching. They attend service, it is argued, feel a noble stirring within, perhaps are pricked a bit in their consciences, and then go out, as from a bath, leaving behind that through which they have passed. Accordingly, preaching it is maintained, will soon be supplanted. Instituted originally for propaganda purposes in order to explain Christianity, since that need no longer exists, except in mission lands, it will soon as a practice die out. When I left the seminary a dozen years ago there was much of this sentiment abroad, and not a few, feeling that preaching was a decadent art, decided that, in order to make their ministries most effective, they would do well to enter the newly constituted field of Religious Education. I do not know whether this tendency is much current in theological seminaries to-day, but contact with some recent graduates in theology leads me to believe that a remnant is still left.

Only recently I read an article in a religious periodical, by a Young People's Secretary, that accented something of this same note. In an otherwise admirable article, there appeared this statement: "The average present-day pastor, if he will think through the way he spends his time, will see that it is the morning sermon, the Men's Bible Class, the evening sermon, the mid-week address, and the administration of adult activities generally, which are his chief concern. The children and youth are on the margin of his program and not at the center." This much is true. But then he continues: "Is it not plain that this overemphasis upon work with men and women is mistaken. . . . It is not by looking after adults who have gone astray, important as that is, that we chiefly advance the kingdom of God, but by leading boys and girls into the Christian life, so that they will never go astray."

Now, with this latter statement experience is in head-on collision. Overemphasis of any kind is of course mistaken. But to promote all the different forms of adult activity which the writer enumerated is not overemphasis. In reality, it is putting suitable emphasis at the right place. It is only as we are able to direct the lives of grown men and women in the paths of understanding and usefulness that the kingdom of God will at all advance. Unless we can influence constructively the thinking of the parents of our children our task is hopeless. We may, in the scant time that the children of our churches are entrusted to us for religious purposes, teach them many valuable things, and aid them in the formulation of attitudes that will lead to desirable outcomes and responses; but unless their parents are also led in their thinking by Him whose truth leads to freedom and the fulfillment of selfhood we will be in bondage evermore. Preachers, when they find themselves succumbing to the charge that preaching to adults is a waste of time anyway, will do well to remember the results of the researches carried on by Dr. Hugh Hartshorne and Mark May, at Yale University in 1931. These revealed, "that among agencies having the greatest influence in human character building, the home outweighs the school, the church, the Sunday school, the movies and sports, all combined." It is sad indeed to be forced to admit that preaching does not always lead to practice; but what an opportunity the preacher does have to get in on the ground floor in influencing for good the policies and practices of millions of fathers and mothers who are the responsible heads of the homes in which our boys and girls are reared.

The importance of home influence has been borne in upon me afresh by several situations in which I found myself recently. One was that of a girl whom I met a few months ago. She was sophisticated seventeen in all its glory. That she was shallow and aimless was apparent from her appearance, and was confirmed by her conversation. There was nothing winsome or attractive about her. What was wrong with her? Was it her inheritance? No! She was the daughter of a man whose name is well-known to millions, and her mother was evidently a woman of splendid capacities. Was it her formal training? No! She had just been graduated from one of our most respected preparatory schools, where suitable training in religion is intelligently imparted. The trouble was her home. Her father and mother were incompatible. As heads of a home they were everything that parents should not be. The daughter and her father had joint-dates, the two going off together, she with her boy-friend and he with his lady-friend. What was *wrong*? The answer is obvious: it was her home

that ruined her. All that could be done for her by precept was spoiled by example.

Not long since I met another girl of about the same age. She is of a different type. She is wholesome, strong minded and apparently interested in life at its best. Her home training has always been constructive, and when I talked with her she mentioned the fact that her parents were concerned about the thought of her going off to college alone. In discussing the matter with her, I said, "But you know what is right and what is wrong, don't you; and you'll do what is right, won't you?" And she answered, "I *hope* I will." "But," I said, "You can decide that you will, can't you?" "I *guess* I can," she replied, "but you see I did a few things in High School that mother didn't like and she's afraid I'll get into wrong company and go to the wrong kind of parties." "But," I persisted, "you can determine not to be influenced by company of this kind and not to attend parties of which your mother would disapprove, can't you?" "Yes, I *guess* I can," she answered. What was wrong? Was she a mental and moral weakling? No! She stood among the upper three or four in her class in high school. She has been assigned one of the most valuable college scholarships awarded in this country. She has always attended church and Sunday school. She simply is still unable to stand alone. She needs desperately to have properly directed mature thought help in shaping her opinions and judgments.

Preaching decadent? It never had a greater opportunity than it has to-day. The cross-currents of thought and practice were never more numerous. There never was a time when so many long-respected theories were being challenged. Doubts, uncertainty and perplexity exist on every hand. The undertow of life is terrific. The world is sick and needs the therapy which the minister has to offer. The preacher is needed in this modern day as never before—needed to declare that the sordid is not normal; that the unclean is not the pure in new and more beautiful colors; that sin is not an illusion of mortal mind but that to be carnally minded is still death; that we are more than helpless mechanisms wound up generations ago and now ticking off our inevitable moments—in short, that we are still creatures of destiny, with a noble design after which to pattern our lives, and a spiritual end to serve.

Soviet Russia Comes of Age

JEROME DAVIS

AMERICA ranks as a Christian nation and yet in her economic life is often deliberately violating the most elementary principles of social justice, not to speak of the Golden Rule. Soviet Russia boasts of her militant atheism and yet in constructing her economic life is actually trying to embody the principles of economic justice.

As I toured some eight thousand miles in Russia from Leningrad to the Crimea this contrast came often to my mind. For make no mistake, the central drive of the Soviet leaders is to abolish the exploitation of man by man. With this aim they have abolished private industry and have taken over all the natural resources of Russia to run them in the interests of the common man. With this purpose in view they have adopted unemployment insurance, old age pensions, vacations with pay, health insurance, and have made the trade unions one of the strongest forces in the national life.

To be sure there is hardship and suffering aplenty. Almost every one in the cities seems to be having some difficulty with the food problem, but at least the effort is made to share with all equitably. In America many people are starving in the midst of plenty or going barefoot while our stores and warehouses are loaded down with unused shoes. Russia presents no such insanity as that. If people starve it is because there is not enough food to go round, or if people go barefoot it is because of an actual lack of shoes and there is no industrial unemployment.

After visiting in the villages and in the factories, talking freely with worker and peasant alike, I was struck by the new sense of pride which the Russian worker now shows for the new order. A new Soviet nationalism is developing. The people in spite of their poverty are proud of their achievements. They are even proud that they dare to imprison two English engineers for bribery and sabotage in spite of a loss in trade. They are proud of their factories, proud of their schools. In short, the Soviet Union is beginning to come of age. Let me describe some of the conditions as I found them.

One is always struck anew by the dirt, the inefficiency, and the poverty. Many Americans never get beyond these surface facts. Certain other conditions are indisputable. The value of the ruble has sharply declined in the past year. Prices have increased from fifty to one hundred per cent in the government stores and co-operatives. On the open market costs are almost prohibitive. An old suit, worn thin, almost in tatters, will fetch 100

rubles (\$50). A pair of second-hand shoes can be sold for eighty rubles, or \$40. A second-hand watch worth perhaps three dollars will bring 200 rubles. This spells hardship for the peasants and workers who find their wages shrinking.

There is also a food shortage in Russia. Prices have soared. For instance, in Leningrad on the open market ten eggs cost seven rubles, a quart of potatoes two rubles, a pound of dried fruit four rubles, a pound of flour two and one half rubles, a pound of rice three and one half rubles, a pound of sugar eight rubles, while a very bad chicken, mostly skin and bones, costs twelve rubles.

To be sure the workers are nominally on a ration system and have the right to purchase in the state stores or in the co-operatives, where the prices are perhaps a tenth, or even less, of those quoted. The difficulty is that the supplies in these stores are not always sufficient.

The organization of distribution is woefully inadequate. There are often only one or two clerks to a store. All payments must be made at a special cash window so that lines of waiting people a block long are not uncommon. Inefficiency and the spirit of *nitchivo*—"it doesn't matter"—are rife. Kaganovitch, a leading Communist, cites instance after instance of what is happening. For example, bread from a bakery is not delivered on time, with the result that the shop closes without supplying the needs of the workers. The next morning the store remains closed because it is the shop-keeper's holiday, and the workers go hungry. The result is that to some extent there is hunger in Russia.

The case of a worker in the Red Putaloff machine works is all too typical. He receives 200 rubles a month, but this has to support himself, wife and five children. They live in one room and a kitchen for which they pay eight rubles a month. They receive a ration of just under four pounds of bread a day, but get no milk or meat except on rare occasions. While the school was open the children received a noon meal for twenty kopeks (ten cents), but now that the schools have closed for the summer, they get nothing. This means that additional food must be purchased on the open market at ruinous prices. If on her husband's free day from the factory the family spends the week-end in the country, the wife has to come back early the next day to stand in line for their rations, and then go back to the country. "A terrible life," the wife said. "Take me to America."

On the other hand, this is only one side of the Russian picture. Amazing progress has been made in industrial production. No one can dispute

the fact that Russia has been feverishly building during the last five years. Factories, power plants, and new buildings dot the landscape everywhere. For instance, the capital investment in gold rubles for 1932 totaled over twenty billions, of which over half went to industry. Russia is producing some seventeen billion kilowatt hours of electricity annually, and in 1932 alone added seventeen million square meters of living space for her workers.

In connection with such a colossal building program, bad mistakes are made. The Communists frankly admit this. In the mammoth Nishni-Novgorod factory, for instance (the Ford automobile plant of Russia), they used up several tons of special drills, by laying them down in the concrete floor—thinking they were re-enforcing iron. Some of the houses for the workers are constructed so badly that before the plaster is dry they need repairs. Destruction of machinery is unbelievably common. Most industrial workers are merely peasants who have never seen a machine before in their lives. They are used to a primitive cart with a wooden axle which fits perfectly even if it has one or two inches of play. How can they be taught that machinery must fit to one five-hundredth part of an inch? Again, the peasants think that if they are operating a costly machine worth \$10,000, and they misplace an ingot of steel, the machine should stop. "Why should a machine break if two pieces of steel come together in the opposite direction?" the peasant thinks. The result is that thousands and thousands of dollars worth of machinery are spoiled in the factories of Russia. Again, the most primitive methods go hand in hand with the most modern. The giant new subway in Moscow is being built by the use of a type of wheelbarrow which was antiquated a century ago. I have seen bricks for a skyscraper thrown individually one by one from the fifth story to the sixth.

All this picture will create a totally wrong impression unless one realizes that Russia to-day is a gigantic school. Factories must not be considered as solely production units, but as schools for training workers. And bit by bit Russia is learning. This year will see the production of 60,000 automobiles from all their plants, 80,000 tractors, and 20,000 combines. The quality of these machines is in many cases inferior to the American brand, but they are usable and steadily improving.

Perhaps more revolutionary and startling than the changes in industry are the changes in agriculture. The Soviet government is trying to wean the peasants from individual proprietorship to collective ownership. Already two billion acres of land have been socialized in this way. When the decree went out from the Central Government to hasten the collectiviza-

tion program pressures of all sorts were applied. The peasant who would not join might have all his live stock confiscated, his good land might be exchanged for bad, or if he persisted in his hostility toward the movement he might be declared a counter-revolutionary and sent away from the district. The pressures were effective, the peasants yielded and joined. Sometimes they slaughtered their live stock first, sometimes they sabotaged the collectives, but they joined. The Soviet government was elated with its success, but the world depression was causing difficulty in making payments on imports. It became necessary to secure the maximum amount of grain from the collectives. The result was that in many districts party organizers collected too much grain.

The effect on the peasant was instantaneous. In the Ukraine, where the worst mistake in this regard was made, the peasant said, "What is the use of planting if they are going to take all my crop away?" This year he refused to plant more than a small proportion of his fields, and if they were planted he refused to harvest them. The result is that in the Ukraine, which has always been the bread basket of Europe, there is to-day a food shortage. Stalin has had to agree once more to permit private trading in grain. The collectives are changing. The individual peasant is permitted to organize in brigades where five or six peasants can jointly work their land year after year. They are paid according to their output. They are permitted their own home, their own garden, their own chickens, their own horse and cow. The collective farm has become a device for the co-operative pooling of the output of individual peasants.

When one asks the peasant how the collective farm is working out, he is apt to complain: "Payment is not fair. Ivan gets too much, Petroff too little. In the old days we all got along peaceably, now we are all quarreling." "No matter how bad the kulaks have been, they have been treated sinfully."

One wonders if the Soviet government would not have made more effective progress had they pushed the collectivization program more slowly. At present have they not violated their own theory to some degree? They have forced collectivization before its economic base was ready. They could not supply tractors and combines in sufficient quantities, nor did they have manufactured articles to exchange for grain.

The peasant complains that he can purchase little or nothing, and it is true in large measure. Russia is experiencing a gigantic goods hunger. Until this is satisfied the peasant will remain partially discontented.

It is only fair to say, however, that there are many collectives which

are working satisfactorily and that as in the case of the factories, Russia is at present at school. One should not expect the results to be much different from what they are. Slowly, bit by bit, the collectivization program will be modified to make it work. The economics of large-scale production are so great that to go back to the old inefficient methods would be a tragic blunder. In an era of tractors and combines, the old Russian strip farming is unthinkable. In the realm of science, Russia is pushing forward. It is easier to use scientific methods on large-scale farming than it is to revolutionize the habits of individuals. The ideal is to have one agricultural expert for each group of collectives. Only recently Russians have demonstrated a new technique in genetics, whereby one prize English bull can fertilize by artificial means three thousand cows. In the long run the future belongs to the collectives, because they alone have the possibility of changing the whole way of life of the peasant. Collectivization spells mechanization and chemicalization and a revolution of the village on the principle of the welfare of the whole community.

It is commonly reported in America that the Soviet Union is godless. As a matter of fact there are churches open in every town and so long as the people attend service they are unmolested. The Communists insist, however, that a church shall be used and if it is not it is seized for other purposes. Some cathedrals have been turned into atheistic museums.

Communism denies the validity of God and of religion on two counts. First, religion spreads superstition, and second, it has always been used by a privileged minority to exploit the masses of the people. This challenge can only be met by an ethical religion which is serving the common people. There is a real danger in America that the God of the churches will be made into harmony with the dominant practices of the state and the economic order. In America we cannot preach a God of righteousness and ignore the glaring inequalities and injustices which mark the present economic system.

The Communists have engendered in their followers a faith that it is possible to change human nature, a faith that the kingdom of righteousness can and will come on earth here and now. They believe that pecuniary motivation must be radically changed. If the American church is to meet this challenge, it too must have faith in the practicability of the social teachings of Jesus. We must preach with all the power and vigor at our command that men must seek first the kingdom of God and his righteousness. We must teach that the man who merely seeks economic gain at the expense of his fellow men is betraying God and crucifying Christ afresh. We must

teach that throwing the sanctity of private property around factories, business institutions, or other forms of special privilege, when they are not genuinely serving the interests of the largest possible number of people, is forfeiting all ethical and moral title to them.

From all that we have said it can easily be seen that there are radical differences between Russia and America and that the higher ethical values are not all on the side of the so-called Christian country. Even on the economic side it is apparent that America and Russia are experiencing difficulties for somewhat different reasons. America faces unemployment because of underconsumption or overproduction. We have too much grain, shoes, cotton, cloth, etc. In Russia there is no unemployment. Every one is at work, but there is a shortage of everything. It would seem that both countries might gain by friendly relations and recognition. If the United States should extend credit to Russia as Germany, Italy or Great Britain has done it would put thousands of our workers back into the factories. It would give us tens of millions of dollars of foreign purchases. Each order of machinery would mean a further order. As we have noted, the spoilage of machinery in Russia is large. If American machinery were used, it would be American brains and American parts which would have to make good the deficiency. At present we are the only great nation in the world which refuses to have official dealings with the Soviets, and by so doing we are cutting off our noses to spite our faces.

This quarantine of the Russian government has so far not helped the United States one iota—still it is extremely difficult to change the policy. It has long been to the interest of every foreign government to perpetuate this severance in relations between Russia and America. In Moscow I asked several of the foreign ambassadors whether they could advance valid reasons why the United States should not recognize Russia. They were unable to do so. On the contrary, one official confidentially told me that his government would do all in its power to perpetuate misunderstanding and isolation between the United States and Russia because it meant that his own nation secured a larger proportion of the trade. A newspaper representative of the same nation told me that thousands of dollars were being spent by his government to see to it that every bit of information detrimental to Russia was circulated in the United States. At times even confidential governmental facts were transmitted through diplomatic channels to the American Secretary of State to perpetuate the phobia against Russia in the United States.

The Russian people themselves idolize America. Everywhere peasants

and workers were friendly when they learned I was an American. They were more enthusiastic over America than any other land. This should indicate that we should do more business with Russia than any one else.

Two years ago a large concern in the United States was offered Russian business provided they could give credit. The offer was declined. Instead the American concern gave credit only to American concerns. To-day a large part of this same American credit has not been repaid. Had the business been given to Russia, as the president of the concern regretfully admits, payments would have been made dollar for dollar in gold. The absence of diplomatic recognition makes American business men more hesitant to extend credit to Russia. It also makes it impossible for the Soviet government to ship gold directly to the United States. Commercial transactions are hindered all along the line because there are no consular representatives within Russia. In the competition with other nationals this is of no small importance.

It is fortunate that the Roosevelt administration is willing to face the problem of Russia and promises to act. We do not want Russian Communism in America, but even a rugged individualist should by this time be willing to recognize a stable government controlling one-sixth of the land surface of the earth. Will the rest of us "Christians" recognize that many of the Bolsheviks are actually translating justice into the pattern of their economic order more honestly than we have yet done with ours?

Irving Babbitt

LYNN HAROLD HOUGH

OVER twenty years ago Archibald Henderson wrote a book entitled *European Dramatists*. It contained a vivid and significant chapter on Oscar Wilde. Mr. Henderson recognized the "topsy-turvydom" of the age of which he was writing. He quoted with approval the words: "We know that we are brilliant and distinguished, but we do not know that we are right. We swagger in fantastic artistic costumes; we praise ourselves; we fling epigrams right and left; we have the courage to play the egotist, and the courage to play the fool, but we have not the courage to preach" (page 253). "To Wilde," he said, "creation in art consisted in the celebration of a holiday of mentality" (page 262). "If he ate of the fruit of the tree of knowledge it was knowledge of evil, not of good" (page 261). "Wilde gloried in demoralizing the public" (page 312). "He does not construct, he only sets off a mine" (page 315). "Wilde called one of his plays *The Importance of Being in Earnest*. In his inverted way he aimed at teaching the world the importance of being frivolous" (pages 319-320). Wilde himself had written in *De Profundis* "whatever I touched, I made beautiful in a new mode of beauty: to truth itself I gave what is false no less than what is true as its rightful province, and showed that the false and the true are merely forms of intellectual existence. I treated art as the supreme reality and life as a mere mode of fiction."

Oscar Wilde has long been gone from the activities of this life. But he is a symbol and a type of much that has become profoundly characteristic of the period which has followed his own. His essay *The Critic as Artist* might be the Bible of many a critic and many an artist to-day. He was the apostle of unleached imagination and emotion untamed by any noble standard. He was not the only representative of this attitude. He was not the most important. But among writers using the English language he was surely one of the most dramatic.

The struggle between the view of the good life as unquestioning surrender to feeling and the conception of the adequate life as the exercise of noble discipline is a very old one. After quoting Rousseau's statement "Man is by nature good. It is by our own institutions alone that man becomes wicked," Professor Philo M. Buck, Jr., in his book *The Golden Thread*, goes on: "This is a sentiment so often heard at popular meetings that we have almost come to believe it; but Socrates would have filed a minority report. Against this naïve trust in feeling he had the conviction

that goodness is achieved only when disciplined reason is given the unquestioning obedience of both feeling and will. For reason is the divine faculty in man, the thing that distinguishes him from the brute, and only by living under its rule can man elevate himself from the brute and hope to meet all the situations of life with safety and equanimity. . . . And the whole life of Socrates as of every vital personality, is a justification of a will guided not by instinct or feeling, but by the severely disciplined reason" (pages 171, 172).

I

This distinction of the life of the brute and the life proper to man deserves further inspection. And it will form the best introduction to the thought of Professor Irving Babbitt. In the chapter on Humanism in the Renaissance in the volume *Toward Standards* Professor Norman Foerster writes: "Paraphrasing Gellius, the Humanist, Battista Guarino wrote in 1459: 'To each species of creatures has been allotted a peculiar gift. To horses, galloping; to birds, flying comes naturally. To man only is given the desire to learn. Hence what the Greeks called *παιδεία* we call studia humanitatis. For learning and training in Virtue are peculiar to man: therefore our forefathers called them humanitas, the pursuits, the activities, proper to mankind.'" The late Professor Stuart P. Sherman in his wisest book *On Contemporary Literature* wrote: "The great revolutionary task of nineteenth-century thinkers, to put it briefly, was to put man into nature. The great task of twentieth-century thinkers is to get him out again—somehow to break the spell of those magically seductive cries: 'Follow nature,' 'Trust your instincts,' 'Back to nature.' We have trusted our instincts long enough to sound the depths of their treacherousness." Mr. Joseph Wood Krutch (of all people) in his *Five Masters* writes: "Humanism, the name which we give to the most characteristic philosophy of the Renaissance, during its period of highest development was not, essentially, either the revival of classical learning or that materialistic skepticism with both of which it has been identified, but rather an attempt to realize the implications of the fact that life is led upon two planes—the human and the natural—which intersect but do not coincide. It attempted to determine where the assumption that man was merely a shrewder sort of animal was fruitful and where it was not, and 'Don Quixote' is a statement of this problem in comic terms." Very happily Gorham Munson in his volume *The Dilemma of the Liberated* quotes these words from the oration on the dignity of man by Pico della Mirandola: "Thou shalt have power to decline into

the lower or brute creatures. Thou shalt have power to be reborn into the higher or divine according to the sentence of thy intellect" (page 23). Dr. Babbitt himself in his last published volume *On Being Creative* quotes from Cicero's *De Officiis* the words: "The natural constitution of the human mind is twofold. One part consists of appetite, by the Greeks termed *horme* (impulse), which hurries man hither and thither; the other is reason, which instructs and makes clear what is to be done or avoided; thus it follows that reason fitly commands and appetite obeys" (page xv). Ralph Waldo Emerson in lines very frequently quoted wrote

There are two laws discrete
Not reconciled,—
Law for man, and law for thing;
The last builds town and fleet,
But it runs wild,
And doth the man unking.

Matthew Arnold had the same great distinction in mind when he wrote: "Man must begin, know this, where nature ends."

These quotations may be said to indicate the quality of the central humanistic tradition as it has moved century after century through our Western culture. The presence of man with his critical intelligence in the world reveals life upon a new level. And the interpretation of life from the standpoint of man's power to think and appreciate and judge and decide is the essential task of critical humanism. Professor Irving Babbitt lived at the very center of this tradition of critical humanism. And it may be said as a mere statement of fact that Professor Babbitt and Dr. Paul Elmer More have been its most distinguished representatives in our time.

II

Irving Babbitt was born in Dayton, Ohio, on August 2, 1865, and died in Cambridge, Mass., on August 15, 1933. Harvard College put its mark upon him as a young man, and his period of study in Paris had the profoundest relation to the direction of the life of his mind. Of his something like forty years of teaching over thirty were spent at Harvard. But he was much more than professor of French Literature at that powerful University. He became a critic of letters and of life. He continued the tradition for whose sources we go back to the *Poetics* of Aristotle and the great treatise on the Sublime which bears the name of Longinus. Stuart P. Sherman wrote a fascinating account of Professor Babbitt entering his class room loaded with books, and heavily loaded with ideas, whose con-

tents he had analyzed and whose relationships he understood, finding his way with monumental erudition through the vast and complicated highways of the mind. Even those who knew least what it was all about felt that it was tremendously important, and had occasional flashes of insight. At one period a group of profanely hilarious students is said to have organized a contest based upon guessing how many literary references Professor Babbitt would make in a given lecture. In one case the man who got the prize guessed an amazing number—I think it was sixty-seven. Year after year the best men who studied at Harvard felt the profound impact of Professor Babbitt's mind. Some of them became brilliant exponents of critical humanism and later learned to love the sweets of Philistine banquets too much to be loyal. Such a man was Stuart P. Sherman, whose conversion to chaos was one of the major mental tragedies of our time. Other students who did not accept the leadership of Babbitt were so deeply influenced by him that some of their most characteristic work, to paraphrase a *bon mot* used by Professor Saintsbury in another connection, consisted in that subtle form of plagiarism which quotes what a man has said inserting a "not." And many of these in the deeper structure of their thought owed more to Professor Babbitt than they realized. Such a man was Walter Lippmann, in whose serious discussion of life you can discover the presence of Professor Babbitt on almost every page. As the years went on there were men, some of whom had studied under Professor Babbitt and some of whom had eagerly mastered his books, who became brilliant exponents of his tradition or at least acknowledged the profoundest debt to his thought. Such in different ways were Professor G. R. Elliott, Professor Norman Foerster, Dr. T. S. Eliot and Mr. Lawrence Hyde. Notable recognition came to Professor Babbitt from France and Britain and even in China young intellectuals set about relating his type of humanism to that of Confucius.

One of the last occasions on which Professor Babbitt appeared at a notable gathering was that on which he delivered an address on the Evangeline Wilbour Blashfield Foundation before the American Academy of Arts and Letters on the theme: "The Problem of Style in a Democracy." The date was November 10, 1932. The characteristic note of the author is struck in the opening paragraph: "It goes without saying that a man's style should have about it something highly individual; but it is at least equally important that it should have about it something structural, and this structural quality can arise only from the subordination of the uniqueness that each one of us receives as a free gift of nature to some larger whole." He quotes with approval Mr. Brownell's definition of style as that "factor

in a work of art which preserves in every part some sense of the form of the whole." And he quotes with a kind of fascinated disdain the lines of Carl Sandburg:

Go on talking.
Only don't take my style away.
It's my face.
May be no good but anyway, my face.

He comes to the heart of the matter when he says: "Style calls not only for fine craftsmanship—the verbal purity, for example, on which the early French Academy put such emphasis: it also bears a relation to one's total outlook on life. There is evidently a balance to be maintained between technique or outer form and inner form or substance. The failure to maintain any such balance is at bottom what Plato attacked in the sophists. One is sometimes tempted to look on certain contemporary professors of English who instruct ingenuous youth in the art of expressing itself before it has anything to express as in the direct line of descent from a Gorgias or a Protagoras." After paying high tribute to the treatise of Longinus on the Sublime he goes on: "The treatise maintains an admirable balance between the two main elements in style. It deals in minute detail with craftsmanship, at the same time it insists that literary excellence must arise primarily from loftiness of spirit. Longinus mentions as especially incompatible with this loftiness the love of money and the love of pleasure, vices which seem to have been rampant in his day as they certainly are in ours." Then drawing his sharp sword Professor Babbitt cuts straight to the heart: "I incline to believe that we are living in the most un-Longinian of epochs. What would seem to be lacking in an almost unparalleled degree, not merely in contemporary literature but in contemporary life, is the note of nobility. According to a recent English writer, many of the damned in Dante's Hell have a higher sense of human dignity than the race of mortals now above ground."

With cool poise Professor Babbitt is ready to undertake a difficult piece of mental surgery: "Our intellectuals have been devoting much energy of late years to denouncing 'Puritanism' and the 'genteel tradition.' They might have been better employed in considering how far the triumph of the utilitarian-sentimental view of life over the humanistic and religious traditions of the Occident has been in the general interest of civilization. The utilitarians and the sentimentalists have prevailed especially in the field of education, above all in this country. Let us reflect on what this means in the case of the most renowned of living American philosophers, Professor

John Dewey, whose influence is all pervasive in our education and extends even to China and Bolshevist Russia. Professor Dewey does not hesitate to identify experience with scientific experiment. It follows that immense areas of what the past had taken to be genuine experience, either religious or humanistic, experience that has been transmitted to us in consecrated masterpieces, must, inasmuch as it is not subject to test in a laboratory, be dismissed as mere moonshine."

So in one of his last public utterances Professor Babbitt upheld that conception of style which is based upon the combination of "elevation of general conception with technical excellence." So he declared that even in a Democracy—perhaps especially in a Democracy—we must use the whole cultural tradition of the world in securing standards for the present. And so he condemned those intellectual short cuts which make what comes to be a pseudo-science the substitute for critical intelligence.

III

In 1932 Professor Babbitt published his last book, *On Being Creative*. In the Introduction to this volume he deliberately sets about the task of recapitulating the argument he had put forth in his previous books. In a sense this is his final statement of his general position and it will be worth our while to look into it. It has been his lifelong labor to defend a "positive and critical humanism. The aim of the humanist, and that from the time of the ancient Greeks, has been the avoidance of excess. Anyone who sets out to live temperately and proportionately will find that he will need to impose upon himself a difficult discipline; . . . he recognizes in man a 'self' that is capable of exercising control and another 'self' that needs controlling" (pages XIV and XV). Professor Babbitt appropriates for the description of the higher will Walter Lippmann's reference to the belief that "there is an immortal essence presiding like a king over man's appetites." This capacity of a man to take sides with his higher self is the most significant matter in human life. Any attempt to interpret life in the terms of an undisciplined spontaneity is the contradiction of the real meaning of human experience. There is so much of this in our time that Professor Babbitt has found himself saying: "What is disquieting about the time is not so much its avowed materialism as what it takes to be its spirituality." He has no objection to the processes by which man gains control over nature providing he does not in the midst of it all lose control over himself. But the control of the uniformities of nature is one thing and the subjection of human impulse to the control of freely held standards is another. And

"even though the science be genuine it is largely irrelevant, as Pascal again has pointed out, in the realm of specifically human values. One can scarcely repeat too often his [Pascal's] distinction between the three orders—first, the order of material nature; second, the order of mind; third, the order of charity" (page XXVII). Professor Babbitt feels that in these supremely important matters there should be "a mobilization of the sages." "A philosopher who is not at this late age of the world highly eclectic may justly be viewed with suspicion" (page XXXVI). He objects to contemporary liberalism because "Its chief concern has been with throwing off rather than with taking on controls." "The modernist movement has many merits: but in so far as it has encouraged men to surrender their imaginations to ill-defined general terms (beginning with liberty itself) one may say of it as Burke said of the French National Assembly that its improvements are superficial, its errors fundamental" (page XLIII).

IV

A definite point in the struggle between the critical humanists and the apostles of surrender to lawless expansive emotion in the United States was reached when the publication of a symposium of clear and penetrating analysis entitled *Humanism and America*, edited by Professor Norman Foerster, led to a counterblast in which passionate condemnation was hurled at the believers in standards. Mr. Spingarn, for instance, in *Creative Criticism* "urged us in the name of creation to get rid of both inner and outer inhibitions and let ourselves go." It became clear in all this fierce contention that one chief objection to the critical humanists was a belief that their principles would dam up the creative stream if it would not exhaust it at its source. It was this objection with its specious plausibility with which Professor Babbitt was dealing in his essay *On Being Creative*. With his usual erudition he went back to the real beginning of such a discussion in an acute analysis of the central principles of Aristototele's *Poetics*. "Aristotle bends his whole effort to showing that imitation may be ideal, or as we should say, creative. It becomes creative in direct proportion as it succeeds in rendering the universal through the particular. . . . Aristotle's *katharsis*, the most discussed term in criticism, can only be interpreted rightly in the light of his doctrine of the universal. A great tragedy portrays passion and portrays it vividly; at the same time it generalizes it. The spectator who is thus lifted into the atmosphere of the universal tends to be purged of everything that is petty and purely personal in his own emotions" (pages 12 and 13). Professor Babbitt is not afraid of imitation if it is "as Joubert says

. . . the imitation of one spirit by another spirit and not of one book by another book" (page 14). Professor Babbitt takes the war into the enemies' country by his scornful reference to the type of creativeness which is characterized "not by its truth to the universal, but by its attainment of novelty" (page 5). There is a whole philosophy of criticism in the contention that a man who expresses a universal principle in a concrete situation has a perpetual element of freshness in the concrete situation, and a perpetual element of permanence in the universal principle. Through this high type of imitation a man attains the only nobly creative quality.

V

I first met Irving Babbitt a number of years ago. I had written a rather long article for the *London Quarterly Review*, analyzing the volumes of criticism which Professor Babbitt had published up to that time, attempting to set forth the essential principles upon which his thought rested, and his contribution to the interpretation of life and letters. The editor of the *London Quarterly* had given it the first place in a certain number of the *Review*, and it had fallen into the hands of Professor Babbitt. The result was a letter in which I was asked to lunch with the author at the Harvard Club in Boston on my first visit to that region. I confess that I looked forward with some anxiety to the meeting. It is something of an experience to look for the first time into the eyes of a man whose books you have been fairly devouring and many of whose ideas have become structural in your own thinking. And when I first saw the author of *Rousseau and Romanticism* I had a happy feeling that he looked as he ought to look and carried himself as became a master of that critical humanism whose cause is the cause of civilization itself. What was served at the luncheon I do not remember. But to my delight the conversation was unceasing. And there were about two hours of it quite without a pause. The ages of civilized thought seemed to come to life and move brilliantly about you as you talked with Professor Babbitt. His easily carried and amazingly massive erudition gave one a new conception of the meaning of the intellectual life. And as one looked and listened he had the sense of being in the presence of an Atlas of the mind who carried the weight of a whole world of thought upon his shoulders. Only once was there even a hint of bitterness in his words. We were speaking of Stuart P. Sherman, of his intellectual virtuosity, and of his desertion of the cause of critical humanism. Professor Babbitt was interested in the rumor that Sherman was not satisfied with what he found in Philistia and that at the time of his

death his thoughts were inclined to turn toward other paths. He spoke however in the quietest of tones one sentence which I shall never forget: "When I think of Stuart Sherman," he said, "I sometimes wonder how much an older man ought to give himself to a man who is younger." As we turned to another subject, I knew how deeply the sword had pierced. Perhaps it was natural that we spoke of Henry Adams. The contrast between the man who was unhappy because he never found in life anything greater than himself, and the man who won a quiet serenity because he found permanent standards, is part of the moral and spiritual history of New England. At last I tore myself away, taking a taxicab for Somerville, where I was to give an afternoon lecture to the New England Conference of the Communion of which I am a member. I realized too late that the nectar of this conversation had quite gone to my head. Luckily I knew thoroughly the ideas I wanted to express in this particular lecture. I said the words. But all my vital energy had gone into the two hours with Irving Babbitt. I have always felt that this was the dullest and most unkindled lecture I ever delivered.

I especially remember a visit with Professor Babbitt at his home off Harvard Yard. He was alone and once again we sat through luncheon and for a period afterwards with no third person sharing in the conversation. I felt particularly the mellowness of his mind, a mellowness which blended happily with the sharpness of his wit. I think all of his understanding students must have felt during the last years of his teaching, how finely he had escaped the mental hardness and rigidity which comes to some very earnest men as the years go by. He met quite triumphantly the particularly searching test of being able to smile at himself. There is a fascinating example of this, by the way, in the closing sentence of one of his later essays: "I can only hope that, in my magnifying of the critical function, I do not offer too close a parallel to the dancing master of Molière who averred, it will be remembered, that 'all the mistakes of men, the fatal reverses that fill the world's annals, the shortcomings of statesmen, and the blunders of great captains arise from not knowing how to dance.'" The conversation on this particular day moved about in the most fascinating way through many ages and many lands. Professor Babbitt seemed to have the literary output of civilized man at the tip of his tongue. We were speaking at one point of Dr. Paul Elmer More, whom he esteemed so highly. "When I had finished one of the volumes of the *Shelburne Essays* I said to More, 'You ought to pay more attention to religion.'" Professor Babbitt paused for a moment. Then he said, whimsically, "And see where he

has gone now." (Most of the brilliant volumes of *The Greek Tradition* had been published at the time.) Once again he was silent. Then he said: "I have never said all I have to say about religion." Greatly daring I replied, "And if I may say so, I hope you will not. Doctor More is speaking to the men who are ready to take the journey from critical humanism to religion. The men who are ready to believe in standards but are not ready to listen to the voice of religion need you *just as you are*. Critical humanism needs an Aristotle as well as a Plato." He greeted this only with friendly silence. In 1932 Professor Babbitt gave the Commencement Address at Drew University. He was in fine fettle that day. It was a delight to see the way in which he brought the principles of critical humanism within the range of thoughtful men and women who were in no sense specially equipped in the knowledge of the history of criticism. The address was full of the quiet and penetrating mirth of the mind. You felt that Professor Babbitt was the embodiment of that poise and urbanity, that sense of proportion and decorum for which he had been contending for so many years. Then there came the beautiful summer day when in the Harvard Memorial Church at the funeral service of Professor Babbitt I read the words in praise of famous men from the Wisdom of Ben Sirach: "Leaders of the people by their counsels, and by their knowledge of learning meet for the people, wise and eloquent in their instruction," and Dean Sperry read a noble prayer of Cardinal Newman, and with these additions to the ritual of *The Book of Common Prayer*, friends and students of Professor Babbitt reminded themselves of that which was gone and of that which remained.

VI

That which remains consists first of all of an influence exercised upon the minds of students and readers and leaders of thought for many years and in many lands. This influence has been increasing in potency for more than a generation, and while it is of course impossible to appraise or estimate its range with anything like adequacy, it is clear that it represents one of the definitely outstanding forces in the intellectual life of our time. And wherever there are students and readers of Professor Babbitt this influence is notably active to-day.

Then there are the books. *The Masters of Modern French Criticism* involves a journey of the mind through nearly a century and a half of French criticism. With all its clarity of thought the book has an almost sparkling brilliancy. Madame de Staël, Joubert, Châteaubriand, Sainte-

Beuve, Scherer, Taine, Renan, Brunetière, move through its pages. His gift for swift and telling expression is remarkable. "Joubert tends to see only the benefits of order, just as Emerson tends to see only the benefits of emancipation." "One way in which Sainte-Beuve avoided repeating himself was by renewing himself." "Brunetière lived neither for the senses nor the imagination, but solely for ideas." "Unless some new discipline intervenes to temper the expansion, cosmopolitanism may be only another name for disintegration." "The dilettante is an intellectual voluptuary."

The great masterpiece of Irving Babbitt was *Rousseau and Romanticism*. Of this book the Athenæum said: "We are almost compelled to declare that it is the only book of criticism worthy the name which has appeared in English in the twentieth century." Here the contrast between the surrender to expansive emotion and the acceptance of masterful discipline appears in its full significance. Romanticism represents a riot of voluptuous and undisciplined emotion. Classicism represents the way of obedience to permanent standards. But Professor Babbitt recognized the dangers of a conventional and pseudo-classicism. Indeed if Rousseau merely represented a reaction from a hard and mechanical and external convention, Professor Babbitt would be glad to welcome him. But he is the very symbol of the quest for delicate and exquisite emotions which accept no law but their own luxurious sense of freedom from restraint. Their law is to have no law. And here Professor Babbitt insists on the necessity of the *inner check* upon that structure in thought and expression which comes from the apprehension of universal standards and of obedience to their behests. But while he would not surrender to lawless impulse, however vital, he would not have the mind hardened to dull rigidity by mere convention. Hence his own watchword of Vital Control (*frein vital*). No man can go lightly through the pages of *Rousseau and Romanticism* and emerge with the slightest sense of what it is all about. But the man who will give it the sort of patient and industrious study which he is willing to give to Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason* will emerge with his whole outlook upon modern life and modern culture lifted to a new plane. The almost incredible erudition of the volume, the clearness and persistence and the subtlety of the thought, the pursuit of type after type of Romanticism to the ultimate quality of its meaning and expression, make the mastery of the book one of the outstanding intellectual experiences of a man's life.

Democracy and Leadership attempts to substitute for the iridescent dreams of the romantic imagination the sure insights of the moral imagination. Doctor Babbitt sees clearly the menace of a merely emotional democ-

racy. He sees clearly that Democracy, if it is to be permanent, must produce the aristocratic virtues. And he insists that a permanent order must be based upon a disciplined sense of justice rather than upon an undisciplined sense of sympathy.

The New Laokoon looks in upon that confusion of the arts which a lack of coherent standards makes inevitable. It seeks to inspire the production of an art ordered yet spontaneous, based upon clearly defined standards, yet luminous with vital energy.

Literature and the American College asserts that a study of the sub-human can never completely equip a man for human tasks. In the day when physics and biology are teaching us so much of importance about life below the human level, those humanities which study man's relations as a creature of free moving and critical intelligence become not less but more important. "The aim of Socrates in his training of the young was not to make them efficient, but to inspire in them reverence and restraint; for 'to make them efficient,' said Socrates, 'without reverence and restraint, was simply to equip them with ampler means for harm.'" The study of the products of man's free intelligence exercising its powers in matters of human and not sub-human relationships, is the defining matter in an adequate process of education.

It is only by a close and patient and thorough study of the books of Irving Babbitt that one comes to feel their full power. It is as he marshals his evidence and unfolds his thought, page after page, that its cumulative force is felt with something like the inherent power which belongs to the author's mind.

VII

Professor Babbitt's attack upon humanitarianism as distinct from humanism has often led passionate enthusiasts for social reconstruction to turn away from him. But by humanitarianism he meant that uncritical social sympathy which substituted an undisciplined emotion which had not taken the trouble to face all the facts, for a clear and unhesitating meeting of the social situation. In the long run his own conception of justice will probably prove a more dependable basis for social action than the most eager uncritical sympathy. So, though it can scarcely be denied that his fear of sentimentality in social enthusiasms led him to underestimate the significance of some leaders in social reform, on the whole his own clear and humanistic approach to the problems of society has possibilities of first class importance.

As to his relation to religion, it may be said that Professor Babbitt always felt that the leaders in the struggle for an authentic religion were his allies and not his foes. He was ready to say: "Between the humanist and the authentic Christian, on the other hand, there is room for important co-operation." (*Humanism and America*, page 37.) And he was ready also to say: "For my own part, I range myself unhesitatingly on the side of the supernaturalists." (*Humanism and America*, page 39.) It cannot be denied that he definitely feared the excesses of undisciplined religious enthusiasm. But he responded profoundly to that doctrine of grace which is the central matter in religion. And it was remarked in Harvard Yard that his best students were inclined to take the matter of religion very seriously.

VIII

If we sense the importance of Paul Valéry's caustic analysis of the modern Western mind as characterized by contradictory ideas and incompatible desires we are ready to see in what fashion Professor Babbitt brought to our time and especially to America just the quality of leadership it most needed. In the long last one is forced to admit that such men as he are not judged by the times in which they live. The times in which they live are judged by the response they give to such leaders. For the future of civilization itself depends upon our discovering vital energies which are ready to submit themselves to noble control, and upon our loyalty to standards which express universal principles and which glow with a creative quality which comes from the source of life itself.

The Spirit of World Politics¹

REVIEWED BY FRANCIS J. McCONNELL

PROFESSOR WILLIAM ERNEST HOCKING of Harvard is a foremost defender of all the essential values which Christianity holds dear. It would be hard to define his philosophic position precisely, but he is a theist with somewhat of the idealistic insight and power of James Royce, yet with a closer view of facts than Royce seemed capable of. In this discernment of the factual he is like William James, with something also of the James gift of striking and convincing phrase. His mind is more comprehensive than that of either Royce or James, while, like James especially, he seems to put the human in a central place and to keep the stress always on what we call, rather vaguely indeed, the human values.

From the background of high idealism and ethics Professor Hocking here makes a close approach to an important social problem. He lays down certain guiding principles in advance but makes it clear that while he states these principles at the outset he has not departed from the actual in formulating them. It is manifest that this book is written out of a world-view of a definite positive type. William James once said that the student who goes into a laboratory and stares about, without any presupposition or expectations, is the "veriest duffer." Professor Hocking did not visit the Near East to stare about. He took with him rational and human tests, but not abstract and artificial ones. He evidently conceives it to be the duty of governments to provide an opportunity for the fullest and best life possible under given circumstances, but he keeps before him not only that large and fine humanity, but the actual circumstances also. There is evidently a desire to make his solutions more than general statements. It is said among some of Hocking's friends that he has long withheld from publication a book on Democracy because he has felt that he has not been able to make concrete suggestions which have satisfied him on the color question in the United States. This statement has in it the marks of truth. In any event there is about the opinions of the book before us a ripeness which reveals close observation of men and events, and prolonged brooding over their meaning. The book comes out of altogether independent thinking. Of course, any writer is dependent on the transmission of facts for his conclusions and sometimes misses it in the selection of transmitters. In dealing with the Egyptian problem, for example, every allowance has to be

¹ *The Spirit of World Politics.* By William Ernest Hocking. New York: The Macmillan Company. \$5.00.

made for possible error in the transmitter—and very likely there is some error here. All the social groups dealt with offer intricacies and complexities hard for the outsider to judge accurately, but Professor Hocking has found enough for a treatment which is academic in showing the skilled mind's approach and yet human enough to reveal that human behavior in its social aspects indicates a surprising degree of like-mindedness everywhere. If the reader will pardon a ridiculously unworthy illustration, may I say that one evening, in a territory of that Near East of which Doctor Hocking writes, I crept up as close as I could to a group of Bedouins sitting around a fire talking—when they did talk—in low tones. I wished to be able to say that I had stood at a camp-fire of nomads and had heard them converse in tones like those of the patriarchs of Genesis. After I had made friends with two or three mangy dogs who guarded the group, I got close enough to see what was going on. It was not quite a meeting and converse of souls like that of Abraham's, Isaac's, or Jacob's—but a tense card game which to my uninitiated and inexperienced eyes looked like poker. At least these persons spoke and acted and expressed themselves—or rather failed to express themselves—like Americans whom I have seen playing poker.

After a series of special studies of the Near East, Doctor Hocking arrives at definite hostility to some current tendencies—hostility to any kind of determinism, especially economic determinism; then hostility to such relativity as to morals as would destroy the possibility of international ethical relationships—then hostility to the “pernicious theory that government has nothing to do with ethics or with general culture.”

We have heard all sorts of international conduct justified now and again by reference to the “backwardness” of certain states. Doctor Hocking's book is the first and only one I have ever known to try to find out and tell what such backwardness is. He sets up three standards to judge this backwardness: (1) the degree of mastery of nature, especially through scientific method, (2) public morality—in which the Western states have at times fallen so low as to beget disillusionment in the mind of the East as to Western civilization, (3) the condition of the common people. In stating this last standard the deep-searching observation is made that the attractive human flower of a civilization in its elite gives a sense of rottenness and unreality if it involves squalor, ignorance and serfdom on the part of the masses. In the consideration of these standards the author considers the Burden of Egypt, the Burden of Syria, the Burden of Palestine—with keen and discerning treatment also of mandates and colonies.

The last one hundred pages of the book are to me the most stimu-

lating, dealing with such fundamental problems as the ethics of inequality, nationally considered. What a tonic it is to read on page 509:

"The following propositions I deny:

"That western civilization must control the world or perish;

"That capital requires a market expanded by pressure regardless of the quality of the means used;

"That the rate of expansion cannot be controlled;

"That an honest and disinterested service to other states is impossible;

"That the amount we charge for our services to peoples backward in any respect must always be the maximum possible;

"That this charge must include political control. What I assert is that, in all these matters, the ethical question is pertinent, and ethical action within our power."

Doctor Hocking's book is in a fine and high sense Christian. If anyone doubts this, let him read this paragraph from one of the closing chapters of the book—that on "Is There a Moral Code for States?" The theme is forgiveness in international relations. Page 479.

Forgiveness "implies refraining from punishment when punishment is clearly merited. . . . It is the willingness to treat a fault as if it had not been committed, not for the sake of inaccuracy (and certainly not from fear) but for the sake of a firmer alliance with a presumed better will of the offender."

If this passage is not Christianity, pure and applied, individual and social, ideal and practical, it would be hard to tell what is.

Book Reviews

Christ and Human Suffering. By E. STANLEY JONES. New York: The Abingdon Press. \$1.00.

It isn't any wonder that the new book, *Christ and Human Suffering*, by E. Stanley Jones is enjoying a wide circulation. It ought to be read, not only by the clergy, but by the laity everywhere. A problem so baffling to the sufferer of ill and misfortune is here lit up with God's love, handicaps are transformed into blessings and fragmentary lives are redeemed and made into angels of light.

After reading this book no one need again ask the reason why souls are made great and why the world waits on the messages from men like the author. A life that is attuned to God and bows in humble submission to his will, plus a beating and yearning heart toward humanity in all its suffering, is bound to speak in terms that wake the harassed soul to new visions and turn defeated spirits into victorious personalities.

One chapter alone, "The Cost to God," is worth the price of the book. Here one feels that Doctor Jones in his characterization of God as a suffering God forever dispels the idea that God is unbending and Jesus tender and forgiving. In depicting the heartbreak of God toward his suffering children, he has done a service to multitudes of people who cry out in protest that God sits apart from the world and is oblivious to the distress and anguish of humanity. With clear and unerring insight Doctor Jones has given us the kind of God whom Jesus showed to men.

The author has not dealt with this perplexing problem of human suffering in the abstract or from the philosophical point of view. He doesn't argue. He declares that the "central fundamental tendency of the universe is love, and the cross is its illustration and consummation." He speaks out of a rich experi-

ence as one having authority and draws his illustrations from the lives of men and women who have made proof of the boundless love of God.

One who has passed through the dark valley of suffering and stands quivering and despairing can take up this book and be assured that all things work together for good to them that live in the light of God's eternal love.

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The World of Jesus. By HENRY KENDALL BOOTH. Charles Scribner's Sons. \$2.00.

THIS is a book of fresh interest and of lasting value for all who want to visualize the background of the life of Jesus. It describes with vivid and circumstantial detail the world in which he moved, with its geographical setting, its roads and towns, its people, and its manner of life. The author has drawn upon recent discovery and scholarship, which furnish the material for the imaginative reconstruction of the first century world, and he has used his material without pedantry and with skill in bringing the details into perspective. His style sometimes runs into enthusiastic superlatives which make it seem overwrought; but this fault is not sufficient to mar the main impression of his work. He has brought facts which are known to most people only in fragments into a new wholeness of understanding, and he has developed some subjects which are rarely known at all. One of the most notable of these is his treatment of the nature and method of Hebrew poetry, which illuminates many of the sayings of Jesus. The scope of the book is indicated by these chapter headings: "The Maelstrom of Palestine," "Cross Currents in Thought," "The Religious Background,"

"Nazareth," "By the Blue Lake,"
"Never Man So Spake," "Highways and
Byways," "The Crown and the Cross,"
"Jerusalem and Jesus."

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The Beginnings of Christianity.

Part I. The Acts of the Apostles.
Edited by F. J. FOAKES JACKSON
and KIRSOPP LAKE. Volumes IV
and V. Commentary and Addi-
tional Notes. By KIRSOPP LAKE
and HENRY J. CADBURY. New
York: The Macmillan Company.
\$5.50, each.

THE completion of this work on Acts is a notable achievement of co-operative scholarship making available the most thorough treatment of any book of the New Testament. Since Foakes Jackson brought out his own commentary in the Moffatt series, this volume was intrusted to Professor Lake. His collaborator is Professor Cadbury, whose valuable monographs on the Lucan writings made him the natural choice.

An English translation is printed with the detailed commentary in Volume IV making the work usable for that larger group who have "more grace than Greek." The notes are concise as well as thorough, happily unburdened with endless citations from other commentaries. Nearly forty detached notes on a wide variety of subjects related to Acts comprise the bulkier Volume V. Other classicists have also contributed to this volume which becomes almost a Bible dictionary for the Apostolic Age.

Foakes Jackson championed the Lucan authorship of Acts in his commentary, but in these volumes the traditional view is denied. Nevertheless, there is a very perceptible tendency toward greater conservatism than in the first two volumes in the series. For instance, hellenistic influence on Paul is surprisingly depreciated and the essential historicity of the

hearing before the Sanhedrin in chapter twenty-three is defended. Surely no one can complain that the authors do not maintain a judicious caution in their exposition of the many moot questions.

On the other hand, the ground is laid for not a few new conceptions of the apostolic age. The Schwartz theory that the journey in Acts 13-14 is a doublet of Acts 16 is tentatively accepted. Acts 9. 32 to 11. 18 should probably follow chapter twelve. The most revolutionary contention, however, is that no sound linguistic basis exists for assuming that the "hellenists" of chapter six were Grecian Jews. Parallels would rather indicate that the word means Greeks. Hence, the author of Acts may assume Gentile Christians in Jerusalem, and as early as the day of Pentecost. He would relate not the genesis of a gentile mission, but the continuous rejection of the gospel on the part of Jews and its acceptance by Gentiles. Whether his representation is true to fact is another matter. A distinct merit of the commentary is the continual distinction between what "Luke" and his sources intended to say and what the facts might be.

No student of the Apostolic Age can neglect these volumes which bring together all significant work in the field. Among the notes of most interest to the minister might be named those on The Holy Spirit, The Apostolic Council of Jerusalem, Paul's Controversies, and the Chronology of Acts, by Lake, and Roman Law and the Trial of Paul, The Speeches in Acts, and the Hellenists by Cadbury.

One impression that is left by these exhaustive volumes is the extent of our ignorance of the beginnings of Christianity. We see how many of the statements glibly repeated in small manuals are conjectures rather than facts. The History of the Apostolic Age is still to be written, and like the life of Jesus, it is one that cannot be written. But these

volumes contain the building stones for any attempted reconstruction.

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What Shall We Say of Christ? By
SYDNEY CAVE. New York: Flem-
ing H. Revell Company. \$1.50.

A KEEN, scholarly, illuminating examination of the testimony of the first Christians and of the Gospel records concerning Christ leads Doctor Cave to say of Christ that he is indeed the Son of God and both God and man in a sense that nobody can claim to understand fully. There is no doubt as to what Doctor Cave would say of the Master, in this little volume, which is one of "The Westminster Books." It is everywhere clear, positive, constructive, educative, and of exceptional value to the student and the minister.

In very compact yet adequate form, Doctor Cave describes the substance of the message of the first Christians who were articulate in history—notably Saint Paul, the author of the Epistle to the Hebrews, and the author of the Fourth Gospel. Doctor Cave wisely points out that scholarship and accurate information will not alone tell us what to say of Christ, and he constantly urges us to understand conditions in the day Christ lived, before we turn from these early records. In the same manner he deals with the Gospels, and in his refutation of several modern criticisms, which are fully and frankly faced, he is almost at his best.

This is as fine and helpful a brief outlining of the essentials of faith in Christ as one could ask. Sound and painstaking, conservative without dogmatism, confidently affirmative without arbitrariness and shallowness, it makes a delightful and enriching volume appealing to the beset and bewildered modern man

and a readily available source of information for the religious leader.

Upon reading it, the reader must ask himself two questions—namely, What shall *we* say of Christ? and What *will* we say of Christ?

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From Chaos to Control. By SIR NORMAN ANGELL. The Century Company, New York and London. \$2.00.

Is there a way out of the chaos in which the world is engulfed? Norman Angell, author of *The Great Illusion*, and brilliant expositor of current international problems, believes there is. And what is the way? In answering this question it is to be remembered that the author is not discussing the function of religion in modern society. There is, however, in this and other writings of Norman Angell, an implied dependence upon moral and spiritual values.

The author believes that the educator holds the key to the future. The politician can help, the economist and the diplomat can do their bit, but not until minds are remade will there be anything like peace and order in this troubled universe.

Mass ignorance—this is the stumbling block which imperils the progress of democracy and the attainment of national and international security. The author refers to an election in a certain English district where the successful candidate was lifted to political power because he had married a pretty actress, had killed seven Germans, and had kicked three goals. In other words, the people did not know what they wanted. And worse, they did not care about finding a cure for unemployment, nor improving the monetary system, nor evolving a better economic organization. Norman Angell might have added that a good many elec-

tions in the United States have turned upon issues of no greater significance.

What then is democracy to do? It must educate the people, educate them to initiate their own thoughts and to develop their own political, social, and economic philosophy. Only in this way will an enlightened statesmanship be given a free hand to determine policies upon the basis of facts. The prejudice and political hysteria that heretofore have molded national and international policy must now give way to a calm and dispassionate consideration by the electorate of essential world problems. This is a task of the home, of the school, and of the church.

WALTER W. VAN KIRK.

Secretary, Commission International Justice and Good Will,
Federal Council of Churches of Christ in America.

Personality and the Fact of Christ.

By HAROLD PAUL SLOAN. Nashville: Cokesbury Press. \$1.50.

Doctor Sloan has long been a doughty protagonist in defense of traditional theology. In this work he expresses his concern not for its "formalities," but for its "vitalities." He draws his vigorous sword not against higher critics or evolutionists, but against the deniers of personality and the supernatural. The book is an earnest and at times eloquent appeal for a view of Christ that will answer the deep needs of the human spirit and at the same time will be true to the data of the Scriptures.

The author distinguishes between the immediate facts of consciousness and knowledge mediated through the senses. He discusses the separate witness to the extraordinary characteristics of Jesus of the back-lying documents of the Gospels as scholars have analyzed them. The argument moves on to an acceptance of the Nicene theology as the only adequate explanation of the biblical data and as alone offering sufficient redemp-

tive significance for the tragic facts of human life.

One is gratified to find an active pastor and busy church counselor dealing energetically with problems of such profound moment when even in such serious days as these, many preachers are interested only in the superficial, the passing and the petty. There is still much need of protest against mechanistic conceptions of life which, while happily being rejected by philosophic minds, continue to prevail in popular thought. The personality of Jesus does fit into the spiritual aspirations of man with a conviction of finality which is inexplicably amazing. Doctor Sloan does well in emphasizing this correlation.

A captious critic could find many faults in the work under review. He might be inclined to annotate many sentences with *non sequitur*, and might append to many paragraphs *post hoc non propter hoc*. It might be granted that the triumphs of Christianity recounted by Doctor Sloan have been achieved through a church which has very generally held to the interpretations of Nicæa, but it still might be argued that these accomplishments possibly were made in spite of the church's schematic theology rather than because of it.

The early theologians fitted together the various conceptions of a great literature, the Bible, into a pattern of thought which has been so impressed upon the mind of Christendom that it is well nigh impossible to substitute any other without a damage to faith. This is the advantage which the conservative theologian always has. But whether this method of working together into a whole the unsystematic expressions of differing religious experiences with their accompanying mental fabrications is legitimate, and whether the particular pattern of thought of the redemptive scheme thus achieved corresponds actually to the reality of the Eternal Spirit in whom we live

and move and have our being and our redemption as well, are questions that persist when this particular reader lays down the book.

WILBUR V. MALLALIEU.

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Is Sin Our Fault? By STEWART A. MCDOWALL. New York: Fleming H. Revell Company. \$1.50.

THIS book offers new encouragement and support to the thinking Christians who are seeking an apologetic for the Christian doctrine of sin in the face of a widespread questioning, or too often complete rejection of the idea that man can and does sin and is therefore worthy of condemnation. The argument of the writer is philosophical, but like all good philosophy, it is supported by the accepted findings of several fields of science. In this case the contributing support comes largely from biology, with some help from psychology.

The author begins by listing most of the stock statements of those who believe that the Christian idea of sin has been exploded by the findings of modern science. Recognizing that "you cannot ask a single question whose answer does not finally involve the whole Universe and its relation to the Absolute" (p. 83), he begins at the beginning by defining God. He says that God is Creative Love, eternally active. Man is the object of God's creation, and the heir of his love.

The purpose of man's life is the achievement of perfect freedom that he may share in God's love. Perfect freedom is won when all an individual's activity, physical, mental, and spiritual, is the expression of an integrated personality. In seeking for the elements which form the ideal that will motivate such integrated activity, goodness must come first. Truth and beauty, the other two ultimates in the philosophical trinity, are worthy aids, but truth and beauty are concerned with man's relation to things,

while goodness concerns the relations of person to person, of man to man, and man to God.

Since love involves surrender, and since God is Perfect Love, He of necessity had to surrender to man the privilege of finding his freedom. When man permits some department of his life to direct his activity, thus thwarting to that extent the achievement of the integrating ideal, he sins. He not only sins against himself, or against the person to whom his activity brings some harm, but against God. For, to fail to guide himself toward the completeness for which he was created is to reject the Love which gave him birth, and rejected love brings the greatest suffering possible.

But hope lies still in the surrendering Love. God again surrendered himself in Christ, revealing his suffering, and appealing to man to put goodness first. To understand—to share—that suffering and to respond to that appeal, is the way of forgiveness for sin and the way of becoming the true child of God, the heir of his love.

The careful reader will find much of value, much to stimulate his own thinking, much of hope for the future of Christian philosophy. His one regret will be that lack of space limited the writer's full development of parts of his thesis, leaving some phases of his argument not always clear, and some questions not wholly answered.

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Laissez Faire and After. By O. FRED BOUCKE. New York: Thomas Y. Crowell Company. \$3.00.

IF any enthusiast thinks the problems in national economics faced in an effort to inaugurate some sort of national planning and control are simple, he should read this book. The author is a progressive but an economist, not an emotionalist. He seeks to find a way out of

the anarchy of the old *laissez faire* economy on grounds that may be found workable, taking into consideration the fact that old customs and laws change slowly, as does indeed the ability of the masses to accept change. Thus, while abandoning the old competitive, *laissez faire* order, or lack of order, he does not find an easy cure-all in state socialism.

He divides his treatise into three parts: In the first he analyzes the old *laissez faire* competitive system. In the second, he studies the possibilities of immediate reform. In the third, he examines the changes that must take place in economic theory. His pages are flecked with questions, many of which are not answered, but most of which will have to be answered in the course of attempted reforms. His multitude of questions reveal the complexity of the problem and the need of scientific and practical methods as well as theoretical concepts. The result is a book not easy to read, but immensely well worth a painstaking reading, especially if one thinks the New Deal is either an easy road to solution or a quack remedy bound to fail.

The gist of the treatment is about this: Invention, science, modern business organization and technical progress have effectually scrapped the old individualistic, competitive order. But we still work under laws and ethical concepts that belonged to that era; property rights are still paramount to human welfare, though property power has concentrated into the hands of the few. It matters little that the total of national wealth is great if the average of personal income is not high for the masses and there is no assurance of its continuity—*continuity of income for the common man is the greatest desideratum*. The old rights of property and contract must be revised. The business enterpriser has assumed priority and the management of finance and credit has taken control, resulting in a "vicious circle of large profits, expan-

sion and capitalization," with increasing interest charges and demands for profits to the detriment of adequate income for the millions, a loss of purchasing power, a production-profit economy as against a consumption-commonwealth economy.

There is no necessary relation between the advantages of technical progress and the modern type of business management. There is no necessary relation between risk and profit in modern business. There are very few "immutable economic laws," and both economists and captains of industry will have to abandon the assumptions of them held in the past. "Human nature is a social product," and the *laissez faire* individualism that sought to guarantee liberty of person and action no longer does so under a complex industrial organization, using specialization and machine, mass, standardized methods of production. The commercial system is mechanical, not vital, and the depression has proven it has no power inherent within itself to insure recovery. It will have to be mended through social insurance as an immediate medicament, national control as far as possible as a more lasting change in method, and a substitution of co-operation in the place of competition as the law of trade. The author believes this will have to be done under a continuation of private ownership, with an increase of public control, or else a resort to an experiment in state socialism, which, he believes, is impracticable.

ALVA W. TAYLOR.

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The Heroic Age of Science. By WILLIAM ARTHUR HEIDEL. (The conception, ideals, and methods of science among the ancient Greeks.) Published for Carnegie Institution of Washington by The Williams & Wilkins Company, Baltimore. Publication No. 442. \$2.50.

Plato's Atlantis. By WILLIAM ARTHUR HEIDEL. Proceedings of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences, vol. 68, No. 6. \$0.85.

EVERY student of Greek thought is aware that the philosophers were interested in varying degrees in science and that they made definite contributions not only to scientific theory and method, but to the stock of scientific knowledge. Consequently Professor Heidel's volume will appeal to the student of ancient philosophy as well as to those interested in the history of science. The author draws abundant materials from his intimate knowledge of the whole field of the Greek philosophical literature. As the scientist would anticipate, the Greek mathematicians are equally placed under contribution. It will, however, come as a surprise to many that Professor Heidel has found much of his most valuable material in the Greek medical writings. After all, the Greek physician was probably the nearest ancient approach to the modern man of science.

Wisely the author has not undertaken any narrative account of the origins and development of Greek science either as a whole or in any special field, but has confined himself to a topical treatment of concepts and methods. Consequently the volume constitutes a new and important contribution to the study of Greek thought. Fortunately Professor Heidel's vision is so clear and his style so lucid that the reader has no difficulty in grasping easily the important results presented. The volume is abundantly, but not excessively, annotated and there is a helpful index.

The student of antiquity never ceases to be amazed and fascinated as he draws one after another the curtains which have concealed the past to discover how much man had achieved at dates which are steadily becoming more and more remote. Man in the prehistoric and early historic times was constantly observing

the world about him and converting the results of his observation to usefulness. Unconsciously he was a scientific investigator, discoverer, and inventor. It is not, however, until the sixth century B.C., and in the Greek lands that man at last became a scientist. In the four succeeding centuries occurred the rapid developments which Professor Heidel has so skillfully analyzed. The scientist endeavored to formulate laws of nature and, with their aid, to systematize his further observations, to prosecute experiments, to correlate his results, and to discover additional laws.

The Greeks were not a numerous people and only a limited number of individuals in a few of their cities engaged themselves with scientific questions. Even though a few Greeks did wander to distant regions, the possible field of observation was narrowly circumscribed as compared with the present. There were few instruments to utilize in research, and those quite imperfect. Considering these narrow restrictions the progress effected by the ancient Greeks appears the more remarkable. The test of the value of their work is not to be found in its absolute amount of character, which at the present day may seem trivial, but in the fact that they were the founders of science, that they laid the bases upon which the whole later structure has been erected. It is true that many of their conclusions were erroneous, but recent investigations have shown that many conclusions regarded as established only a generation ago were also erroneous.

One of the earliest fields explored by the Greek scientist and one which never failed to interest him as it does the scientist of to-day was geography in the broadest sense of that term. As to-day, the geographer and the historian found much in common. Indeed the beginnings of geographical science and of historical knowledge were worked out by practically the same group of individuals,

conspicuous among whom were Hecataeus of Miletus and Herodotus. In his book Professor Heidel brings out clearly the significance of what he calls the historical-geographical tradition.

In his pamphlet on the Atlantis question he draws upon his ample knowledge of the literature which embodies that tradition to demonstrate with beautiful scholarly method the sources from which Plato derived his picture of Atlantis. Though Plato's Atlantis was never a reality but only a literary invention, it was created from materials existing in the stock in trade of Greek thought.

GEORGE MATTHEW DUTCHER.

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Christ and His Time. By DALLAS LORE SHARP. New York: The Abingdon Press. \$2.00.

I began reading this book, as I had other lives of Christ, expecting to find it more or less dry in spots, but not so. The opening sentence caught me and succeeding pages held me with the fascination of a fast moving novel. This uncritical account of Jesus' life reads like a romance, written in a style so fluid and elegant in its flow that it is difficult to lay it down before finishing it. The richness of choice in words and pleasing imagery is simply astounding. Take the opening sentence, only one of many:

"As the dawn faintly kindled on the summit of distant Hermon, then burst into flame from the highest pinnacle of the Temple, the priests, with a threefold blast of silver trumpets, woke Jerusalem to the life of a new day."

Such sentences abound on almost every page.

Like Ludwig's *Son of Man, Christ and His Time*, by Professor Sharp mirrors the Life of Jesus, as seen in the Gospels, following the usual "Harmony of the Gospel"; but it seems

to me that Professor Sharp comes closer to the spiritual significance and inner richness of the Great Man of all time. Both books are, of course, *interpretations* colored by the writers' respective beliefs about Jesus. They see him through glasses of different colors. Ludwig's is that of a Naturalist's point of view; that of Sharp's is stoutly Supernaturalistic. But admirably well done in its own chosen coloring.

Professor Sharp's book will be much more pleasing to the more conservative reader as it includes the most improbable miracles, such as the "Annunciations by Angels" and "Satan" taking Jesus to the "top of the Temple" in the "temptations." Nevertheless, one has a feeling that critical questions are pressingly present in the writer's mind but are skillfully suppressed for the sake of giving uninterrupted flow to the story and an unmarred impression of the snow-white Life he is presenting.

Aside from its literary charm and sustained spiritual tone the book's value is greatly heightened by being sprinkled generously with minute, detailed information about Palestinian life and customs to enlighten the reader. Professor Sharp shows a thorough acquaintance with Jewish background and history. In fact chapter four, "The World Awaiting Jesus," as a bird's-eye view of late Jewish history, is the most graphic and informing short account that I have ever read. This chapter is worth the price of the book.

One comes upon sections now and then dipping deeply into theological defense of a point of view, which seems out of place, if not unfortunate, in so admirable a book. As for instance on page 62, where the author pleads the right of temptation in "Jesus' human nature" and the power of overcoming it in his "divine nature." As to Jesus' person, this has tangling implications that the writer could have avoided.

But aside from such occasional sallies, the book is tremendously stimulating and at the same time unusually informing and inspiring. It is richly suggestive to ministers, teachers of religion, and to youth, and not over critical in regard to niceties of modern interpretations of religion.

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The Meaning of Right and Wrong.

By RICHARD C. CABOT. New
York: The Macmillan Company.
\$2.50.

WHAT for want of a better term may be called project writing has several advantages, of which the sustaining of interest easily tops the rest. Not even James Truslow Adams, who increasingly embraces this style, is more of a master of it than Doctor Cabot. The result is that these pages are exceedingly easy to look at! The author has many achievements to his credit. He teaches both social ethics and clinical medicine at Harvard. His writings in both fields are among the best. Never did his trusty pen stand him in better stead. Clear, crisp phrases; unique expressions; a flair for illustrations and a rigidly logical outline make this book a work of art. If for no other reason than its power in pedagogy, this book should be read and mastered by preachers and teachers.

Convinced that it is high time for us to put up better moral collateral, he argues for ethics as the keeping of agreements. No child's play, this! Only one agreement can rightly be deemed absolute—the agreement to face the facts and do our best. Perpetually there must be “the honest endeavor to keep our agreements—explicit and implicit—until they are dissolved by the consent of all concerned.” “Principles are agreements with ourselves.” But even our “principles” need watching! Ethics, if it knows what it is about, does not rest con-

tent with the domains of consistency and growth, but stays on trail of self-deceit. It is in its relentless baring of our self-deceit that this book majors. “Our desires are good when they are in line with the authoritative need to grow, bad when by self-deceit they diverge from it.” There can be no end of our moral muddle or our spiritual depression until our needs for security and growth get out from under the yoke of the bondage of our self-deceit. Hence a “good” desire and a “righteous” will mean not only that these have been formed “in view of all the facts, present and future, that appear to bear on them,” but that we include among these facts that generous array of whims and prejudices belonging to us which, along with our ideals, we extol as our “principles.”

The familiar tricks of self-deceit: offering moral alibis, saying “not just now,” or “just this time,” persuading ourselves that whatever advantages we have we are properly entitled to, or “convincing ourselves that we are nobody,” do not exhaust the list. Pretending unselfishness, or an inability to see; claiming autocracy; disguising “sloppy thinking as liberalism”; the thirst to get something for nothing; invoking the law of self-preservation—these, and more, must be added if the sway of self-deceit in our lives is to be clear. Easy slogans—“law and order,” “be socially considerate,” “desire only what is attainable”—display still further the defects of our deceit.

In any work on ethics, one expects sections on right and wrong; and if the writer has a nose for values, a discussion of supermorals may also be looked for. But in this book there is a unique section on implementation, particularly designed to circumvent self-deceit. Nowhere will you find more effective suggestions as to how “to put teeth into ethical laws,” how to operate “ethical brakes and tractors,” and how to “clear the deck for action.”

Ethics ought to be "true to the kindred points" of philosophy and psychology. Brightman's *Moral Laws* contacts the first; Cabot's book, the second. The perusal of these two books will give one a comprehensive view of the ethical situation to date.

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The Way of Escape. A Challenge to the New Generation. By SIR PHILIP GIBBS. New York: Harper and Brothers. \$3.00.

THE title of this book is very enchanting to serious-minded students of present world conditions. The way of escape from the economic, social, moral and mental break-down of modern civilization is sought by thousands to-day who are anxious to help mankind out of the world-wide quagmire into which all nations have plunged. The author, as in most of his other works, has written in a clever and scintillating style. Sincerity is apparent on every page and one lays down the book after reading the last line with the feeling that here are strong, vigorous proposals—at times emphatically prophetic of radical changes of a world-wide nature—which cannot be passed over lightly.

While some of the proposals as to the way out of our present troubles smack of Utopia, an unbiased reading leads one to the conclusion that the author has written with a world vision, a comprehensive understanding of world problems and an international attitude of mind that is stimulating and refreshing. He throws out a challenge to the youth of to-day to build a new world society along lines that are so radically different from the old order of things that it will send a shiver down the spine of all who believe, aside from a little patching here and there, in maintaining the *status quo* as the best bet for human prosperity and happiness. The author of that soul-

stirring, disillusioning war book, *Now It Can Be Told*, has, in *The Way of Escape*, written his greatest book and one of the most thought-provoking books that has come from the press in recent years—dealing constructively with the problems of modern civilization.

The first four chapters, "World Bewilderment," "The Break-Down of Intelligence," "Money, Men and Minds," and "The Machine-Driven World," are a discussion of world conditions and causes back of them—a critical study of the weaknesses of modern life and practical and constructive suggestions for building up the wasted places. The fifth chapter, "The Invasion of Women," although readable and interesting, is by far the weakest in the book, and, excepting a few short paragraphs, contributes little or nothing to the main line of thought. The sixth and seventh, "Life and the Land" and "Empty Places," put forth plans and suggestions of a fanciful nature and yet are invigorating mentally, and challenging to the adventurous. Here many daring souls will find new food for thought which, when carefully digested, will make them even more daring in their efforts to get mankind out of old ruts. The chapter, "Peace or War," with its critical analysis of the "Peace Treaty" which sowed dragon's teeth all over Europe, is worthy of more than one careful reading. It is full of disillusioning facts and is a challenge to youth to stop the "silly" thing, war, or meet the fate of the victims of the World War, which he describes thus: "The common men, the rank and file, the victims and martyrs of war, were at the mercy of a few brains playing for high stakes far behind the lines and utterly callous of the mass of human agony wallowing in the mud, crouching beneath high explosives, waiting for death, dying." The author's *The Way of Escape* here appeals to the reviewer as sane and practical, a challenge to all intelligent people, especially to intelligent

youth, who must build the new society. The last two chapters deal with the place of the individual in society and the goal—happiness and prosperity—both of the individual and of society, and are thought-provoking, mentally stimulating and inspiring to a very high degree.

The book is worthy of very careful reading and should be in the library of every minister, educator and every student of our depressed civilization.

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The Life of Jesus. By MAURICE GOGUEL. Translated by Olive Wyon. The Macmillan Company. \$6.00.

THE most prolific writer on the New Testament among French Protestants is Maurice Goguel. The culmination of more than twenty years of work upon the gospels is to be found in his *Life of Jesus*, which fortunately appears in English only a year after its original publication. Here the reader will find the most competent attempt in our generation to do what an increasing number of scholars assume to be impossible, that is, to give a connected account of the ministry of Jesus.

The key to the problem of any life of Jesus lies in the evaluation of the sources. Goguel agrees with form-criticism that the earliest tradition was fragmentary and that the framework, even of Mark, is secondary. Yet he believes that the main outline may be reconstructed by critical procedure. The most original feature lies in the use of the Gospel of John. The Johannine "taboo," of which Canon Raven complained, does not restrain Goguel, but the critical results of the French scholar will please the English theologian as little as the conclusions of those who find historical material only in the Synoptics.

Goguel distinguishes between the the-

ological teaching of the Fourth Gospel and certain historical references which stubbornly refuse to fit the point of view of the evangelist. From John 3. 22 to 4. 3, the author discovers a period before the Galilean ministry described by Mark when Jesus himself practiced baptism. He might have been looked upon as a renegade disciple of John the Baptist until his withdrawal to Capernaum. It was the opposition of Herod which forced the withdrawal of Jesus from Galilee. As long as he still hoped that he could return to Galilee, he remained in concealment in the north. John 7 recounts the final departure of Jesus to begin a new ministry in Judæa. This lasted from the Feast of Tabernacles to the Feast of Dedication, after which Jesus retired to Perea until the eve of Passover. Mark has telescoped these two visits and introduced an artificial scheme confining that ministry to less than a week.

[The problem then arises of distributing the various Jerusalem events in Mark over the two visits. Goguel here prefers John at many points; he believes that the cleansing of the Temple simply arose from a word spoken at the first visit in answer to John 10. 22. The decision to seize Jesus was taken before his return to the city and was not delayed long after his entrance, which was accompanied by a messianic demonstration. The Romans collaborated in the arrest; the only real trial was before Pilate, where Jesus was condemned on a messianic charge.]

Goguel fully recognizes that the teaching and ministry of Jesus were oriented against the eschatological expectation of the kingdom of God. Objection may well be taken against some of his psychologizing. Too much is made of the exact wording of Luke 17. 25, but his presentation is a wholesome corrective to the non-messianic interpretation

of Jesus which has been popular in certain circles in America.

Most readers will feel a lack of balance at many places; there is actually a longer discussion of the form of the teaching of Jesus than its content. But it must be remembered that the author has a strictly historical purpose and he should be read with that in mind. Whether he agrees with the author or not, the careful reader will profit from this full survey of the problems of the life of Jesus. The extensive treatment of the literature makes the volume valuable for reference. It should humble every careless minister, who bends texts to fit his homiletic desires, to be exposed to the enormous amount of study that painstaking scholars have devoted to the gospels in order to make Jesus of Nazareth more truly known.

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Does Science Leave Room for God?

By R. O. P. TAYLOR. Nashville:
Cokesbury Press. \$1.25.

THIS readable and thought-provoking book impresses one who is somewhat familiar with both religious ideas and ideals and the methods and content of science, as pleasing, plausible, but not altogether convincing. Science as a spring-board from which to leap into the realms of theology is good enough, but if the spring-board is weak or improperly adjusted, the dive may be unsatisfactory.

That science has advanced religion through its discoveries and at the same time has developed a new type of mentality to deal with the truth is well brought out by the author. But to say that there must be room for God in science else there would be two sets of impressions—one of God and one of Nature—is a weak argument. Is it not better to say that there are now two sets

of impressions, but they are but phases of the same idea and that science and religion both fill the same room? This thesis would in my opinion be a better basis for a full discussion at once acceptable and convincing.

Furthermore, to say that the miracle of the crossing of the Red Sea is more acceptable to the scientist than to the classical scholar because it suggests to him One who can handle the laws of nature without breaking them, does not appeal to a scientist. Such is not a scientific statement. The scientist would not deny, however, that it was possible that some law was working then which he has as yet not discovered, and that his mind is, in the very nature of the case, open on the subject of miracles.

Again, to say that since science does not recognize morality, beauty, or love, it makes it necessary to leave room in science for religion is no argument at all.

The author is on solid ground when he says that matter once thought simple, now complex, shades off into energy and may end in mind. That very line of investigation will undoubtedly be one of the great fields for the science of the future.

Throughout the eight succeeding chapters the author attempts to show that our ideas of a Creator, a Lawgiver, a Judge and a Merciful Father, all have their counterparts or similar realities in science. Moreover, he holds that the contemplation of God in the rôles mentioned above has developed ideas of him as a distributor of justice, a sender of the Incarnate Logos, the Spirit, and there have resulted evidences of the fruits of the Spirit. From a theological viewpoint the above is logical, but their counterparts in the realm of science are difficult to find. To assume that such entities are to be found in science because we believe them to exist in theology is unwarranted. To assume that they exist as entities in the-

ology in order to prove that they exist in science is also unwarranted.

That science does not do away with the idea of a Creator is true, but to say that the discoveries of science have made the acceptance of a Creator easier is not so evident. It is much easier to say that science discovers law, that law predicates intelligence and that intelligence may create.

The author next claims man as a creator carrying on the work of the Creator. The fact is that man is rather a manipulator of laws and principles—he uses them to his own ends. Further, the statement of the author that evolution is a proof of a Creator is no proof. His statement does predicate an urge—the *Urkraft* of the Germans—which, governed by law (an expression of intelligence), has resulted in the evolved forms before us. But the scientist cannot discuss the causes of the urge, which well may be Mind. That is outside his realm.

God as a Law-Giver can be paralleled in science only to the extent that science recognizes law as the basis of its investigations. But to say that the monotheistic idea of the Jews was a great step forward for science and one of the fundamentals of its development is not convincing. Science, if it accepts God (and it does), never begins with him. It begins with facts and arrives at God through those facts and the laws governing them.

Furthermore, to say that all things are possible in theology because things once thought impossible in science are now accepted facts is a weak plea. Nor is it true that because Einstein has evolved formulas which bid fair to explain the laws of the universe, it follows that mind is dominant over matter. It shows rather that mind recognizes law in the universe, which may be a recognition of Intelligence ruling the universe.

The old idea of a God as judge meting out punishment to us who err has given away to such a broader view of the

universe and God that it is held by some that man now justly feels himself so insignificant that he must escape punishment. This may or may not be true. But the author points out that because man is the highest product of evolution, is carrying on the process, believes in the unity of the universe, has a conscience, he cannot pretend to such insignificance as to secure release from punishment. This seems to me to be both poor theology and poor science.

From the standpoint of justice, God being just, man must be taken seriously, since God is responsible for him. Therefore, man must have special treatment. Justice demands not only punishment but also equal opportunity. This is good. The austerities of life have developed man, new controls will still further develop him. Moral law did not exist before he appeared on earth. The natural world has co-operated with man in correcting wrongs. Adaptation to law is a rule among living things. All of this, according to the author, is an *exact parallel to the operation of moral judgment of God*. This may be good theology also, but I believe that it has no real counterpart in science.

A merciful Father is well exemplified by the fact that man is discovering plants that cure his ills, that bodily repair is possible, that restoration and compensation, that the care of the weak, that parentage, instruction of the young—all are part and parcel of justice tinged with mercy. This is possible. But it is not convincing to the scientist.

To say that the *Urkraft*, the urge of life which is an expression and evidence of mind, has caused life forms to adapt themselves to their environment and in so doing have developed the ability of self-repair, restoration and compensation would be nearer to the viewpoint of science. The immediate result is adaptation, self- and race-preservation.

In discussing the Incarnate Logos, the author states that creation is the product

of an Intelligence, that the realm of order opens up wider fields as science proceeds, that life and mind are best studied in close association with matter, that matter offers opportunity for expression and that the discussion of truth should be in accordance with scientific procedure. This is praiseworthy. It is real science. Would that the author had carried this idea out throughout the whole work.

The author, unfortunately, uses these statements as a basis for arguing that God became incarnate in the flesh in the person of Jesus Christ. This has no parallelism in science excepting to say that life once appeared in matter and finally evolved in man.

Again, the author states that mind may be underlying all matter; that mind existed before man appeared; that now man perceives unity in the universe, controls evils, co-operates with Nature, sees the pattern which never changes and because of *this there must be a likeness between the mind that PERCEIVES unity and the Mind that CONCEIVED unity*. This is excellent logic but I submit, poor science. It is possible. It is plausible. But it is not scientific. Science has no room for this kind of a parallelism. Science does not make comparisons between the material and the spiritual. It observes phenomena. It comes to no conclusions through pure logic.

Finally, under Marks of the Spirit, the author argues that life is a gift. It appears intelligent—the mark of a gift. Cells co-operate, organs in the body and men in society show fellowship. Morals are engendered through the spirit of love, the result of fellowship. Choices in mating, the development of arts, of Grace, even Revelation—all appear in an ascending order as marks of the spirit *and as an exact counterpart of the process of evolution illustrating intelligence behind matter*. All of which is possible, but it is not convincing. Finally, to say that the fellowship of the Holy

Ghost thus begun in the lowest forms of life and ending with the Communion of Saints, is a mark of the spirit is logical but certainly not scientific.

To a man with religious experiences this book is stimulating. As a man of science it leaves me cold. I cannot bridge the gap between the foundations of Science and Religion afforded me by this treatise. The foundations appear to me to be obscure and insecure; the bridge weak.

Had the author assumed physical, chemical and bio-chemical phenomena as expressions of law which predicate intelligence and then shown that the Urkraft (urge) of life which is an expression of law and intelligence, had resulted in all we know of life to-day, including its theological implications without attempting to show their counterparts in science *per se*, the results would no doubt have been more convincing.

Does Science Leave Room for God? There is no doubt of it. Both have all the room they want. Both can occupy the same room without crowding or friction. For God expresses himself to us as law and as truth. Science seeks to discover laws and the truth. Science seeks God because it seeks the truth.

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Scientific Theory and Religion. By
ERNEST WILLIAM BARNES. New
York: The Macmillan Company.
\$4.00.

THE substance of this volume of some seven hundred pages was given in the Gifford Lectures of 1929. To its preparation the Bishop of Birmingham devoted six to eight years. Few are the theologians who have earned a doctorate in Science in Cambridge University or any equivalent school, of which there are not many. The result is a book of

encyclopedic learning upon the world described by science and its spiritual interpretation.

One half of the book sets forth the mathematics by which the author supports his conceptions of space, time, matter (which he describes as congealed energy) and radiation. Perhaps this is as it should be in this day of Jeans, Eddington and Einstein. Bishop Barnes adopts the motto of Robert Boyle, "Mathematics is the alphabet in which God wrote the world." He endorses Roger Bacon, "He who knows not mathematics cannot know any other science, what is more, he cannot discover his own ignorance or find its proper remedies."

Fascinating as an invitation to ascend to the stratosphere is the lure to follow the algebraic equations by which, for instance, Riemann's theory of space is presented. The language is ever lucid, the arguments faultlessly cogent. The author addresses himself to educated men and women who have no technical knowledge of science or philosophy. By his pq - qp 's of tensor calculus he succeeds in making this reviewer feel more ignorant than he has ever felt in the reading of a book. Possibly others may also be a bit dismayed by this section of the book, and I am wondering whether such abstruseness is necessary and whether we would not have known that the author is probably the most learned of present-day divines without the exhibition of mathematical erudition.

The utter loyalty to truth for which Bishop Barnes has suffered is evident in his scientific discussions. He asserts that the God we worship and whom we know in personal experience has also indisputably made revelation of himself in physical nature. The positions at which he arrives are interesting and instructive. "I confess that I can form no satisfactory understanding of the process which led to the creation of matter, as we now know it, save on the assumption that some

Cosmic Artificer has been at work, with the result that we can observe, even in the building of raw matter, creation according to plan." He holds that at some time the living emerged from the non-living, probably as a result of some synthesis of carbon, hydrogen and oxygen under the influence of the sun's ultra-violet rays. He believes that biological research will prove a virgin birth to be possible. He thinks that life exists throughout the whole cosmos and that in many places its development has reached stages immeasurably in advance of that attained by man upon the earth.

In his discussion of personal religion, Bishop Barnes is delightfully simple and amazingly orthodox. Why he should be denounced as the most militant of modernists is not apparent in this his greatest volume.

Stalwartly he contends that "the new knowledge of our era should not lead to skepticism or to religious indifference." Belief in God as Christ revealed him is in no way inconsistent with acceptance of the standpoint created by modern science. The moral and intellectual essentials of the Christian outlook will survive any temporary eclipse.

Here and there Bishop Barnes takes positions with which this reviewer cannot agree, as where he states, "the natural conclusion from the evidence now available is that God is primarily transcendent and only immanent to a very limited degree in so far as his creatures share his nature and serve his plan."

In the main he follows the ideas and arguments of Rashdall and with no less evangelical emphasis. "Of late the evangelical churches seem to have lost some of their enthusiasm for conversion. Unless they can recapture the spiritual power of which it is the essential outcome they will die. Churches die of respectability, just as they become a nuisance through superstition."

"I should even hesitate to affirm dog-

matically that petitions for rain or fair weather were necessarily unavailing. Until we have proved that the physical cosmos is a closed system there is no theoretical reason why God should not harken to such prayer. I would pray for a friend's recovery from sickness with the knowledge that such prayers are often of no avail and yet with hope that God in his goodness would grant my petition. At the same time I recognize that to learn God's will, and to accept it with a submission in which there is no resentment, form a chief object of prayer."

Bishop Barnes argues strongly that belief in a purposive God and belief in immortality stand or fall together. "On earth man has no permanent home and if, as I believe, absolute values are never destroyed, those which humanity carries must be preserved elsewhere than on this globe."

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From Faith to Faith. By W. E. ORCHARD. New York: Harper & Brothers. \$2.00.

DOCTOR ORCHARD'S *From Faith to Faith* records the genuine struggle of a soul for truth. Whatever may be said of the passing from the Protestant to the Roman fold, one knows the agony of it. No Apologia can be lightly regarded, especially that of an incisive and brilliant thinker. The story is intensely interesting—it has the flavor of real pioneering—the argument, however, particularly the latter chapters, is unconvincing. Evangelicalism of Nonconformist flavor, so deeply rooted in Doctor Orchard's career, doubtless accounts for the defense complex so manifest. This by no means assures one of the finality of this unique pilgrimage.

There is an inevitable impression of accommodation in the terms of subscrip-

tion to Catholic demands, and a strained attempt to justify the logic and sincerity of the Roman Church in her unyielding claims of supremacy. There is no questioning the writer's sincerity, but to claim that sacramental doctrine, that is, transubstantiation, "reposes upon the scientific conception of matter," and that this doctrine "should be no stumbling block to the modern physicist," is open to grave question.

Doctor Orchard states that he never regarded the Weigh House as more than an experiment that "could not exist for long without either creating confusion or ending in collapse." The Weigh House testimony goes far beyond the basis of experiment. An interim pastorate of that church a summer ago revealed a quality of life and faith unparalleled in my experience. The record of that which Doctor Orchard calls an experiment, measured by devotion and sacrifice, makes the validity of orders insignificant, and ornateness of ritual secondary. This experiment produced the desire to become prophets and priests. It brought forth slum workers, missionaries, prison chaplains, and consecrated Christian business men. No argument for Rome could make the Christ spirit more real, nor validity of orders add one iota to the effectiveness and worth of such a ministry.

Doctor Orchard, on dining at the College of Propaganda, referred to a skim milk past and a creamy present. To quote, "I have been living on skimmed milk, and now I am getting the cream." One cannot forbear the observation that "skimmed milk" has worked wonders if history be true. Prophets have subsisted on such a fare, and reformations have thrived on this disciplinary diet. The claim that Protestantism has shattered the "unity of Christendom, put civilization on the wrong path, and left humanity so hopelessly confused and divided," makes one wonder what would have hap-

pened if Luther had not been born. Rome is indebted for survival to the heretics from John Knox to Wesley.

The book leaves one with deepened conviction that each must proclaim the truth in "His Own Tongue." We are eclectics by nature, and truth is to be found in the most unexpected places. Doctor Orchard's stand makes any ground of compromise impossible, and Church Union unthinkable. Reunion will come more likely through the recognition of unity in diversity. All systems of truth are broken lights of the God who made them, and must be respected if personality is to endure.

Doctor Orchard has told a frank and courageous story. It is refreshing to find a great scholar and humanitarian questioning after truth until it cuts to the quick. Moreover, it is delightful to discover a priest of God and our living Lord who puts yearning before popularity, and adventure above preferment. The book should be read by a wide circle of readers. This Apologia may not convince, but it will inspire. The spirit of the cross is in it and the loneliness of a great pain.

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The Christ of the Christian Faith.

By W. DOUGLAS MACKENZIE.
New York: The Macmillan Company. \$2.00.

I ACCEPTED the task of reviewing this book rather casually, expecting it to be only "another" book about Jesus. I found myself fascinated and compelled to read on to the very end. Here is an author who greatly believes in Jesus and yet has an open mind where so many who believe have seemed to feel it necessary to shut and bar the door against many of the conclusions of historical criticism and of experimental science. The book therefore has the

lure which belongs supremely to the literature of successful quest. Very familiar is the spectacle of men who have taken the torches of history and science and have arrived *nowhere*. Equally common, the sight of men who have stood up amid the shadows of obscurantism and have tried by huge noises to convince the world that they did not need to *arrive* because they have always been there. Our contempt of the latter is matched by our pity for the former. We have read so much of both that our temptation on picking up any new book is to ask first of all concerning the author: "Does he get anywhere? Did he ever start?" and if the answer is in the negative, to turn to more promising guides. Doctor Mackenzie has not been afraid to make a wide circuit in his intellectual and spiritual travels and he has not been without his joyous discoveries. And as he invites us to accompany him in retrospect, we find ourselves willing companions.

He does not for a minute share the views of those who assert that Christianity could exist independent of the Jesus of history. Christianity arose, he declares, "from the discovery by a new community that the living God had entered into, had actually invaded their individual lives, that this invasion had taken place in the personality of Jesus, and had become a personal experience through faith or devotion toward Him." And he is convinced that if we "compel or allow, from any historical force or consideration, any Christian community to lose its assurance of the forgiveness of sin through Jesus Christ . . . that eternal life is the destiny of man, that the historical Christ is the known and living eternal Controller of that destiny"—then the community will "disintegrate."

He shares the view of the Barthians that we must "cease to think of religion as man's act in the search of his nature for God," and that "to know God is to

meet the revelation of God's will with a decision of man's soul." But he criticizes the movement because "in fear apparently of the failure of criticism to agree upon details in the life of Jesus, they find the Gospel to consist in God's acts of redemption through the death and the resurrection of the incarnate Son of God, *without attempting to consider more closely the actual manifestation of the divine nature of Christ in his earthly ministry!*"

To that earthly ministry, the author turns. Recognizing all the historical problems involved, he nevertheless believes that we have presented to us a very clear picture of the consciousness of Jesus, and he concludes: "Conscious of being the Son of God, making the strange name Son of Man beautiful forever, pouring out wisdom unsurpassed, love divine, pity tender and pure upon friend and foe alike, and going to the cross under the burden of sins, not his own but of all mankind—it is He who founded the Church." The ardor of his conviction is forcefully expressed again and again in language which many of us share and of which we can quote but a few sentences: "The fact is that they (certain scholars) have surrounded the meager historical image, which they have rescued and refashioned out of mere remnants of the synoptic gospels, with the halo of that Lord Jesus Christ by whom the church was founded. They would spiritually perish if those remnants were all, but they live in the afterglow of a sun that has set, in the love and adoration which were never created except by a Redeemer and Lord. May it be for the men of our generation a brief mid-summer's night!"

The author's final conclusion is a familiar one. "It is the Deity of Christ with all its vast and glorious mystery which is the simplest explanation of historic Christianity." But if the conclusion is familiar it is not trite or commonplace nor is the process by which it is reached

"old stuff." The book is alive and athrob with the modern spirit, but that spirit is chastened with a reverence for history and informed with an experience of God through Christ without which one will go very far astray in his search for reality.

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The Doctrine of Redemption. By
ALBERT C. KNUDSON. New
York: The Abingdon Press. \$3.50.

WHEN Dean Knudson published *The Doctrine of God* he intimated that it would be followed before long by a volume on the more specific questions of Christian doctrine. The present volume is the sequel we had been led to expect, and it is every way worthy of its predecessor. For those who are familiar with *The Doctrine of God*, this will be commendation enough. We find here all the qualities we have long been familiar with in anything that comes from the pen of Dean Knudson. The scholarship is ample; the historical positions are fairly and adequately stated; the biblical teaching is fully considered and the interpretation impresses one as eminently sane; and everywhere there is a fine loyalty to the great traditional emphases of Christianity, without, however, the least suggestion of subservience to any shibboleth.

Dean Knudson, as we should expect, considers Christian doctrine, and in particular the doctrine of redemption—which he regards as practically inclusive of all the rest—from the standpoint of the personalistic philosophy. This gives to his treatment a certain comprehensiveness and unity which revive the best traditions of systematic theology. Assuming the conclusions arrived at in *The Doctrine of God*, Dean Knudson devotes the first half of the present volume to a consideration of "The World, Man, and

Sin." The philosophical nature of his mind is everywhere apparent in this section. There is plenty of evidence of familiarity with recent thought in the fields of science and psychology. The chapters dealing respectively with Freedom, Suffering, and Sin are closely reasoned. Dean Knudson is uncompromising in his insistence that apart from freedom we can make nothing at all of the moral problem; indeed, there is no moral problem. The discussion of Sin is unusually strong. In its rejection of original sin and total depravity, it will hardly please the thorough-going traditionalists, and one notes a curious hesitation on the author's part to accept the "certainty" of sin even although he fully recognizes its "universality." He writes: "That complete abstention from sin was not made easier is no indication that God purposed its existence as a part of his world plan" (p. 270). If, however, we accept the Divine Omniscience on the one hand (and Dean Knudson appears to do this), and the universality of sin on the other, it seems difficult to escape the conclusion that all of God's "planning" as regards man was determined from the beginning relative to the certainty of sin.

The second half of the book deals with the Person and Work of Christ, and with the actual effecting of redemption in human life. Perhaps the most satisfying chapter in the book is the one that treats of the Person of Christ. Dean Knudson believes that the traditional Christology is calling for revision, but he nowhere compromises the reality of incarnation. He believes that Christianity, both historically and empirically, is utterly unintelligible apart from the truth

that "God was in Christ reconciling the world unto himself." He offers an effective and unanswerable criticism of mere humanitarianism. That in Jesus Christ God did something for men, and that according as men find God in Christ they find "redemption"—this he believes to be the indubitable testimony of history and experience. This does not mean that we are tied to some one "theory" of either the "person" or the "work" of Christ. As a matter of fact, Dean Knudson offers a trenchant criticism of the traditional theories. His own sympathies are with "the new Christology" which "sets aside the idea of two component natures and thinks of the unitary personality of Jesus as uniquely dependent upon the divine will and as standing in a unique relation of personal interaction with the Divine Spirit." As a result, Jesus is "both the ideal man and the perfect organ of divine revelation" (p. 325). The "work" of Christ is to be understood accordingly: it was "the natural expression of his personality" (p. 339). He did the kind of work that such a person as he was would naturally do.

In a word, Dean Knudson seeks to "personalize" the Christian redemption. He would release it from the domination of the mechanical and the abstract. It is not too much to say that he has succeeded in his purpose to a marked degree. He has shown that "the Christian redemption" is not only experientially satisfying but also that it is capable of the soundest philosophical statement and defense.

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Bookish Brevities

Some one and a half million volumes of the works of John Burroughs have been sold. The most popular titles are *Wake Robin*, *The Summit of the Years*, *Field and Study*, *Winter Sunshine* and *Riverby*.

President William A. Neilson, of Smith College, himself no mean master in the use of language, in conferring the degree of Doctor of Humane Letters upon Willa Cather, described her as unsurpassed among contemporary authors in her mastery of English prose: pure, firm and melodious.

Fortunately, the alarming rumors about the misfortunes of Professor Julius Richter, D.D., under the Nazi administration are unfounded. He is due to land in New York on October 20 for several speaking engagements. An article by Professor Richter will appear in the winter issue of RELIGION IN LIFE.

The Publisher's Weekly announces a decrease in three years of about 30 per cent in the production of books. History decreased 12 per cent; fiction, 15 per cent; fine arts, 23 per cent; religion, 25 per cent; poetry and drama, 30 per cent; biography, 34 per cent; juveniles, 42 per cent; travel, 44 per cent, and general literature 55 per cent. In this past year of severe depression there has been an understandable reduction in books on psychology and a considerable increase of books on economics and sociology. Social conditions suddenly have become too antagonistic to permit much time for introspection.

Lax of Poplar is one of the most skilled of city missionaries and also one of the most interesting of platform speakers. R. Moffat Gautrey observes that jaded

audiences instantly revive under the breeze of his genial optimism and stimulating faith. David Christie in *The Service of Christ*—a good but not excellent book, the distinguished editor of the *British Weekly* to the contrary notwithstanding—quotes one of Lax's inimitable stories. He was paying a pastoral visit upon Billy the costermonger, who had lost his voice by laryngitis. "Thank ye, for coming, Sir," said his wife, "I know'd you'd be sorry, cos ye're like Billy, yer both earn yer livin' with 'ollerin'."

After thirty-seven years of service in the New Testament Department of Garrett Biblical Institute, Doremus Almy Hayes, author of the famous "*Heights*" series, has retired and will reside in California. Among the many tributes that were paid to the distinguished teacher, that of Dean Charles R. Brown is outstanding. "I had very rewarding associations with many of my fellow-students, but the most precious of them all was the close friendship of Doremus A. Hayes. No man of my generation has helped me so much in the living of a Christian life."

Mr. C. F. Andrews, who is widely regarded and occasionally disliked as one of the most devoted personalities of the age, has written another book, *Christ in the Silence*, which will soon be published in the United States. It is written in response to the comment of his friends that his other book, *What I Owe to Christ*, is objective and needs to be complemented by a book dealing with his deepest inner experiences. Discerning Christian scholars think this new book may secure a place among the spiritual classics of the ages. After its completion, Mr. Andrews slipped quietly away to India where he is reported to have had

more than anyone else to do with the decision of Mahatma Gandhi to break his fast.

In a surpassing study of *The Life of Sir William Osler*, Dr. Frank G. Porter states that his "Bedside Library" had much to do with making him the broad-minded, spiritually-minded leader of the medical world. Doctor Osler advised medical students to start at once a bedside library and spend the last half-hour of the day in communion with the saints of humanity. "There are great lessons to be learned from Job and from David, from Isaiah and Saint Paul. Taught by Shakespeare you may take your intellectual and moral measure with singular precision."

Doctor Osler's "Bedside Library" consisted of The Old and New Testaments, Shakespeare, Montaigne, Plutarchs' Lives, Marcus Aurelius, Epictetus, Religio Medici, Don Quixote, Emerson, and The Breakfast-Table Series of Oliver Wendell Holmes.

Dr. Dinsdale T. Young has long had the reputation of having the largest Sunday evening congregations in Great Britain. For almost twenty years he has been the minister of Central Hall, Westminster, London. In his reminiscences he speaks with gratitude of those who urged upon him in his youth the importance of giving constant attendance to reading. Nothing is surer to me, he asserts, than that ceaseless reading is absolutely necessary for the continuance of pulpit effectiveness. Often have good and earnest preachers withered because they have not nourished themselves with vital books. Next to not having altogether failed of the grace of God there is nothing I am so thankful for as my retention of the love of reading. Could I gain the ear of young preachers—and my heart is lovingly toward them—I would entreat them to lay all fields of

literature under tribute at every opportunity.

A reviewer in an able Boston religious weekly has not a little to say commendatory of a recent volume of sermons by Ernest Fremont Tittle. He then adds "This little volume of sermons is very readable and cheering, but perhaps somewhat lacking in depth. It is filled with a great love for humanity but seems a bit too easily optimistic in its outlook. It is like a refreshing shower in the midst of a summer's drought, but for lasting refreshment something more penetrating than a shower is needed. Of intellectual meat there is not much for anyone who is deeply steeped in the modern mood, but very much of value for many millions of troubled, but not keenly critical minds."

To all who know the forthright, deep-ploughing, straight-furrowing mind of Doctor Tittle, these "buts" are as close an approach to humor as can with propriety be admitted to these columns.

An English edition of *Charles Wesley: Evangelist and Poet*, by Frederick Luke Wiseman, has been published. The book is hailed with much delight as the book of an author who has published so little though he has been capable of publishing so much. When Doctor Wiseman received an ovation upon assuming the Presidency of the recent Methodist Conference, he responded by singing Charles Wesley's—

"My soul, through my Redeemer's care,
Saved from the second death I feel,
My eyes from tears of dark despair
My feet from falling into hell.

"Wherefore to him my feet shall run,
My eyes on his perfection gaze,
My soul shall live for God alone,
And all within me shout his praise."

The Nazarene of Colonel H. Stanley Todd has become a famous picture. E.

Stanley Jones regards this virile, radiant portrait as the most adequate portrayal of the Christ for believers of to-day. Dr. Ralph W. Sockman writes in his characteristic, brilliant style, "I entered a darkened room where, in solitary impressiveness, hung Colonel Todd's picture of the Galilean Christ. That figure so arrestingly modern, with its light hair and blue eyes transported me into another world—a world of noisy men made quiet, a world of worried men made calm, of sinful men made pure, of hopeless men made confident. And when I came out again into the confusion of the New York streets it was not quite the same as when I entered . . ."

Some do not find these superlative values in the picture. Few fail to be impressed by its reverential influence upon the crowds when it is placed upon exhibition. May it not be that Protestantism has unduly confined its ministry to those of ear-responsiveness, to the neglect of many whose sensitivity is in the eye?

A critic said of Joseph Conrad that he suffered from gout and unwritten books. Mrs. Pearl S. Buck confesses to the latter malady. She asserts that she cannot be happy without writing novels, quite irrespective of whether they are read or not.

Fiction writers, Mrs. Buck affirms, are driven by one of two concepts. They are either obsessed by an extraordinary situation between people or by some character or characters. To the latter class, she belongs. People crowd her mind. When she begins a novel she must push back the eager throng. This one and that one cries out, "Look at me! I've been waiting through the past two books, aching to be expressed. Can't you use me yet?"

Mrs. Buck believes that life and not the delineation of abstract moral theories

is man's best teacher. She announces as her writing creed, "I believe in life, tragic, gay, glorious, incomprehensible life. I believe in human beings and in the good and evil mingled in us all. I believe in art and in keeping art to its one holy use, which is to portray faithfully, as only the purest art can, life itself and life only."

There are more than ten thousand biographies of Napoleon Bonaparte. There promises to be as many of John Wesley. For interest in the most influential spiritual leader of the English-speaking race is on the increase and there are collections of material which have not been exhausted.

Maldwyn Edwards has written a brief book which discusses the social and political influence of John Wesley. It contains more unfamiliar factual material than is to be found in the several other recent books on Wesley. Some of this material will surprise those who know only the Wesley of the burning heart and not as the pamphleteer who pronounced Queen Elizabeth to be as just and merciful as Nero and as good a Christian as Mahomet.

The doughty John is portrayed by Dr. Edwards as a Tory of the Tories in his profound distrust of the people. Vigorously he led in opposing the American Revolution, believing as he did that the greater the share the people have in government, the less liberty, civil or religious, do they enjoy. So pioneering was he in humanitarianism, that the author declares it is almost true to say that Wesley discovered the poor. He adds that if to the Evangelical Revival belongs the credit of the abolition of slavery, then Wesley is the father of that abolition, for he made possible the Evangelical party and continued to be the guide, counsellor and friend of its leaders.

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